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The studies in this dissertation – concerning inter-firm R&D collaboration, patent 
production and sharing, and electric power infrastructure – will illustrate the influence of 
path-dependency on outcomes delivered by policies stimulating innovation in the lighting 
sector. This dissertation will build upon prior findings in path-dependency studies by 
applying path-dependency to distinct policies: collaboration-enhancing policies, patent 
licensing requirements, and lighting subsidies paired with emissions regulations. In doing 
so, the studies will highlight the social factors that influence lighting innovation. Just as 
the dominance of the electric lightbulb was not produced from a good idea alone – needing 
trade cartels and patent attorneys to achieve just its initial growth – so too do contemporary 
ideas for changing the way we illuminate the world rely on resources far greater than new 
technology ideas alone. In highlighting factors that frustrate the aims of contemporary 
innovation policies towards lighting, this dissertation aims to inform the design of future 
innovation policies such that future policies may account for influential factors and design 
strategies that nullify or take advantage of such factors to enact change. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Solid-state lighting (“SSL”) is a promising new technology that policies have sought to develop in 
the hopes of achieving widespread lighting innovation, but such policies are at risk for having their 
hopes flustered by path-dependencies. SSL technology replaces filaments or fluorescent gases 
used in conventional lighting devices with semiconductor materials that emit light when 
electrified. SSL technology has several advantages over conventional lighting, including superior 
energy efficiency, longer useful life, and greater customizability in terms of the quality of light 
output. Policies have sought to develop SSL technology through direct policies, such funding of 
SSL R&D, but also through policies that favor R&D in general such as policies fostering R&D 
collaboration between firms. Policies have also pursued lighting innovation by directly subsidizing 
energy-efficient product adoption and generally penalizing energy-intensive devices through 
limits on emissions from the electric power sector. Despite the goals of such policies, however, 
many factors can lead to a continuation of current circumstances – new technologies can remain 
undeveloped and new products can remain un-adopted. Such factors can include consumers’ 
history with certain products, the inherent capabilities of firms performing the R&D, and 
infrastructure designed to support the incumbent technology. Scholars refer to these factors as 
“path-dependencies,” a name referring to the fact that such factors are often grounded in history. 
The history of the compact fluorescent bulb (CFL)’s failure to transform conventional lighting 
markets and the many path-dependencies that led to CFL’s failure serves as an example that path- 
dependencies can indeed fluster policy hopes for lighting innovation (Sandahl, Gilbride, Ledbetter, 
R.Steward, & Calwell, 2006). 
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To help lighting innovation policies avoid being flustered by path-dependencies, this dissertation 
seeks to provide insights where path-dependencies may arise and how to work around them. This 
dissertation analyzes three policy areas that have been essential to the development of SSL 
technology and SSL-driven lighting innovation – inter-firm R&D collaboration, patent licensing, 
and emissions regulation. These three areas constitute the most significant ways policy has 
attempted to shape the development of SSL technology and wider SSL-driven lighting innovation. 
In each area, the dissertation applies a path-dependency analysis seeking out latent factors that 
frustrate policies pursuing innovation. To do so, the dissertation starts with a literature review of 
studies on path-dependencies affecting R&D and energy infrastructure, the latter being relevant to 
emissions regulation. The dissertation then presents three chapters, each detailing a separate 
analysis of path-dependencies in one of the three policy areas. 
 
1.1.1 Chapter 3: policies for inter-firm collaboration and SSL technology development 
 
The study presented in Chapter 3 analyzes path-dependencies affecting policies that support inter- 
firm R&D collaboration by exploring the break-up of a SSL-R&D-focused joint venture. In the 
late 1990s, Philips and Hewlett-Packard (HP) created an important private sector investment in 
SSL technology development through the short-lived Lumileds joint venture. Lumileds sought to 
combine HP’s optics expertise with the lightbulb product design and manufacturing knowhow of 
Philips. Lumileds represented the most significant private investment in SSL R&D – the joint 
venture stood at the cusp of a growing SSL market with a dominant market share and a long 
technological lead relative to competitors. Moreover, the policy environment of the late 1990s 
supported inter-firm R&D collaboration and encouraged the Lumileds joint-venture. Despite such 
a positive environment for Lumileds, however, HP abandoned the joint venture after six years and 
discontinued SSL product R&D. Given the importance of Lumileds to privately funded SSL 
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technology development and the supportive policy environment for Lumileds, Chapter 3 seeks to 
understand why the disruption of Lumileds happened. Chapter 3 provides a path-dependency 
analysis to the history of Philips, HP, and Lumileds so as to reveal specific factors behind Lumileds 
disruption. Chapter 3 seeks to offer lessons for policymakers by identifying factors that can disrupt 
inter-firm R&D collaboration and thus slow technology development. 
 
1.1.2 Chapter 4: patent licensing policies for federally funded SSL R&D 
 
The study presented in Chapter 4 analyzes path-dependencies in policies toward SSL patent 
licensing that seek to promote knowledge-sharing. The US federal government has provided most 
of the world’s funding for SSL R&D through the US Department of Energy’s Solid-state Lighting 
program (DOE SSL). However, the DOE SSL’s funding has come with requirements that funded 
researchers provide patent licensing privileges to a specific set of SSL industry firms. The patent 
licensing privileges constitute a form of “compulsory licensing,” a term for policies that require 
patent-holders to grant others the right to take actions that otherwise would infringe on the patent. 
However, scholarly evidence raises an issue of whether compulsory licensing policies can lead to 
the suppression of actual R&D. For example, a 2013 assessment of the DOE SSL program by the 
National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine recommended that the DOE SSL 
program end its patent licensing policy on the grounds of negative impacts to SSL R&D activities. 
Such negative impacts could prevent SSL technology from being developed, contrary to the goals 
of the compulsory licensing policy. Given the importance of the DOE SSL program’s patent 
licensing policy and the risk of negatively impacting R&D, Chapter 4 analyzes to understand what 
impacts the DOE SSL program’s policy has had on funded researchers. Chapter 4 seeks to offer 
lessons for policymakers on how policies toward R&D funding and toward R&D sharing – with 
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patent licensing being one mechanism for R&D sharing – can be structured so as to encourage 
R&D sharing without discouraging R&D production. 
 
1.1.3 Chapter 5: Climate change mitigation policies and SSL product adoption 
 
The study presented in Chapter 5 analyzes how regional differences in response to climate policies 
can help or hinder the benefits of SSL adotption. A key driver of R&D for SSL light bulbs has 
been the hope that SSL light bulbs and other SSL lighting products will contribute to the goals of 
climate change mitigation policies.. The superior energy efficiency of SSL products has long been 
connected with hoped-for reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. Frequently, however, policies 
for combating climate change are implemented at a nation-scale and fail to account for key 
differences between US regions. Policies such as the US wind production tax credit and the US 
solar investment tax credit, for example, have applied to the entire US despite the fact that certain 
regions do not enjoy much potential for taking advantage of such policies. Moreover, the 
differences between US regions in impacts of policies related to SSL product adoption constitutes 
a gap in scholarly knowledge. Where studies have paid attention to the role of efficient products, 
they have failed to analyze regional differences and SSL products’ role in particular (M. Brown, 
Kim, Smith, & Southworth, 2017). Given the importance of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse 
gas emission reductions to the efforts to fund SSL technology development, as well as the potential 
for policies promoting SSL products to ignore regional differences and inefficiently allocate 
resources, Chapter 5 seeks to understand regional differences in the interactions between SSL 
adoption and climate policies. Chapter 5 seeks lessons for policymaking regarding where and how 
it may be most effective to stimulate SSL product adoption in the name of climate change 
mitigation benefits. 
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1.2 Contributions to academic debates 
 
Beyond informing policymaking, the studies in this dissertation make contributions to path- 
dependency theory on par with contributions made by published academic journal articles and 
filling crucial gaps in the literature. While the important factors revealed through the path- 
dependency analyses presented in this dissertation have important implications for policymaking, 
the dissertation’ studies contribute to path-dependency theory through unique applications of path- 
dependency to new areas. As will be shown in Chapter 2’s literature review, academic literature 
on path-dependency contains several crucial gaps in terms of how and to what topics path- 
dependency analysis has been applied. Each study presented in this dissertation involves an 
original and novel application of path-dependency analysis and thus expands the scope of the 
theory. Moreover, as shown in Chapter 2’s review of literature on path-dependency, published 
academic journal articles frequently serve the purpose of using path-dependency analysis to 
contribute a new factor that explains failure to innovate. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 of this dissertation 
perform exactly that task and thus make contributions on par with published journal articles. 
 
Chapter 3’s analysis makes contributions on par with published journal articles by expanding the 
domain of path-dependency theory to the new topic of joint ventures and brings novel content to 
the theory by focusing on entire firm histories. As written in Chapter 3, joint ventures have been a 
common topic of research in the management science and business history fields, but these fields 
have not applied the path-dependency analysis framework to exploring the causes and effects of 
joint ventures. The path-dependency analysis framework has only seen one application to joint 
ventures –a study by Pajunen & Fang (2013), which focuses on the beginnings and endings of joint 
ventures between Finnish and Chinese firms. However, Pajunen & Fang’s study only focuses on 
how early events during a joint venture’s history create lock-in effects that influence events later 
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in that joint venture’s history. Pajunen & Fang’s work does not examine the histories of the 
respective firms coming to the joint venture and does not incorporate those histories into 
explaining outcomes of a joint venture. This leaves a gap in the literature – an application of path- 
dependency that examines the whole history of firms involved in a joint venture. Chapter 3’s 
analysis fills this gap by applying a path-dependency analysis that encompasses the whole scope 
of Hewlett-Packard’s and Philips’ respective histories. In so doing, Chapter 3 provides a 
contribution to path-dependency theory similar to that made by several published academic journal 
articles by contributing Core Capabilities as a new factor that explains the failure of joint ventures. 
 
Chapter 4’s analysis contributes new explanations to academic debate by not only exploring a 
novel topic but also by bringing path-dependency analysis to that topic for the first time. Chapter 
4’s analysis is novel without the addition of path-dependency in that Chapter 4’s analysis studies 
a compulsory licensing policy for a specific technology. Compulsory licensing most famously 
occurred in WTO negotiations that require multi-national pharmaceutical corporations to grant 
small firms in developing nations the right to make drugs and medicines patented by the multi- 
nationals. Most scholarly literature on the impacts of compulsory licensing has focused on this 
example of compulsory licensing – most of the attention given to compulsory licensing in 
academic journal articles centers on the WTO negotiations. Conversely, very little attention has 
been paid to the effects of policies within a specific country focusing on a specific sub-domain of 
R&D such as SSL. As such, very little is known about what impacts these more focused policies 
may have. No study focuses on a technology-specific compulsory licensing policy. To this new 
area of research, Chapter 4 brings path-dependency theory for the first time. No prior study has 
used the path-dependency framework to analyse patent licensing, and so Chapter 4’s analysis 
expands the domain of path-dependency theory to include not just patent licensing, not just 
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compulsory licensing, but compulsory licensing of patents in a specific technological domain. 
Beyond meeting the novelty of application standard, Chapter 4 also meets the standard of a 
published academic article on path-dependency theory by contributing Appropriability Regimes 
as a factor explaining failure to innovate. 
 
Chapter 5’s analysis contributes to the literature on path-dependency in energy systems via 
implementing a new paradigm of forward-looking path-dependency analysis. As shown in Chapter 
2’s review of literature on the path-dependencies in energy systems, the literature’s published 
academic articles apply path-dependency retrospectively. All studies reviewed involve a historical 
examination of energy systems’ evolution, taking advantage of time that has passed and revealed 
causes and effects. None of the studies provides a forward-looking approach that could inform 
policymaking before policies are implemented. As shown in the works by Alan Porter and others 
on forecasting technology pathways, however, path-dependency analysis can indeed be applied 
prospectively. The literature on path-dependency in energy systems has thus lagged the literature 
on R&D policy by failing to employ a forward-looking approach, leaving a large gap for future 
work. This is especially important given the strong path-dependencies present in energy systems 
– these strong path-dependencies make the need for analyses that can advise policymaking 
prospectively all the more immediate. While there is much potential for forward-looking 
applications of path-dependency in energy systems, Chapter 5’s analysis helps to fill this gap. 
Moreover, Chapter 5 makes contributions to the literature on par with published academic journal 
articles. Chapter 5 contributes several counterintuitive findings that reject reasonable hypotheses 
(and common policymaking assumptions) about how energy systems would behave under 
expanded adoption of SSL. 
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1.3 Terminology: Distinguishing “innovation” from “technology development” 
 
Importantly, this dissertation chooses carefully its use of the terms “innovation” and “technology 
development” so as to avoid performing a common conflation of activities that advance certain 
technological products with activities that change the way human civilization meets fundamental 
needs. Typically, writings on “innovation” portray an interlinkage between some technological 
research activity and the fulfillment of basic human needs. Such writings may have the effect (and 
may intend to have the effect) of convincing readers that support for technology research activity 
is critical to meeting basic human needs. This dissertation disavows that illusion. From human 
history, it is clear that any specific technological research activity is not necessarily critical to 
meeting human needs. To mitigate the possibility of propagating false ideas among readers, this 
dissertation provides definitions of innovation that separate it from technological research 
activities. This dissertation uses the term “innovation” to refer to a widespread societal change 
grounded in technology for producing common services. This work uses the term “technology 
development” to refer to humans working to arrange non-human objects so as to beget a new object 
that reproducibly provides some service.1 As an example, a horse alone is not a technology – it is 
a non-human object. But arranging a horse with other non-human objects for the reproducible 
production of some service, e.g. combining a horse with a saddle or a buggy to provide 
transportation, constitutes a technology. Moreover, getting horse-and-buggies widely adopted, 
having roads made specifically to accommodate horse-and-buggies, and developing common 
social customs grounded in the horse-and-buggy such as Sunday rides constitutes transportation 
innovation. More relevant to this dissertation, a piece of dead tree trunk (a plant) is not a 
 
1 Authors of peer-reviewed publications use different definitions for innovation and technology, and they often 
don’t define either term clearly. Here, the intent is to provide a clear definition so that readers could assess how 
well the terms in this dissertation match what they have read elsewhere to better their own understanding. 
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technology. But chopping the tree trunk into smaller pieces, arranging them with other materials 
for combustion, and organizing all this into a pile to provide light (and heat) is a technology. And 
widespread adoption of fire pits, including social customs such as dancing and feasting at fire pits, 
constitutes innovation. 
 
For this dissertation, the key example of widespread technology adoption and social customs 
grounded in that technology is the electrification of lighting. Lighting has been mostly provided 
by the sun and wood fires over human history, yet at the time of this writing most lighting is 
provided by a variety of devices all making use of electric power. The story of Thomas Edison’s 
first electric lightbulb and subsequent worldwide electrification of lighting in the late 1800s and 
early 1900s is often offered as the explanation for how we got from there to here. However, 
Edison’s invention of the filament bulb alone does not constitute innovation according to the 
definition used in this work. Rather, Edison’s invention constitutes technology development. This 
work frequently contrasts “technology development” with “innovation” because many policies 
promise innovation through technology development and in reality primarily support technology 
development without looking to innovation. 
 
Important factors influencing whether a technological development leads to innovation are 
revealed through analyses grounded in the Path-dependency Theoretical Framework. As 
mentioned above, many policies attempt to create innovation by targeting technology 
development. As will be demonstrated throughout this work, however, far more than technology 
development alone is necessary to achieve innovation. The path-dependency theoretical 
framework presumes that many factors hold the status quo in place, and that altering only one 
factor – say, changing the incumbent technology – will likely not be sufficient to create innovation. 
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CHAPTER 2.  REVIEW OF PATH-DEPENDENCY STUDIES AND THE 
HISTORY OF SOLID-STATE LIGHTING R&D 
 
2.1 Literature on path-dependencies in R&D and energy systems 
 
In search of answers to the research questions raised in Chapter 1, this dissertation first turn to 
published academic literature on path-dependency and its applications to R&D and energy 
systems. Since the first two questions raised in chapter one concern technology development, we 
review the literature on applications of path-dependency to R&D activities (recall that this 
dissertation defines technology development to consist of most types of R&D activity). Since the 
third question concerns energy systems, we review the literature on applications of path- 
dependency to energy systems as well. 
 
While this review of literature on path-dependency in R&D and energy systems reveals helpful 
insights about the general nature of path-dependency in both areas, this review also highlights 
critical gaps in the literature for purposes of answering the dissertation’ research questions. This 
review outlines those gap as the motivating and justifying context for the original research to 
follow in the next three chapters. 
 
2.1.1 Path-dependency and R&D in firms, regions, and sectors 
 
Many works focus on firm-level or industry-level R&D innovation, finding local branding and re- 
deployment of existing institutions to be useful strategies for breaking out of R&D path- 
dependency. Importantly, a study by Pajunen & Fang (2013) applies path-dependency analysis to 
a sample of technology-focused joint ventures between Finnish and Chinese firms. Pajunen & 
Fang’s study focuses on how early events during a joint venture’s history create lock-in effects 
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that influence events later in that joint venture’s history. Nelson & Winter (1982) provide a 
theoretical framework analyzing the importance of the routines and structures an R&D-intensive 
firm sets out at the beginning of its existence in determining the later responses of the firm to 
changes in the firm’s business environment. Analyzing knowledge-management practices within 
firms, Coombs & Hull (1998) find that some practices do more than others to enable firms to 
innovate and break out of path-dependency. As an example, Aylward (2006) argues that adapting 
innovation activities to local concerns, such adapting the Australian wine industry’s centralized 
R&D governance to needs for regional branding of wine products, can disrupt path-dependency 
and restore innovative activity. Moreover, Strambach (2008) finds that firms can innovate even in 
the face path-dependency, for example in the face of institutional environments favoring an 
incumbent technology. Using the coined term “Path Plasticity,” Strambach argues that agents can 
re-deploy established institutions away from incumbent technologies and toward innovative ends. 
In studying the lighting industry’s diverse portfolio of products, Onufrey & Bergek (2015) 
elaborate that some self-reinforcing activities can also reinforce other activities, while other self- 
reinforcing activities can inhibit other activities. The former can lead to situations in which 
multiple self-reinforcing activities exist – i.e. a multi-path scenario – while the latter leads in 
general to a single self-reinforcing activity. 
 
Taking reinforcing patterns and scenarios to the regional level, path-dependency analyses also 
commonly focus on innovations in regional policies toward R&D, finding integrating and cross- 
boundary collaboration activities as helpful means for breaking out of path-dependency. In the 
case of regional innovation, Cooke (2005) argues that breaking out of a region’s economic path- 
dependency requires integrating the regions innovation and education systems, which among other 
things benefits technology transfer within the region itself. In a similar manner, Pylak (2015) notes 
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several internal factors that contribute to the propensity of an entity to break out of a path- 
dependency in the context of regional economic growth. Pylak finds in general that high level of 
knowledge and competency enables regions to break out of path-dependency more often than 
regions with lower knowledge and competency levels. Examining the regional innovation system 
of Germany’s Baden-Wuttemburg province as a specific example, Baier, Kroll, Schricke, & 
Stahlecker (2012) find that routinized innovation activity structures do not by necessity promote 
path-dependency because they do not by necessity inhibit exploration of novel technology areas. 
Moreover, Baier et al. find that having a diverse set of core economic and technical competencies 
mitigates path-dependency by helping entities adapt to external changes, such as sweeping 
technological change. Finally, In analyzing the success of Finland’s national innovation system 
and economic growth, Park & Lee (2005) notes that Finnish government’s proactive approach to 
fostering cross boundary collaboration and facilitating R&D planning efforts across sectors 
enabled the country to liberate its R&D from a path-dependency created by historic trade ties with 
the Soviet Union. 
 
Path-dependency’s application to R&D has not only been retrospective – applications of the path- 
dependency theory can also have prospective, i.e. forward-looking, components as well. The 
practice of looking forward at pathways for technological development has been well-established 
through the works of Alan Porter and other scholars. Porter’s work highlights the prospective 
usefulness of the Path-dependency Framework for producing reasoned expectations and plans for 
action regarding how to shape the future development of a technology. The work of Porter and 
others (Cunningham & Porter, 2011; Kwon, Porter, & Youtie, 2016; Lahoti, Porter, Zhang, Youtie, 
& Wang, 2018; Porter & Cunningham, 2005; Youtie et al., 2012) focuses in part on using (1) 
intensive, retrospective data analysis on what paths a technology’s development has taken, and (2) 
13  
intensive, prospective discussions with experts in order to establish what paths a technology’s 
development might take in the future (Huang, Guo, Porter, Youtie, & Robinson, 2012). In both the 
retrospective and prospective analysis, Porter’s approach seeks to identify the interdependencies 
between a technology and related (or adjacent, but not yet related) areas of scientific research, 
related (or adjacent) areas of commercial activity, and other factors outside of the development of 
the technology itself that may influence a technology’s trajectory. Identifying the 
interdependencies becomes important in the context of what Porter and others refer to as “NESTs” 
- New & Emerging Science & Technologies. While prior technology forecasting efforts focused 
on innovation pathways that were more linear in nature owing to the military application of the 
technologies-of-interest, NESTs are subject to a greater variety and number of influences and 
experience non-linear innovation pathways. In addition, NESTs are expected to generate 
significant wealth for those able to anticipate and take appropriate positions on NESTs’ 
development pathways (Porter, Guo, Huang, & Robinson, 2010). An example of the type of 
analysis that Porter’s approach has produced for dye-sensitized solar cells appears in Figure 1, 
showing how the Path-dependency framework can be applied to forecasting in the form of a multi- 
path map showing options for long-term technological development. The multi-path map concept 






Figure 1: A hypothetical technology multi-path map for dye-sensitized solar cells, showing 
an example of how the Path-dependency Framework can be applied to forecasting. Source: 
(Porter et al., 2010) 
 
2.1.2 Path-dependency and energy systems 
 
Prior research finds the energy sector prone to path-dependency’s influence. Buhanist (2015) finds 
that Groningen-style contracts for gas imports continue to persist after the global recession that 
began in 2008-2009 decreased gas demand and caused severe financial harm to the contracts’ 
buyers. Buhanist attributes the persistence of Groningen-style contracts to path-dependency, for 
while the global recession demonstrated a tremendous need for innovation in gas import contract 
design, no such innovation occurred in the following six years. Seeking to explain this inertia, 
Wolsink (2012) argues that the centralized regulation and technological design creates inherent 
path-dependency in energy infrastructure. Moreover, Palm (2006) finds that the representation of 
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local energy companies across a greater number of policy-making situations than other interests 
like environmental advocates, who were represented in far fewer policy-making situations, served 
to enable path-dependency in the energy policy of two Swedish municipalities. Fagerberg, 
Mowery, & Verspagen (2009) find that, in Norway, an energy-focused economic development 
strategy created its own path-dependency, limiting innovative efforts to grow industries unrelated 
to energy. Gjelsvik & Aarstad (2017) affirm this finding, highlighting the role of the financial 
sector in Southwest Norway for continuing to invest in energy-dependent industries even in 
periods of abundant capital. National Bureau of Economic Research (2012) also finds strong 
evidence for path-dependency in energy sector innovation, such as firms that have innovated in 
both fossil-intensive and clean energy technologies previously being likely to continue doing so 
regardless of incentives to change. 
 
Clean energy technologies are frequently used to illustrate the degree to which path-dependency 
is endemic to the energy industry across the world, and this has been called out by important 
practitioners seeking to influence global policy designs. For example, in calling for economic 
growth strategies powered by clean energy and other sustainable practices, the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (2012) emphasizes a great deal of path-dependency 
opposing transition efforts: “Changing current patterns of growth, consumer habits, technology, 
and infrastructure is a long-term project, and we will have to live with the consequences of past 
decisions for a long time. This ‘path-dependency’ is likely to intensify systemic environmental 
risks even if we were to get policy settings right relatively swiftly.” (Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, 2012, pp.3) The Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development calls for temporary government support of innovative energy technologies as a 
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means for breaking out of path-dependency, but cautions against policies that may by design create 
their own path-dependencies and stifle further innovation. 
 
Beyond avoiding path-dependencies created by policies themselves, policy design in general is 
sometimes a weak point for path-dependency analyses that frequently focus on characterizing the 
path-dependency inherent in the energy industry. Nonetheless, the application of path-dependency 
framework still has yielded some useful insights – both in highlighting naïve policy making that 
should consider path-dependencies with greater care, and also in highlighting means of breaking 
free of energy sector path-dependencies. Looking forward, Scholvin (2014) applies path- 
dependency theory to evaluate options for the future of South Africa’s capacity-constrained and 
coal-dominated electric power industry. Scholvin highlights that the most prevalent options at the 
time failed to account for many relevant conditions owed to history of South Africa’s electric 
power industry. Kivimaa & Virkamaki (2013) use an economic development path-dependency to 
explain policy development processes in Finland and the UK focusing on transportation energy 
technology innovation that focuses on private automobiles, highlighting that alternative innovation 
pathways for reducing transportation demand should account for these path-dependencies. 
Emphasizing means of breaking free of path-dependencies, Essletzbichler (2012) notes that 
localized processes aid implementation of national efforts to achieve energy transition and break 
out of path-dependency. On a similar note, Becker, Beveridge, & Rohring (2016), in addressing 
the German city of Hamburg’s referendum on whether to place certain electrical networks under 
ownership and control of the city’s government, argues that a efforts to break free of path- 
dependency can be augmented by external environmental changes – such as a wider rebirth of 
interest and demand for public ownership in general. 
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2.1.3 Gaps identified in the path-dependency literature 
 
As shown in the literature review, the domain of path-dependency theory has very little analysis 
of joint ventures and entire firm histories. While joint ventures have been a common topic of 
research in the management science and business history fields, these fields have not applied the 
path-dependency analysis framework to exploring the causes and effects of joint ventures. The 
path-dependency analysis framework has only seen one application to joint ventures – the study 
by Pajunen & Fang (2013), which focuses on the beginnings and endings of joint ventures between 
Finnish and Chinese firms. However, Pajunen & Fang’s study only focuses on how early events 
during a joint venture’s history create lock-in effects that influence events later in that joint 
venture’s history. Pajunen & Fang’s work does not examine the histories of the respective firms 
coming to the joint venture and does not incorporate those histories into explaining outcomes of a 
joint venture. This leaves a gap in the literature – an application of path-dependency that examines 
the whole history of firms involved in a joint venture. 
 
Another gap in the literature is that path-dependency theory also has yet to be applied to patent 
licensing policies, let alone compulsory licensing policies for a specific technology like the DOE 
SSL program’s patent licensing privileges. From the literature review, it is clear that path- 
dependency theory has not yet been applied to the topic. No prior study has used the path- 
dependency framework to analyse patent licensing, let alone a technology-specific compulsory 
licensing policy like the US DOE SSL program’s patent licensing privileges. Path-dependency 
theory has yet to be applied to patent licensing, compulsory patent licensing, and compulsory 
licensing of patents in a specific technological domain like SSL. 
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Beyond gaps in the technological domains and other areas of application, academic literature on 
path-dependencies in energy systems lacks strength in the domain of forward-looking path- 
dependency analysis. Most of the literature’s published academic articles apply path-dependency 
retrospectively, with the exception of Scholvin (Scholvin, 2014) who’s study only analyzes the 
energy system of South Africa and thus lacks insights for the US energy system. The published 
articles frequently involve a historical examination of energy systems’ evolution, taking advantage 
of time that has passed and revealed causes and effects. None of the studies provides a forward- 
looking approach that could inform policymaking before policies are implemented. As shown in 
the works by Alan Porter and others on forecasting technology pathways (Huang et al., 2012), 
however, path-dependency analysis can indeed be applied prospectively. The literature on path- 
dependency in energy systems has thus lagged the literature on path-dependency R&D policy by 
failing to employ a forward-looking approach, leaving a large gap for future work. This is 
especially important given the strong path-dependencies present in energy systems identified by 
the literature, because these strong path-dependencies make the need for analyses that can advise 
policymaking prospectively all the more immediate. 
 
Given the need for analyses advising policymaking and the gaps in the literature identified in this 
review, it is clear that new work is needed to both address the questions and fill in the gaps. The 
following three chapters each describe original research undertaken to address one of the 
dissertation’ research questions. 
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2.2 A brief history of SSL R&D 
 
2.2.1 1940s through 1970s: Solid-state lighting occupies small niche applications 
 
Contrary to SSL R&D’s focus nowadays on efficient lightbulbs, early SSL R&D was rather 
conservative in nature and focused on basic materials and applications in other industries highly 
dependent upon semiconductors. The development of SSL from the 1940s through the 1970s 
followed patterns exhibited by other fields of technology. Large US firms performed most of the 
world’s SSL R&D and produced most of the SSL products. Firms did not collaborate, had little 
R&D background of their own to build from, and experienced slow and sporadic progress. 
Researchers found SSL technology applications that largely supported other emerging and 
semiconductor-intensive fields, such as computing. 
 
While conducting R&D on LED materials in support of other semiconductor applications, US 
firms also sought potential sales revenues from niche applications for the earliest LED 
technologies. Pursuit of a diverse set of R&D paths by a diverse set of firms yielded steady 
improvement in LED performance and enabled a succession of LED niche applications. During 
the period between World War II and 1980, LEDs achieved new applications and competed with 
existing lighting technologies in indicator lighting, such as calculator displays and watches. 
 
As with their performance of LED R&D for indicator lighting applications, major US firms led 
the way in finding niche applications for LED products. IBM used LEDs as indicator lights to 
signal data processing on its mainframe computers. Texas instruments developed indicator LEDs 
for controls on its audio and video equipment and local area communicators. Many large US firms 
pursued the integration of LEDs into calculators and digital displays as those technologies 
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themselves emerged in the 1960s and 1970s (Haitz, Kish, Tsao, & Nelson, 2000). Table 1 shows 
some examples of niche LED applications that US firms negotiated between 1960 and 1970. 
 
Table 1: Examples of LED niche applications between 1960 and 1970. Source: Sanderson 
& Simons, 2014 
 
 
Year Introduced Application Pioneer firm 
1962 Circuit board indicator lights Texas Instruments 
1962 Alpha-numeric displays General Electric 
1967 Indicator lights Monsanto/Hewlett-Packard 
1968 Early electronic display Hewlett-Packard 




2.2.1.1 1945 to 1979: The performers of the world’s solid-state lighting R&D 
 
 
Originating in the post-World-War-II work by US firms on semiconductors, a variety of US firms 
performed much of the world’s R&D on the earliest SSL technology. Multiple US firms pursued 
R&D on Light-emitting Diodes (“LEDs”) in desire of both scientific knowledge and commercial 
productivity. Initial progress in LED technology was quite slow. Researchers at US firms used one 
another’s discoveries to propel further R&D, but the researchers frequently stopped and re-started 
their LED work. Most frequently, researchers would initiate a new LED R&D path by trying to 
synthesize a new light-emitting semiconductor material; researchers at US firms created several 
new materials in pursuit of promising LED R&D paths. Little clear idea of what types of LED 
R&D would be most productive existed in the 1950s and 1960, however, and researchers found 
themselves pursuing initially promising LED R&D paths that ultimately led to no resolution. 
Conversely, as later history would show, certain R&D paths that did not initially seem promising 
turned out to be quite fruitful. The lack of formal inter-firm collaboration on LED likely hampered 
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technological progress, since the individual firms each had relatively little progress of their own 
and were already trying awkwardly to build from one other’s R&D. 
 
Table 2 shows that large US firms held the wide majority of positions among the list of top-cited 
publications by firm between 1945 and 1981. 
 
Table 2: Between 1945 and 1981, the top ten R&D organizations ranked by citations and 
papers published on the topic of inorganic LEDs. Source: Sanderson & Simons, 2014 
 
 
Institution Country Raw citations Raw papers 
Bell Labs US 3226 131 
RCA Corporation US 1425 76 
IBM US 1277 58 
General Electric US 879 32 
Westinghouse US 859 59 
GTE Sylvania US 513 35 
Monsanto US 428 13 
Fujitsu Japan 310 13 
Univ. Illinois Urbana- 
Champaign 
US 265 4 




Early LED research centered on materials that emitted red and orange light. US firms performed 
intensive R&D with group III, IV, and V semiconductor compounds in the early 1950s in hopes 
of developing better transistors. Coincidentally, the same semiconductor compounds proved to be 
efficient emitters of light. Theories of the transistor gave researchers inspiration as to how 
semiconductor compounds might also work for LEDs (Holonyak Jr, 2013). By the 1960s, several 
US firms including RCA, General Electric, and IBM were researching low-energy infrared LEDs 
based on a particular group III/group V semiconductor compound – Gallium Arsenide (GaAs). 
IBM researchers pursued an aluminum-gallium-arsenide compound (AlGaAs) for LEDs, while 
General Electric researchers pursued LEDs based on gallium-arsenide-phosphide (GaAsP). 
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General Electrick’s Nick Holonyak saw potential for orange-emitting LEDs to replace orange- 
emitting, filament-based nixie tubes in alphanumerical display devices. Unfortunately for 
Holonyak’s vision, however, the early red and orange LEDs suffered from rapid material 
degradation and subsequent loss in light output (Sanderson & Simons, 2014). 
 
Despite the degradation and output losses challenges, General Electric took the lead as the first 
firm to sell LEDs by offering small batches of LEDs for sale in the early 1960s. Despite General 
Electric’s first-mover advantage, however, Monsanto Corporation developed the first mass 
production process for LED materials and set up a factory for producing GaAsP in 1968. That 
same year, Monsanto introduced the first LED indicator lamps and Hewlett-Packard introduced 
the first truly electronic display based upon LED materials, intended as a successor to the Nixie 
tube (Haitz et al., 2000). Monsanto and Hewlett-Packard entered into an agreement to have 
Hewlett-Packard produce LED devices from Monsanto’s GaAsP materials, but Hewlett-Packard 
soon broke the agreement and began producing its own GaAsP materials (Sanderson & Simons, 
2014). 
 
While Hewlett-Packard was going rogue on its agreement with Monsanto, AT&T’s Bell Labs set 
a new record for LED efficiency by doping gallium-phosphide materials (GaP) with nitrogen and 
found quick innovations in manufacturing processes for producing GaP, helping GaP to become a 
dominant material for both red and green LEDs throughout the 1960s and 1970s. AT&T built upon 
its own success with GaP for red LEDs by developing GaP for green LEDs. Despite having low 
brightness, AT&T’s green LEDs inspired researchers in the US to pursue a greater range of LED 
colors. In particular, AT&T’s green LEDs inspired RCA researchers Paul Tietjen and Jacques 
Pankove to each separately pursue blue LEDs in the early 1970s. Tietjen worked with Stanford 
PhD student Paul Maruska to develop GaN single-crystal films, while Pankove’s team developed 
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metal-insulator semiconductor materials (“MIS”) with GaN. Neither path yielded an efficient blue- 
emitting LED device, however, and in 1974 RCA ended all blue LED research. RCA’s decision 
to end blue LED research signaled other firms to stop research on GaN materials, and it wasn’t 
until the late 1980s that Japanese firms resumed pursuit of blue LEDs through GaN (Sanderson & 
Simons, 2014). 
 
2.2.2 1980 to 2000: New applications for solid-state lighting and the foundations of white LEDs 
 
In parallel with the disruptive climate policy changes from the 1980s to 2000, SSL experienced 
disruptive technological change. Improvements in materials for orange and red LEDs made them 
popular for new niche applications in the 1980s and 1990s. New regulations required automobiles 
to have a center high-mount stoplight (CHMS) installed. Because of significant expected cost 
advantages to high-brightness and low-lamp-count LED device for the CHMS application, many 
researchers began pursuing new materials for red LEDs. By 1990, researchers had developed a 
device based on aluminum-gallium-arsenic (AlGaAs) material with 10 lumens-per-watt efficiency 
– enough to rival and exceed the efficiency of a red-filtered incandescent lamp (the incumbent 
device of the time). The AlGaAs-based devices had limited color spectrum, however – able to emit 
only a deep red that worked well for automobile signaling but not much else (Haitz et al., 2000). 
An aluminum-gallium-indium-phosphide (AlInGaP) material developed soon after the AlGaAs 
devices enhanced efficiencies and enabled between 10 and 20 lumens-per-watt efficiencies for a 
wider color spectrum of orange and red LEDs. The new levels of brightness from AlInGaP-based 
LEDs made them an attractive option for automobile taillights and for traffic signals (Johnstone, 
2007). The late 1980s and early 1990s also witnessed the resurgence of the gallium-nitride (GaN) 
material. Originally abandoned in the mid-1970s when RCA ceased GaN research due to low 
overall operations income, the new environment of global R&D competition saw Japanese 
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researchers taking up the quest for the blue LED in the late 1980s. Researchers resolved GaN p- 
doping difficulties by 1991, setting the stage for the first high-output, high-efficiency blue LED 
device that would inspire a new wave of efforts toward developing a white LED for general 
illumination (Sanderson & Simons, 2014). 
 
Meanwhile, the foundation for white light LEDs was being laid in the form of Japanese research 
that finally unlocked the keystone to white LED light - a high-emitting blue LED. Two Japanese 
researchers – Isamu Akasaki of Nagoya University and Shuji Nakamura of Nichia Chemical 
Industries – separately developed processes for p-doping GaN LED devices to make them blue 
LEDs. Akasaki found in 1986 that a low-power electron beam could activate a key impurity for 
GaN p-doping: magnesium (Amano, Sawaki, Akasaki, & Toyoda, 1986). Separately and later, 
Nakamura began working with GaN and indium-gallium-nitride (InGaN) materials, each of which 
had been dismissed by earlier LED researchers because of known frequency of defects in these 
materials’ crystals. Nakamura knew that the common process for annealing GaN materials used 
ammonia during the cooling process; during cooling, however, the ammonia decomposes and 
releases atomic hydrogen. The atomic hydrogen would then de-activate the p-doping of the GaN 
material. The phenomenon, called “Hydrogen Passivation,” was well-known to researchers who 
had worked with other materials for LEDs decades earlier. Because of the non-collaborative nature 
of US-firm-dominated R&D between World War II and 1980, however, the knowledge never 
reached GaN researchers until Nakamura’s work. Instead of using ammonia, Nakamura annealed 
his materials in pure nitrogen gas, avoided Hydrogen Passivation, and retained a p-doped GaN 
material (Nakamura, 1991). Nakamura’s process proved to be the first such process for reliably 
growing GaN-based materials for blue LEDs, and moreover the materials enabled blue LED 
devices 200-fold brighter than prior blue and green devices. In 1992 Nichia demonstrated 
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unprecedented efficiencies for both blue and green LED devices based on Nakamura’s InGaN 
materials. Nakamura’s materials also enabled new blue-laser devices, enabling a new wave of 
applications such as blu-ray discs and DVD-ROMs.2 Most consequentially, Nichia and other 
industry leaders saw Nakamura’s high efficiency blue LEDs as the key stepping stone toward 
developing LED devices for producing white light (Haitz et al., 2000). Not only could blue LEDs 
be color-mixed with red and green LEDs to produce white light, but the high-energy light from 
blue LEDs could be converted to lower-energy red and green light via transmission through 
phosphor materials – a process called “Down Conversion.” Nichia took advantage of its expertise 
with phosphor materials for television displays and developed devices that Down Converted light 
from Nakamura’s blue LEDs into a controllable mixture of colors, including white light. Nichia 
released the world’s first white LED in 1996. The device used a yellow yttrium-aluminum-garnet 
(YAG) phosphor to cover the blue LED and thus down-convert blue light into white light 
(Johnstone, 2007). 
After acquiring blue light LED technology, however, Nichia pursued a very aggressive 
technological and legal strategy to capitalize on the new discovery. Unlike the strategy Nichia had 
followed with prior products, Nichia chose not to license its blue LED technology after its 
demonstrating in 1993 and instead chose to invest in facilities for LED production. Nichia saw 
itself as having a first-mover advantage and wanted to capitalize on the opportunity to build 
exclusive competency in a technology widely demanded. Moreover, Nichia’s choice precipitated 
huge growth in sales of new mobile phones with displays requiring white LED backlights, and the 
subsequent demand for white LEDs from mobile phone suppliers created huge sales and high 
 
 
2 The short wavelength of blue laser light enables more dense storage of digital memory in devices such as DVDs 
and CDs. 
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profits for Nichia (Kishi & Takahshi, 2010). Nichia’s success did not rely solely on its blue LED 
technology, however, and instead came about from an aggressive legal strategy that Nichia used 
to keep other firms from producing blue LEDs. After acquiring several patents, Nichia sued firms 
such as Japan’s Toyoda-Gosei and the United States’ CREE who were trying to produce their own 
blue LEDs based on R&D and processes distinct from Nichia’s. A long series of appeals, 
countersuits, and settlements followed and lasted for many years. While Nichia’s legal action gave 
it some early advantages, court decisions in 2002 eroded those advantages by forcing Nichia to 
sign cross-licensing agreements with Toyoda-Gosei and CREE. Cross-licensing agreements 
amounted to technology-sharing between the battling firms. The legal battles influenced Nichia’s 
strategy, and the firm began to instead actively pursue cross-licensing agreements – signing two 
such agreements in 2002, one with Lumileds and another with Osram-Sylvania (Sanderson & 
Simons, 2014). Table 3 shows new applications for LEDs that emerged between 1980 and 2010, 
as well as the firms that pioneered each application. 
 
Table 3: From 1981 to 2010, new applications for LED technologies and the firms that 
pioneered each application. Source: Sanderson & Simons, 2014 
 
 
Introduced Application Pioneer 
1981 Early LED traffic lights Electro-Tech’s 
1980s- 
1990s 
Auto    interior    lighting, early   color LED 
displays 
Siemens, Sanyo, and later 
CREE 
1993 Bright blue LED, enabling electronic device 
backlighting 
Nichia, Toyoda Gosei 
1990s Bright white LEDs; LED streetlights, 
flashlights, traffic lights 
Nichia, Lumileds, CREE 
1997 Architectural lighting Color Kinetics 
2000s LED light bulbs Various firms 
2004 Commercial LED daylight auto headlamp Audi, Lumileds 
2004 AC LED (low power) Industrial Technology 
Research Institute (Taiwan) 





2.2.2.1 1980 to 2000: Changes in the performers of the world’s solid-state lighting R&D 
 
 
Along with other technology-based industries, lightbulb manufacturing had become a globally 
competitive industry during and after the 1980s. As of the early 2000s, multinational European 
firms like Philips and Osram-Sylvania and the Japanese conglomerate firm Toshiba dominated 
lightbulb manufacturing. Among US firms, only General Electric held much presence in the 
lightbulb manufacturing market. Moreover, even the four giants mentioned here saw their market 
shares slowly eroding due to competition from manufacturers in China and other developing 
nations (Sanderson & Simons, 2014). 
 
Coinciding with competition from China and the developing world was the decision by several 
large US firms to abandon their SSL endeavors. Monsanto sold its LED R&D activities to a firm 
eventually acquired by Taiwanese firm Everlight Electronics, an LED manufacturer. One of 
Monsanto’s leading researchers, George Craford, acquired a new position leading Hewlett- 
Packard’s LED R&D. Hewlett-Packard continued LED R&D for many applications and with the 
ultimate hope of developing LEDs for general white-light illumination. Another Hewlett-Packard 
researcher, Roland Haitz, founded a joint-venture with Philips called “Lumileds Lighting” 
specifically intended to develop LEDs for general purpose lighting (QuarkStar Inc., 2015). In 
1999, however, Hewlett-Packard spun off Agilent Corporation and transferred the LED R&D and 
the new Lumileds Lighting joint venture to Agilent. After some financial difficulties, however, 
Agilent sold its stake in the joint-venture to Philips in 2005 and thus ended the Hewlett-Packard 
line of R&D into LEDs (House & Price, 2009). Table 4 shows the top-ranked organizations by 
citations to papers published on LED technology between 1982 and 1991. In comparison to Table 
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1, a change from dominance of large US firms to strong international competition becomes quite 
apparent, with many of Table 4’s rows being occupied by Japanese firms and other spots being 
occupied by firms of other non-US origins. 
 
Table 4: Between 1982 and 1991, the top ten R&D organizations ranked by citations and 
papers published on the topic of inorganic LEDs. Source: Sanderson & Simons, 2014 
 
 
Institution Country Raw citations Raw papers 
Osaka University Japan 1562 24 
Fraunhofer Institute of Applied Solid-state 
Physics 
Germany 829 3 
AT&T Bell Labs US 598 41 
Nichia Corporation Japan 430 1 
MIT US 403 7 
NTT Corporation Japan 354 34 
University of Joseph Fourier France 349 1 
University of Texas at Austin US 346 9 
University of Toronto Canada 325 2 




The 1990s would see a resurgence of US presence in SSL R&D, but not necessarily the resurgence 
of large US firms. Table 5 shows the top-ranked organizations by citations to papers published on 
LED technology between 1992 and 2001. While US organizations occupy many of Table 5’s rows, 
five out of the seven US organizations are universities. Only two US large firms make the list – 
Xerox and Bell Labs, which had long been separated from AT&T. Table 5 exemplifies the rise of 
universities as global R&D competitors. 
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Table 5: Between 1992 and 2001, the top ten firms ranked by citations and papers 
published on the topic of inorganic LEDs. Source: Sanderson & Simons, 2014 
 
 
Institution Country Raw citations Raw papers 
Nichia Corporation Japan 7589 71 
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign US 6565 66 
Bell Labs US 4631 72 
MIT US 4583 69 
University of California Santa Barbara US 4058 58 
University of California Berkeley US 3959 36 
Harvard University US 3186 15 
Tohoku University Japan 3042 61 
Xerox Corporation US 2516 33 




2.2.3 Policy and Technology converge: Emissions reduction policies create new opportunity for solid- 
state lighting technologies 
 
Policy-driven demands for reducing greenhouse gas emissions enabled a new application for SSL 
 
– that of high-efficiency general illumination. Semiconductor and optics researchers did not fail to 
grasp the energy-efficiency value of SSL in the new emissions-reduction-focused policy 
environment. Researchers from multiple sectors began touting the value of SSL as no longer a 
durable, long-lived technology – but also one of high energy efficiency and thus capable of 
enabling reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. This section describes a proposal exemplifying 
the shift in perception among SSL researchers of how their technology would be valued and how 
the technology ought to be marketed to investors. 
 
A key example of the shift in perception around marketing’s value case for SSL technology, and 
an example crucial to the history of the DOE’s SSL program, appears in the original proposal for 
a federally funded R&D program put forth by Haitz, Kish, Tsao, and Nelson in the year 2000. The 
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proposal laid the foundation for the eventual creation of a DOE SSL program in the Energy Policy 
Act of 2005, and the proposal is widely credited as the origins of today’s program (QuarkStar Inc., 
2015). The proposal makes numerous references to the carbon-dioxide-reducing potential of SSL, 
reflecting the new perceived value of SSL’s energy-efficiency advantages in the greenhouse-gas- 
reducing policy environment. 
 
Emphasis on the greenhouse-gas-reducing policy environment was critical because, despite the 
energy-efficiency advantages of SSL technology, few private firms were investing seriously in the 
technology. The financial situation of major lighting manufacturers motivated the Haitz et al. 
proposal. Roland Haitz – the first author of the proposal and a leading semiconductor and optics 
researcher at Hewlett-Packard for decades – believed strongly in the potential of SSL to replace 
filament bulbs and fluorescent tubes for general illumination. Yet Haitz saw SSL R&D to be too 
expensive an undertaking for incumbent lighting manufacturers – namely General Electric, Philips, 
and Osram Sylvania – to find it worth putting up capital and investing in SSL R&D. Global 
competition in lighting products had whittled prices down so low as to create razor-thin margins 
for lighting product manufacturers. Any money spent on R&D would have appeared in the near 
term to be “burning cash” – throwing money away completely on a futile investment. Haitz saw a 
crucial gap created by what he believed to be the relatively long break-even time for any 
investment in SSL R&D. Federal funding could fill this gap, however, according to Haitz’s view 
(QuarkStar Inc., 2015). 
 
In pursuit of the federal funding needed to fill the gap in SSL investment, Haitz recruited 
colleagues at Hewlett-Packard and at Sandia National Laboratories (QuarkStar Inc., 2015). 
Together they drafted a proposal for a federally funded R&D program focused on SSL in the name 
of – importantly – energy savings. Since the immediate benefits of SSL R&D funding were likely 
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to accrue first to researchers and secondly to firms deploying any newly arisen technologies, Haitz 
et al. needed a social benefits premise to justify the proposal. Haitz et al. certainly did find a story, 
but one that differed from the story they would have told if they had made their proposal during 
the early years of SSL R&D. For rather than focusing on durability (e.g. military/aerospace and 
”national security” applications), lifespan (e.g. consumer savings in avoided replacements), or 
even color-control values created by SSL, Haitz et al. focused their proposal upon SSL’s energy- 
saving value. In the policy environment of the proposal, which Haitz presented in Washington 
D.C. in 1999 (QuarkStar Inc., 2015), energy consumption had become synonymous with 
greenhouse gas emissions.3 Moreover the new policy goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions 
had just emerged, notably with the then-recent Kyoto Protocol agreement. The new policy goal 
placed re-framed energy-consuming technologies as having value to the extent that they could 
reduce energy consumption itself and, by extension, reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Haitz et al. 
saw the opportunity to bolster their proposal for R&D funding and included several features in 
their proposal to make apparent SSL’s energy-saving potential. 
 
To make apparent the energy-saving potential, and serving as evidence of the perception-shift 
regarding the value of SSL, Haitz et al.’s proposal makes many statements arguing that SSL can 
enable significant reductions in both energy consumption and associated greenhouse gas 
emissions. Early in the proposal, Haitz et al. make as context a direct reference to the Kyoto 









3 To those willing to admit consensus science into their conscience 
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“In the Kyoto Protocol of 1997, e.g., the developed nations agreed to limit their greenhouse gas 
emissions, relative to the levels emitted in 1990. The United States agreed to reduce emissions 
from 1990 levels by 7% during the period 2008 to 2012.” (Haitz et al., 2000) 
 
Haitz et al. go on to claim that white-light SSL products for general illumination would “change 
the way we live and the way we consume energy.” The proposal claims that by the year 2025, and 
in every year following, the amount of electricity consumed by lighting would be cut in half by 
envisioned SSL technologies. Specifically, the proposal estimates a potential savings of more than 
1,000 tera-watts of electricity per year. In addition, the proposal estimates that the avoided energy 
consumption in 2025 and thereafter would also avoid approximately 220 million tons of carbon 
emissions per year (Haitz et al., 2000). 
 
While the proposal and its references to potential avoided carbon emissions did not immediately 
beget federal investment, Haitz et al.’s 2000 proposal foreshadows the DOE SSL program created 
in 2005. The proposal foreshadows such details of the DOE SSL program as the program’s annual 
budget amount, the program’s essential industry-government partnership, and the program’s 
intellectual property arrangements (Haitz et al., 2000). Ironically, the proposal argues that the 
lighting industry would not be willing to invest in SSL without the federal funding suggested 
(Haitz et al., 2000); yet at the same time as the proposal’s drafting and presentation, Roland Haitz 
himself was leading a joint venture, called “Lumileds Lighting,” between Hewlett-Packard and 
Philips that would focus exclusively on SSL R&D. Moreover, it seems that, in the intervening 
years between the 2000 proposal and the 2005 creation of the DOE program, the lighting industry 
was able to sufficiently maintain investment SSL R&D to be able to absorb and make use of, if 





2.2.4 The DOE SSL program 
 
The DOE SSL was created by the US Department of Energy in 2005 as a separate program under 
the Department’s Building Technologies Office. Despite its small size, the scope and breadth of 
the DOE SSL program’s activities are impressive. The DOE SSL program represents a huge 
amount of activity including government, non-profit, investor-owned, and other private actors in 
the name of advancing SSL technologies. The DOE SSL program funds, carries out, and 
coordinates efforts across multiple domains, including basic research funding, product testing, and 
collaborative technology pathway mapping with major industry actors. The DOE SSL program’s 
efforts stretch across SSL products, including both LEDs and the less ready for commercialization 
Organic LEDs (OLEDs) whose semiconductor components are made out of organic compounds 
(i.e. polymers or plastics). Each year, the DOE SSL program produces a comprehensive strategy 
for supporting SSL R&D, through direct funding of projects as well as other activities such as 
convening stakeholder workshops and technology demonstration events. The DOE SSL program’s 
annual strategy documents include both a plan for supporting R&D – the “Multi-year Program 
Plan” – and a roadmap for supporting SSL manufacturing activities – the “Manufacturing 
Roadmap.”4 Both are multi-year look-ahead documents designed to outline future paths for SSL 
technology development, and both are developed through extensive roundtable discussions with 






4 Beginning in 2008, the Multi-year Program Plan and the Manufacturing Roadmap were formally separate 
documents produced through separate processes. In 2016, however, the DOE SSL program consolidated the two 
documents into a single annual strategic plan. 
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member viewpoints on key areas for R&D (Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, 
2016). 
 
Through the program’s funding of key R&D areas guided by SSL industry members and other 
industry support activities, the program has stimulated rapid improvements in SSL technology and 
has found a distinctive niche as an information broker in the lighting market. The program’s 
intensive product testing through its CALIPER and GATEWAY initiatives provide the best source 
of information on the performance of new SSL products. The improvements to SSL technology 
have come along multiple dimensions of the technology, including color-performance, cost, 
energy-efficiency, lifetime, and more. Many of these improvements have come about as a result 
of DOE SSL research projects funded via cost-sharing agreements with privately owned industry 
actors. Concomitant with the National Academies’ observations regarding the emergence of 
lighting systems sub-sector (National Academies of Sciences Engineering and Medicine, 2017), 
the DOE SSL program has kept pace by discussing, evaluating, and supporting R&D into SSL 
lighting systems (Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, 2017). 
 
2.2.5 Current excitement around SSL’s potential for driving innovation rests primarily on 
technology 
 
Since the invention of the electric lightbulb, the technology has not changed very much until recent 
developments in the use of semiconductors for lighting birthed the new categories of research, 
technology, and consumer products known as SSL. Beginning with a few key applications in the 
1960s (many years after the invention of the solid-state semiconductor), SSL R&D went dormant 
in the late 1970s and 1980s until a major breakthrough by Japanese researchers enabled light- 
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emitting diodes (LEDs) to produce white light.5 Whereas SSL had been applied to niche 
applications such as indicator and signaling lights, the white LED breakthrough excited 
possibilities for using LEDs in general illumination. But this excitement juxtaposed very different 
technologies; SSL did not exist as a new refinement or incremental development in the history of 
incandescent bulbs or even fluorescent bulbs, and instead SSL’s origins came from a very different 
domain of technology development. Despite this juxtaposition, SSL stands poised to out-perform 
incumbent technologies such as incandescent bulbs, high-intensity-discharge lamps, and compact 
fluorescent bulbs in everyday applications familiar to American consumers (National Research 
Council of the National Academies, 2013). 
 
Some of the excitement around SSL technology for everyday consumer applications is well- 
justified because SSL offers huge energy advantages in energy savings relative to incumbent 
technologies. SSL converts a greater amount of electricity into useful light than incumbent 
technologies, creating significant possibilities to reduce energy consumed for lighting. Despite the 
presence of high-efficiency competitors such as compact fluorescent lamps (CFLs), SSL will likely 
have a larger role in reducing energy consumption owing to SSL products’ superior energy 
performance (National Research Council of the National Academies, 2013). Underscoring SSL’s 
superior energy performance is the US Department of Energy’s goal to have LED products that 
deliver 200 lumens-per-watt by 2025 (US Department of Energy, 2016c). With 15 percent of all 
retail electricity having gone to lighting in 2014 (US Energy Information Administration, 2016), 
reducing lighting energy consumption poses a significant opportunity for national energy savings. 
 
 
5 LEDs cannot alone be useful toward illumination; additional components, including optical, electrical, structural, 
and thermal components are needed to make LED luminaires, e.g. light bulbs powered by LEDs. Throughout this 
work, however, the term “LEDs” and “SSL” will refer to finished light bulbs and other luminaires using 
semiconductor elements for illumination. 
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Quantifying this opportunity, LED products have been forecasted to yield a 40% savings in energy 
for lighting by 2030 at high levels of adoption (Navigant Consulting, 2014). 
 
The excitement around SSL technologies’ energy saving potential at high levels of adoption can 
be further justified by noting that SSL also proves superior in many common lighting technology 
performance metrics. SSL products also offer improved durability, superior aesthetic potential, 
superior performance in cold environments, reduced maintenance, reduced need for replacements 
owing to the products’ long useful life, and novel form factors (National Research Council of the 
National Academies, 2013). Unlike CFLs and high-intensity discharge lamps, for example, SSL 
products are at full brightness as soon as they are powered (i.e. the light switch is flipped on). Also, 
application of proper control systems to LEDs can enable users to change the color of the light 
produced by the LED bulb. Beyond color control, LEDs with control systems can increase or 
decrease the apparent color-saturation of illuminated objects. Moreover, while incandescent lamps 
emit infrared light and therefore emit heat, LEDs do not emit infrared light and therefore have 
advantages in illumination for heat-sensitive applications such as illuminating art work and retail 
products. SSL products have long useful lives under the designed-for operating conditions, 
reducing the need for and cost of replacements. (National Research Council of the National 
Academies, 2013). 
 
However, SSL devices appear not to have yet replaced many conventional devices, and as such 
much of SSL’s potential appears yet untapped by consumer product markets. Despite the many 
advantages of SSL products, overall penetration of SSL into US illumination markets remains low. 
While the past 6 years have seen notable increases in the penetration of SSL into different markets 
and applications, thanks in part to significant reductions in price of SSL products (National 
Academies of Sciences Engineering and Medicine, 2017), only 6.4 percent of installed luminaires 
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in the US were LEDs in 2015 (US Department of Energy, 2016c). In a 2013 assessment, the 
National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine expected that SSL lamp sales will 
increase as light, color quality, and cost-effectiveness are improved (National Research Council of 
the National Academies, 2013).6 Moreover, the number and size of markets that SSL technology 
could penetrate continue expanding, leading to greater and greater expectations for the innovative 
potential of SSL technology. While recent SSL product price reductions reduced profitability for 
LED component manufacturers, new applications for LED products have also emerged over the 
same period - creating new opportunities for investment and new markets for the SSL industry 
(National Academies of Sciences Engineering and Medicine, 2017). One of the most profound 
examples is the SSL systems sub-sector, which enable such applications as using the color- 
precision and long life of LEDs for superior horticulture and the using precise control of LED 
output at high frequencies for wireless communications (National Academies of Sciences 





















6 The National Academies later assessed in 2017 that those sales increases would be contingent on meeting 
customer expectations for lamp reliability, establishing interoperability with control systems, and consistent 
delivery of high-quality light (National Academies, 2017). 
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CHAPTER 3. PATH-DEPENDENCIES IN INTER-FIRM R&D 
COLLABORATION: PHILIPS, HEWLETT-PACKARD, AND THE 
LUMILEDS JOINT VENTURE 
 
 
3.1 Research Question 
 
This chapter addresses the question of why, in a policy environment favorable toward inter-firm 
R&D collaboration, a promising SSL-focused joint venture was abandoned by one of its parent 
firms. Hewett-Packard (HP) and Philips founded the joint venture firm Lumileds in the late 1990s, 
a time when new applications for SSL technologies seemed to be on the rise. Moreover, this was 
a time when US policy favored inter-firm R&D collaboration – in prior decades, US policy had 
generally discouraged inter-firm R&D collaboration. With the combination of HP’s expertise in 
the light-emitting diode (LED) SSL technology and Philips’ market reach and manufacturing 
expertise for all sorts of lighting products, Lumileds seemed well-positioned to capture a growing 
LED market.7 Yet in less than a decade’s time, HP’s spinoff company Agilent sold to Philips the 
stake in Lumileds that Agilent had inherited from HP, making Philips a near-complete owner of 
Lumileds (the remaining shares being owned by Lumileds employees). When faced with a policy 
environment favoring inter-firm R&D collaboration and a promising joint venture, why did 







7 LED technology is what underlies most solid-state-lighting-based products available for sale at the time of this 
writing. The term “solid-state lighting” encompasses both LED and Organic LED (OLED) technologies. LEDs are 
made by combining metal elements and earth-elements into semiconductor compounds, such as Aluminum- 
Indium-Phosphide. Conversely, OLEDs make use of carbon-based polymers (i.e. plastics). 
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Part of the Lumileds joint venture’s promise came in the form of generally expected high growth 
in markets for LED technology. In the early 1990s, HP had penetrated the automobile lighting 
market with high-brightness red LEDs used for taillights. This represented an important step 
because it was the first time in which LEDs were used for an application that specifically required 
high brightness. Moreover, means for creating blue LEDs were discovered in the early 1990s by 
Japanese researchers, which combined with existing red and green LED technologies offered the 
promise of creating white-light LEDs. HP’s recent opening of new applications for red LEDs 
combined with what some observers felt was the imminent creation of a white-light LED created 
high optimism for LED technology. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, LED market growth was 
often forecast to double within the next six years. Moreover, HP was well-positioned 
technologically to claim much of the new market for itself. 
 
Yet while HP’s technology positioned the company well for dominating much of the growing LED 
markets, more than just good technology was necessary to advance LED products – and that’s 
where Philips entered the picture. The next few sections provide a brief discussion of the 
complementarities between HP and Philips that undergirded the Lumileds joint venture. 
 
3.1.1 Independent Research: HP had prior experience with LEDs, not Philips 
 
Business reporting from years prior to the foundation of Lumileds indicates that HP was the party 
who brought all the SSL R&D and expertise to the joint-venture. While many articles report on 
SSL R&D achievements made by HP, almost no articles link Philips and SSL R&D in the years 
prior to Lumileds. HP’s experience working with diodes as indicators for its measurement 
equipment appears to have formed the SSL R&D base from which HP hoped to achieve LED- 
based general illumination products (e,g, lightbulbs). 
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Long before HP had hopes for LED-based general illumination products, HP was working 
alongside other major US technology firms on some of the earliest LED technologies. There are 
at least two competing stories on the origins of HP’s LED expertise. In one version, HP first 
acquired LED technology in 1965 through a technology license from Siemens to use LEDs for 
voltmeter displays in 1965 (House & Price, 2009, pp.33). In another version, HP needed 
microwave-emitting LEDs and in 1961 formed a joint venture with an investment group headed 
by local venture capitalist Jack Melchor to develop microwave LEDs (Krey, 1990), later buying 
the joint venture outright in 1965.8 Both version agree, however, that Hewlett-Packard grew its 
LED business by including LEDs as a part of the instruments and devices the company sold, such 
as displays for calculators. 
 
The concept of HP’s SSL R&D leading the company beyond device components like calculator 
displays and toward lightbulb-like products appears as early as 1988, the year in which HP reported 
developing an Aluminum Gallium Arsenide (AlGaAs) LED for emitting red light that HP expected 
to introduce to automotive lighting markets (Steranka et al., 1988). In an article titled “Now a LED 
can take on the Light Bulb,” the new AlGaAs red LED was reported to exhibit light output 125 
times greater than HP’s former LEDs. HP marketing engineer Chris LeBlanc attributed the red 
LED breakthrough to 15 years of HP R&D on infrared LEDs and low-power lasers. Because the 
new AlGaAs LEDs emitted bright red light, HP expected the new LEDs to compete with 







8 Far from an example of inter-firm collaboration, however, this joint-venture was very different from Lumileds in 
that Melchor’s investment group had no technical capabilities or other expertise to complement HP’s own 
technical expertise. Instead, Melchor’s group served primarily to finance HP’s technical work. 
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These were reportedly the first applications in which LEDs would compete with incandescent 
bulbs in high-brightness applications (Barnard, 1988). 
 
Replacing incandescent bulbs in automotive lighting applications with HP’s red LEDs and later 
orange-yellow LEDs continued to dominate the focus of HP’s SSL R&D throughout the early 
1990s. An article on HP’s Components Group, the primary unit behind HP’s LED R&D, quoted 
vice president and general manager of the Components Group William Craven as saying that HP’s 
red LEDs would be in automotive taillights by 1992 (Krey, 1990). A 1994 article described HP’s 
new orange-yellow LEDs as likely to enter automobile models by 1995 and that the market for 
automotive LEDs to grow to $1 billion by 2000 (Nauman, 1994). That same year, reporting 
emerged on HP’s release of new Gallium Phosphide (GaP) LEDs that yielded 2x the brightness of 
Gallium Arsenide LEDs and could provide red-orange, amber, and green light, which HP expected 
to make the LEDs competitive in automotive lighting (McLeod, 1994; “Technology Brief -- 
Hewlett-Packard Co.: New Lights Might Replace The Incandescent Lamp,” 1994). Underscoring 
HP’s uniqueness in being one of a few firms performing SSL R&D, one article also reported that 
only Toshiba LEDs could compete with HP LEDs and that Toshiba LEDs were still far behind 
HP’s (McLeod, 1994).9 Later reports discussed improved durability for HP’s automotive LEDs 
(“HEWLETT-PACKARD: HP supplies SnapLED automotive lilighting assembly for 2000 
Cadillac Deville,” 1999; Wirbel, 1996). HP received the 1998 Market Engineering Product 
Innovation Award from market researcher firm Frost & Sullivan for the company’s work on LEDs 
for automotive lighting (“Alternative Technologies Have OE Lighting Products Manufacturers 
Scrambling For Market Share,” 1998). 
 
 
9 This would appear to ignore Nichia’s progress on blue-emitting LEDs but for the fact that Nichia had not produced 
high-brightness blue LED products comparable to HP’s. 
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3.1.2 The forming of Lumileds: HP and Philips’ knowledge complementarity 
 
Reporting on the founding of Lumileds shows that HP and Philips exhibited strong 
complementarities, with HP offering its deep background of SSL R&D and recently successful 
LED products to the joint venture and Philips offering its product manufacturing and lighting 
market expertise. Underscoring Philips’ extensive lighting market expertise, an early report on 
Philips’ announcement of its intent to form an LED-focused joint-venture with HP quoted Philips’ 
annual lighting product sales at $7.3 billion per year (“Philips-Hewlett Joint Venture Set,” 1997). 
Later reporting on a 1999 expansion of Lumileds beyond automotive lighting characterized the 
two companies as complementary world leaders: “HP is a world leader in LED technology 
producing a full range of colours, while Netherlands-based Philips is a world leader in developing, 
manufacturing and selling innovative lighting products and systems.” The reporting described each 
firm’s complementary assets as “HP’s high-brightness LED (HB-LED) technologies and 
processes, R&D, manufacturing and sales… and Philips’ market research, application knowledge 
and financial resources” (“HP and Philips expand joint venture advance LED adoption,” 1999).In 
an interview with the San Jose Business Journal, Lumileds CEO Mike Holt also noted the 
complementarities between Philips and Agilent as being behind Lumileds foundation. “HP owned 
the technology to enable SSL. Philips Corp. has a high-priority need to be involed in SSL. The 
cultures of the two companies matched and it really was a perfect fit. What launched Lumileds 
was a blend of Agilent having this really awesome capability, Philips having not only the need but 
also the capability and knowledge of the lighting industry at large, and that became what we think 
is a very powerful force in the industry” (Caldwell, 2001). 
 
3.2 Literature Review 
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In seeking to explain why a firm like Agilent would turn away from such a seemingly economically 
advantageous partnership like Lumileds, this study takes advantage of a theory developed 
specifically for explaining why firm behaviors fail to respond to apparent economic advantages. 
Namely, Nelson and Winter’s theory of Evolutionary Economics puts forth an explanation for why 
firms fail to act in an economically rational fashion. This section provides a review of the 
fundamental concepts in Nelson and Winter’s theory and how they will apply to this study’s 
research question. 
 
3.2.1 A Path-dependency theory of firm behavior: Evolutionary Economics claims Core 
Capabilities determine a firm’s decisions 
 
Contrary to neoclassical economic thinking, Nelson and Winter’s (1982) evolutionary theory of 
economics regards firms’ behaviors as difficult to change and firms’ success or failure as a function 
of the fit between firms’ behaviors and the firms’ business environment. While neoclassical 
economic thinking posits firms as flexible and adaptive to signals from a hypothetical marketplace, 
evolutionary economic thinking posits firms as rigid and fixed in their attributes and abilities. A 
firm’s routines and decision rules are the abilities that matter most to evolutionary economic 
thinking. Nelson and Winter give the name Core Capabilities to a firm’s routines and decision- 
making rules. A firm establishes most of its Core Capabilities at the outset of the firm’s existence 
– a firm’s leaders decide early on ways of making oft-repeated decisions or carrying out oft- 




10 The phrase “why mess with a winning formula” expresses human tendency to reproduce certain behavior patterns, 
especially in business, instead of applying scrutiny to behavior patterns already common. 
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business environment will reward with profits firms having certain Core Capabilities and punish 
with losses firms lacking certain Core Capabilities. 
 
While firms maintain certain early-established Core Capabilities, firms can change their Core 
Capabilities in response to significant exogenous events – albeit not often, with great effort, not 
always with success, and in ways that reflect their original Core Capabilities. Tremendous shifts 
in marketplace demands, war, and radical technological changes serve as examples of the kind of 
events to which firms can respond by changing their Core Capabilities. If a firm’s leaders decide 
to change one of the firm’s Core Capabilities, however, evolutionary economics makes no 
guarantees that such a change will succeed. Many firms go through expensive attempts at internal 
transformations that go nowhere and leave the core of the firm unchanged. Moreover, the firm’s 
early-established Core Capabilities themselves influence (and sometimes constrain) leaders’ 
decisions of how to change the firm’s Core Capabilities, a constraint that reflects path-dependency. 
Usselman (1993) writes that “Even when a firm does change in response to the environment, those 
changes will strongly resemble what came before.”11 Nelson and Winter write that “‘it is quite 
inappropriate to conceive of firm behavior in terms of deliberate choice from a broad menu of 
alternatives that some external observer considers to be ‘available’ opportunities for the 
organization. The menu is not broad, but narrow and idiosyncratic; it is built from the firms’ 





11 Usselman elaborates: “…Even in an industry often characterized as experiencing revolutionary change, we can 
detect substantial elements of continuity. The shape of the new can be seen in what came before if one looks 
closely at the embedded capabilities of the firms involved and pays particular attention to what Nelson and 
Winter refer to as the ‘programmatic’ nature of their routines.” (Usselman, 1993, pp.3-4) 
12 Another good Nelson and Winter quote: ‘One cannot infer from the fact that an organization functions smoothly 
that is a rational and ‘intelligent’ organism that will cope successfully with novel challenges. If anything, one should 
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By emphasizing how choices are carried automatically by routines instead of rational calculations, 
Evolutionary Economic contributes to understanding firms, industries, and regulatory systems by 
highlighting the real inflexibility of firms. Rather than basing policy on false predictions of 
smooth, rational responses to drastic changes in a business environment, policymaking benefits 
from a more accurate understanding of firm responses – and, in turn, so do those whom 
policymaking affects13. Nelson and Winter write that “…Efforts to understand the functioning of 
industries and larger systems should come to grips with the fact that highly flexible adaptation to 
change is not likely to characterize the behavior of individual firms. Evolutionary theory does 
this.” (Nelson & Winter, 1982, pp.134-135) 
 
3.3 Hypothesis and rival hypotheses 
 
3.3.1 Hypothesis H1: HP/Agilent abandoned the Lumileds joint venture because HP/Agilent 
lacked Core Capabilities suitable for inter-firm collaboration 
 
From Nelson and Winter’s theory, we hypothesize that Core Capabilities played a role in 
determining the fate of Lumileds. We hypothesize that, in its early history, HP formed a Core 
Capability that somehow prevented the firm from forming lasting inter-firm collaborations, and 
that this Core Capability was inherited by HP’s spinoff firm Agilent. Further, we hypothesize that 
Philips in its early history formed a Core Capability that favored inter-firm collaborations, contrary 
to HP. HP’s Core Capabilities must have enabled the firm to prosper in its early environment, 
however, for this is a key stipulation of Nelson and Winter's theory. As such, the environment 
 
expect environmental change to make manifest the sacrifice of flexibility that is the price paid for highly effective 
capabilities of limited scope.’ (Nelson and Winter, 1982, pp.126)” 
13 Moreover, scholars have applied the concepts of evolutionary thinking beyond firms behaving in a business 
environment. See early chapters in Mowery and Rosenberg for an application of evolutionary economic thinking to 
national R&D policymakers acting in a global environment. “…the “fit” between the structure of a national R&D 
system and its environment influences the effectiveness of that system.” (Mowery and Rosenberg, 217-218) 
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regarding inter-firm collaboration must have changed significantly between HP’s early years and 
the time at which Lumileds was founded. Taken together, this hypothesis argues that Agilent 
ultimately abandoned Lumileds because Agilent had inherited a Core Capability from HP that 
somehow led Agilent away from inter-firm collaborations. 
 
3.3.2 Rival hypothesis R1: HP/Agilent abandoned the Lumileds joint venture because 
HP/Agilent’s expected net returns on SSL technology development fell below HP/Agilent’s 
desired net returns from remaining in the joint-venture 
 
Alternatively, we can take the converse of Nelson and Winter’s theory – neoclassical economics 
 
– and form a rival hypothesis regarding economic signals. Neoclassical economics theorizes that 
firms will respond rationally to economic signals in their environment, such as rising or falling 
prices or regulations raising or lowering barriers to entry. As such, the rival hypothesis holds that 
Agilent must have abandoned the Lumileds joint venture because Agilent saw that the costs of 
staying in the joint venture would outweigh the benefits. Moreover, this must have changed during 
the course of Lumileds’ existence – according to neoclassical economics, HP/Agilent would have 
entered the joint venture because it saw potential net gains, so for Agilent to have later abandoned 
the joint venture means that Agilent’s perspective must have changed. In other words, the rival 
hypothesis is that Agilent’s expected net returns on SSL technology R&D must have gone from 




3.4.1 Testing hypothesis H1: Examining the early histories and Core Capabilities of HP and 
Philips, as well as changes to the business environment 
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To test hypothesis H1, the hypothesis derived from Nelson and Winter’s theory, this analysis 
examines the early history of Philips and HP and any changes to the general R&D business 
environment specific to inter-firm collaboration. To do so, this analysis builds from prior work on 
the early history of Philips and HP, each firm having been covered in adequate detail by prior 
scholarship. For HP, this analysis relies primarily on House and Price (2009)’s exhaustive 
coverage of HP’s history through the early 2000s. For Philips, this analysis relies primarily on 
work by De Vries and Boersma, scholars who have specialized in the history of Philips. This 
analysis also literature on the history of R&D policy as a data source on whether the R&D business 
environment changed between the period of either firm’s early history and the time of Lumileds’ 
existence. 
 
3.4.2 Testing rival Hypothesis R1: Examining the life of Lumileds and HP’s expected net returns 
from SSL technology development 
 
To test the rival hypothesis based in neoclassical economic theory, this analysis examines reporting 
from the time period of Lumileds’ existence for signs that expected returns on SSL R&D decreased 
substantially. In particular, this analysis uses the Georgia Institute of Technology’s library 
databases subscriptions to search for articles in journals, magazines, and newspapers containing 
“Lumileds,” “Light-emitting diode,” “Hewlett-Packard,” “HP,” or “Philips.” The analysis 
searched these terms in each year and collected all relevant articles from the top 40 results in each 
year. Frequent sources containing relevant articles included PR Wire, Business Wire, and III-Vs 




3.5.1 Findings for hypothesis H1 on Core Capabilities 
 
3.5.1.1 The early histories and Core Capabilities of HP and Philips 
 
 
Having examined the change in R&D business environment that took place between World War 
II and the contemporary period, we now turn to examining the experiences during this period of 
two firms of interest between the time of each firm’s formation and the 1970s. The two firms which 
we will inspect, Philips and Hewlett-Packard, each acquired Core Capabilities during the 
companies’ respective formative years. Forged by an environment of international technology 
competition through patents, Philips and its central research laboratory developed a Knowledge- 
exchange Core Capability. Conversely, the era of US R&D dominance compelled Hewlett-Packard 
to evolve an Innovating-from-within Core Capability. This section discusses the origins of the two 
company’s Core Capabilities and characterizes them in some detail. 
3.5.1.1.1 The Philips Company’s early history 
 
The pre-war globalized economy of the late 19th and early 20th centuries contextualized Philips’ 
early development and motivated Philips’ fast evolution of a Knowledge-exchange Core 
Capability. Threatened with patent lawsuits and economic competition from German lighting 
technology firms as well as the US’s General Electric, Philips moved to work around the 
competition by performing its own R&D. Philips developed a Knowledge-exchange Core 
Capability in order to take advantage of the latest scientific developments for purposes of 
protecting the company from international patent lawsuits and to help the company diversify its 
product lines. In its early years, Philips’ Knowledge-exchange capability took the form of inviting 
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well-known scientists to present their latest research at Philips’ research laboratory. Philips’ 
Knowledge-exchange capability later evolved into more comprehensive efforts to absorb findings 
from, as well as contribute findings to, the global research community. Philips’ Knowledge- 
exchange Core Capability survived multiple changes of corporate R&D leadership and both world 
wars, demonstrating the true nature of Philips’ Knowledge-exchange as a Core Capability. 
 
Philips’ early strategic decisions and formative changes affirm Nelson and Winter’s central 
hypotheses by exemplifying the influence of an emerging firm’s environment. Philips’ formative 
years took place in an environment of intensive globalization – the decades from 1880 to 1920, 
during which global trade and industrial competition thrived. Many new multinational companies 
emerged, including other Dutch giants like Shell (known in the original Dutch as “Koninklijke 
Petroleum”) and other electrical technologies giants like Siemens and General Electric, and Philips 
soon became one of these new multinationals. Many of the new multinational firms exhibited 
vertical integration strategies, and most multinational firms in technologically growing industries 
founded their own research laboratories.14 Philips followed suit in both regards (De Vries & 
Boersma, 2005, pp.21). The similarities between Philips and its cohort of firms that emerged 
during the 1880-1920 globalization wave underscore Nelson and Winter’s hypothesis that firms’ 
early environment shape the firms’ Core Capabilities. Moreover, the globally competitive 
environment of the late 1970’s to present day resembles the environment of global competition 
that forged Philips. Philips’ success in R&D joint ventures from the late 1970’s to present day, 
discussed in further detail later, seems almost prophesied by Nelson and Winter’s prediction that 
a firm’s success is connected to the firm’s environmental fit. 
 
 
14 “The General Electric lab was set up in 1900, the chemical company Du Pont in 1902, AT&T between 1910 and 
1912, Eastman Kodak in 1910, and Westinghouse in 1916.” (de Vries, 2005, pp.21-22) 
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3.5.1.1.1.1 The early Philips adapts to a global competitive business environment 
 
In the Netherlands during 1891, Gerard Philips founded the lightbulb production company that 
would become the Royal Philips Electronics Company, better known as “Philips” (Boersma, 2002, 
pp.123). Gerard and his younger brother Anton Philips led the company during its early years. 
During this period, Philips’ business environment was characterized by competitive threats from 
the foreign firm General Electric, whose research receives credit for many of the innovations in 
lightbulb fabrication between 1900 and 1920. General Electric influenced European lightbulb 
markets by offering licenses to General-Electric-patented lightbulb fabrication technologies. 
European firms could attain strong competitive advantage over their European rivals through 
acquiring licenses to General Electric patents. Moreover, General Electric negotiated a patent 
agreement called the “Patentgemeinschaft” with three German firms – AEG, Siemens & Halske, 
and Auergesellschaft – that restricted the number of lightbulbs Philips could sell to European 
markets. 
 
In response, Philips sought to work around the European sales restrictions of the 
Patentsgemeinschaft by entering into American markets. General Electric saw Philips’ entry into 
American markets as a serious threat and offered Philips a unique license contract that reduced the 
Patentgemeinschaft’s restrictions. In 1919, Philips agreed to the license contract. During the 
negotiations for the license contract, however, brothers Gerhard and Anton Philips realized the 
risks of being dependent upon licenses to another firm’s patented technologies. Legislation passed 
in 1910 strengthening the Netherlands patent laws15 further augmented risks from patent licensing 
 
15 “In the Netherlands a new patent law was passed in 1910 and the new law became effective on June 1, 1912. 
There had been patent legislation in the Netherlands before, but that had been abolished 43 years prior to the 
1910 legislation… In the first months following June 1, 1912 [effective date of the legislation], the percentage of 
Dutch applications for patents was very low compared with the number of foreign applications (12% Dutch against 
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and patent competition (De Vries & Boersma, 2005, pp.22). Owing to the new patent risks, the 
brothers Philips decided to set up a research laboratory to free the company from patent licensing 
risks by producing new technologies owned by Philips (De Vries & Boersma, 2005, pp.19-20).16 
The research laboratory, described in the next section, would come to define one of Philips’ Core 
Capabilities that would influence its behavior later during the 1970s/1980s re-emergence of R&D 
global competition. 
 
During its maturation in the early 1900s, an earlier era of global competition, Philips gained 
experience in global industry collaboration – and even conspiracy. Having evaded the 
Patentsgemeinschaft by threatening General Electric’s American markets and getting General 
Electric to agree to a favorable licensing agreement in 1919, Philips began taking proactive steps 
to negotiate interfirm collaborative arrangements – some of which were anticompetitive. Philips 
joined the PHOEBUS cartel, known to its members as the “General Patent and Business 
Development Agreement”, in the 1920’s to consolidate Philips position in the global market for 
light bulbs (De Vries & Boersma, 2005, pp.33). The Phoebus Cartel began in the 1920’s and 








88% foreign). Foreign companies were very keen to establish sound patent positions in the Netherlands that would 
give them sufficient freedom to act on the Dutch market.” (de Vries and Boersma, 2005, pp.21-22) 
 
16 As such, it is worth noting that the goal of technology R&D was to reduce legal risks, particularly risks from patent 
lawsuits. By contrast, improving business performance or product performance featured as strictly secondary factors 
motivating technology R&D – technological progress was assumed a constant of the business model, and the goal of 
in-house R&D was primarily to reduce legal risks to this assumed constant. 
 
17 See also “The Parable of Byron The Bulb” in Thomas Pynchon’s Gravity’s Rainbow for further details on the 
PHOEBUS cartel. 
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3.5.1.1.1.2 Philips’ Knowledge-exchange Core Capability and Philips’ internal R&D division 
 
Philips’ Knowledge-exchange Core Capability, which would later influence its behavior during 
the 1970s/1980s re-emergence of global R&D competition, originated in the early history of the 
firm’s internal R&D division – a division called the “NatLab”. In the winter of 1914, Gerard and 
Anton Philips authorized a central research organization headquartered in Eindhoven. The brothers 
called the research organization the “Natuurkundig Laboratorium” (abbreviated “NatLab”), which 
translated to English as the “Physics Research Laboratory” (Boersma, 2002, pp.124). While 
managers of the Philips NatLab often faced the question of how to manage researchers in the 
context of Philips’ industrial production activities (Boersma, 2002, pp.124), the NatLab’s early 
history – defined by its first director Gilles Holst – would influence Philips’ later behaviors 
regarding knowledge-acquisition and knowledge-sharing activities. 
 
Gilles Holst directed the NatLab from the its inception in 1914 to the post-war leadership transition 
of 1946. As the NatLab’s first director, Holst created organizational structures and routines that 
would stimulate the exchange of ideas across firm boundaries. Holst created an academic culture 
different from that of the rest of the Philips firm, keeping the NatLab organization as informal as 
possible and allowing individual scientists to prosper. Holst directed NatLab researchers to 
exchange knowledge with others inside and outside the firm through participating in committees 
and regular gatherings (Boersma, 2002, pp.127). Holst’s emphasis on knowledge exchange inside 
and outside the firm enabled the NatLab to provide Philips with a source of cutting-edge 
knowledge on early-20th-century electrical technologies. Rather than “leaking” knowledge outside 
of Philips, however, the activities of Holst’s NatLab enabled Philips to initiate a patent strategy 
that led to enormous profits from NatLab research (Boersma, 2002, pp.127). 
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Holst encouraged the Knowledge-exchange Core Capability of the NatLab through many concrete 
actions. Holst organized NatLab-hosted colloquia and symposiums at which world-famous 
physicists, such as Einstein, Meitner, Born, Pauli, Geiger, and even General Electric’s Langmuir, 
shared their research and perspectives with NatLab scientists. The colloquia and symposiums 
continued from 1924 through 1942, when the colloquia were paused to protect scientific secrets 
during World War II. Furthermore, Holst directed NatLab scientists to share their work with the 
world through publication in scientific journals, seeking to bolster the reputation of Philips and 
encourage top scientists to work at the NatLab. While Philips published only one article in 1914, 
the earliest year in Philips’ publication record and prior to the NatLab’s foundation, Holst managed 
to get NatLab scientists to increase publication until achieving a rate of 236 papers per year in 
1937. NatLab publication declined during World War II in order to protect technological secrets 
but recovered after the war ended (De Vries & Boersma, 2005, pp.60). Moreover, Holst 
encouraged knowledge exchange beyond the firm by attracting scientists from universities and 
encouraging universities to recruit faculty from among the NatLab’s researchers. Several NatLab 
researchers left the NatLab to become professors at leading universities such as Utrecht and 
Leyden. Holst himself helped established the Netherland’s first polytechnic university at Delft, 
and two NatLab researchers became some of the first faculty there (De Vries & Boersma, 2005, 
pp.55-58). Finally, Holst also created an independent journal through which the NatLab could 
communicate its findings to industry. In 1936, the NatLab published the first volume of the Philips 
Technisch Tijdschrift (Philips Technical Review). Holst’s own introduction to the first volume 
states that the intent of the journal is to encourage exchanges with the broader engineering 
community regarding Philips products. The journal published in Dutch, English, German, and 
French, and put out 12 issues per year (De Vries & Boersma, 2005, pp.60). 
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3.5.1.1.1.3 The NatLab’s early patent production system as a response to global R&D 
competition 
Philips’ early experience of its business environment had taught the company’s early leadership 
about the importance of maintaining a legal advantage through patents. General Electric’s 
Patentsgemeinschaft with lightbulb manufacturing companies in other European nations 
compelled Philips to recognize the importance of patents and devote considerable resources and 
strategy toward a business model that accounted for and mitigated patent-related legal risks. As 
such, Philip’s early leadership created the NatLab with the goal in mind of using R&D to produce 
patents and attain the upper hand over competitors through a strong patent portfolio that translated 
to a strong legal position. Would Holst’s Knowledge-sharing strategy for the early NatLab thwart 
the company’s overall patent-portfolio strategy? 
 
No. Rather than thwarting the lessons learned during Philips’ early history regarding the 
importance of a legal advantage through patent portfolios, Holst’s commitment to developing a 
Knowledge-exchange Core Capability dovetailed with the goal of using the NatLab for patent 
advantage. Carrying forward the legacy of the Philips’ brothers’ decision to found the NatLab to 
attain advantage in patents, Holst implemented a rigorous system for developing NatLab-research- 
based patents. Holst expected NatLab scientists to develop ideas for patents based upon the 
scientists’ work, and he explicated this expectation. Holst created a small form, called a White 
Card, that NatLab scientists were required to complete on all patent ideas. Upon receiving a White 
Card, Holst himself would decide whether or not the potential patent possessed merit sufficient to 
be worth forwarding to Philips’ internal patent department. If Holst decided not to forward the 
patent idea, he would instead allow the researcher to publish the work in an academic journal. If 
Holst forwarded the patent idea to Philips’ patents office, Holst would direct the researcher to 
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refrain from publishing until the Netherlands’ national patents office registered the application. 
Between the NatLab’s inception in 1919 and 1940, each NatLab scientist submitted between 1 and 
4 White Cards per year (De Vries & Boersma, 2005, pp.22). 
3.5.1.1.1.4 Philips continues knowledge-exchange in the age of US R&D dominance 
 
Far from being idiosyncrasies that lasted only under Holst’s direction and evaporated thereafter, 
the Knowledge-exchange Core Capability persisted after Holst’s departure and the arrival of new 
NatLab director Hendrik Casimir, who directed the NatLab from 1946 to 1972. Casimir had earned 
worldwide renown as a physicist who had performed fundamental scientific research with Bohr, 
Pauli, and Ehrenfest in the 1920s. Casimir assumed directorship in 1946, the dawn of a boom-time 
for fundamental scientific research. Vannevar Bush’s 1945 report “Science – The Endless 
Frontier” (V. Bush, 1945) captured new, widespread favorable attitudes and expectations and 
inspired government leaders around the world to invest in fundamental scientific research (Dennis, 
1997). As such, Casimir’s own views of the role of fundamental scientific research fit well within 
the contemporary zeitgeist (Boersma, 2002, p.128). 
 
While pursuing fundamental scientific research, Casimir also enacted knowledge-exchange 
through connecting the NatLab to other scientific research institutions. Casimir encouraged 
NatLab researchers to keep in touch with scientists all over the world, claiming that research is an 
international activity and duplication is useless. Casimir himself took interest in new natural 
science findings and theories, and always investigated whether a new scientific finding or theory 
could be absorbed into the NatLab’s research program. Casimir also measured the success of the 
NatLab in ways similar to how one might measure the success of a university or other scientific 
institution – in terms of the number of scientific articles published, technical reports produced, and 
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patents acquired (Boersma, 2002, p.128). Casimir’s encouragement of knowledge exchange inside 
and outside the firm enabled the NatLab (and Philips) to influence the latest technological 
developments worldwide. Casimir made reviews of the latest scientific research a regular priority 
for the NatLab (Boersma, 2002, p.129). Casimir also expanded the NatLab’s absorptive capacity 
by scanning the latest scientific developments. According to De Vries and Boersma, at conferences 
on Philips’ corporate research agenda (the CRCs), “…Casimir always asked the question of 
whether a certain new theory or field could be absorbed into the Nat.Lab.’s research programme. 
Thus, a careful scanning of the latest scientific developments under his leadership became a 
continuous item at the top of the CRC’s agendas.” (De Vries & Boersma, 2005, pp.132) 
 
Casimir also maintained Philips’ Knowledge-exchange Core Capability through continuing the 
connections to prominent Dutch universities – in other words, NatLab continued exchanging 
knowledge with universities through exchanging personnel. Between 1946 and 1972, the wide 
majority of scientists coming to the NatLab came from Technische Hogeschool Delft (Delft 
Poytechnic). The NatLab also drew scientists from Eindhoven Polytechnic and the Universities of 
Amsterdam, Utrecht, Leyden, and Groningen. Moreover, Philips maintained contact with 
universities through ‘buitengewone’ (extraordinary) or ‘bijzondere’ (special) professors who 
worked both for the Philips NatLab and one of the universities. The professors helped the NatLab 
maintain knowledge on both the most recent scientific developments and potential scientist- 
recruits to the NatLab (De Vries & Boersma, 2005, pp.134) 
 
De Vries summarizes the NatLab culture as possessing great strength in its knowledge-exchange 
Core Capability. De Vries states that in the NatLab, “…there was a constant search for new 
scientific fields or important external progress in existing fields that might be relevant for the 
Nat.Lab. to take up.” (De Vries & Boersma, 2005, pp.136) 
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3.5.1.1.2 Hewlett-Packard’s early history 
 
Contrary to Philips’ origins in a global competitive environment, Hewlett-Packard’s early 
evolution in the age of US R&D dominance compelled the company to develop a sensitivity and 
responsiveness to the US technology markets. While the global R&D business environment may 
not have been competitive, the US environment was. Hewlett-Packard competed during its early 
years on equal footing against a handful of other US firms in what began as niche technology 
markets. HP’s leadership oriented the company towards competition in niche markets, 
decentralizing decision-making as much as possible to enable the product-focused company to 
compete with maximum flexibility and agility. Conversely, the company rarely engaged in 
exchanges of knowledge with other companies or universities. Instead, the early Hewlett-Packard 
looked to its own veteran engineers and new hires for new ideas on how to stay competitive. HP 
developed a culture of pride in its own people and a focus on getting new ideas from its own 
employees. That is, HP never developed a Core Capability like Philips’ Knowledge-exchange with 
sources outside the firm. Instead, Hewlett-Packard’s Core Capability of Innovating-from-within 
helped the company survive, thrive, and expand during the age of US R&D dominance. The 
unipolar environment of US dominance in R&D from the 1940’s through the 1960’s favored HP’s 
use of one’s own personnel for new ideas, but changes to the environment in the 1970s and 1980s 
challenged HP’s ability to succeed. 
3.5.1.1.2.1 Hewlett-Packard’s origins: The do-it-yourself birth of Silicon Valley 
 
Bill Hewlett and David Packard, both engineering graduates of Stanford University, 
founded HP in 1939 at the dawn of what was to become the golden age of US corporate R&D. 
Hewlett’s creation of a user-friendly variable-resistance circuit motivated the pair to create the 
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company, which soon afterward earned a sales contract from Disney Studios when Disney found 
use for Hewlett’s creation in the upcoming recording of the Fantasia soundtrack. Disney’s need 
for advanced measurement technologies to mix tracks with precision from the symphony 
recordings for Fantasia foreshadowed the precision measurement technologies that would become 
the early HP’s main line of business. Hewlett and Packard established HP’s first operating location 
in David Packard’s personal garage in Palo Alto, CA – later recognized by an Institute for 
Electrical and Electronic Engineering (IEEE) memorial as “the birthplace of silicon valley.” 
 
In the early years, HP acquired good R&D knowledge by acquiring top researchers from 
universities. HP authorized its product development engineers to make hiring decisions, allowing 
the actual engineers to perform interviews and recruit prospective employees. HP also focused its 
recruitment efforts on top engineering schools in the nation such as Stanford but also including 
other top universities like Princeton. HP also reached into universities by offering fellowships and 
internships. Upon a student’s acceptance of an HP fellowship, Packard or Hewlett would ask the 
student to research a particular field and develop a related novel technology proposal. Often the 
student’s proposal would make its way into HP’s R&D efforts and into a product. Such was the 
case with Al Bagley, a young Stanford engineer who earned an HP fellowship, researched atomic 
measurement, and proposed a measuring device that became the HP-524A Electronic Counter for 
measuring nuclear phenomena (House & Price, 2009, pp.21). 
3.5.1.1.2.2 Hewlett-Packard develops a Core Capability of Innovating from Within 
 
Of great importance, HP’s engineers derived much of their new ideas from customer outreach and 
from conversations with HP’s leadership. Rather than studying new scientific developments 
related to their products or attending conferences to exchange ideas with engineers at other firms, 
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HP engineers visited customers and discussed new ideas with HP leadership for inspiration. As 
examples, HP engineer Bruce Wholey often visited Hughes Aircraft facilities for purposes of 
demonstrating and receiving feedback on HP’s waveguide equipment. Don Hammond, HP’s lead 
researcher in crystallography, spent many hours discussing new ideas and inventions with Hewlett 
and Packard in person. Hammond described the discussion as involving intensive detail and 
thought-experimentation: “Bill and Dave would review it and say ‘Why didn’t you do that? Or 
that? Well, I think you’d better take it back and work on it a bit longer.’” (House & Price, 2009, 
pp.23) More academic personnel, such as Dr. Barney Oliver who first led the HP labs after its 
inception in the 1960s, drew some ideas from private reviews of scientific literature in fields such 
as lasers (House & Price, 2009, pp.24). But Oliver’s approach remained the exception at HP, where 
engineers were looking to their markets and to their leadership for ideas. As lead engineer Al 
Bagley described, a new engineer at HP got ideas from self-initiated market research and through 
a review process that included Hewlett and Packard themselves (House & Price, 2009, pp.29-30). 
 
To further enhance its niche-market sensitivity, the early HP decentralized its decision- 
making as much as possible – including decisions about R&D. Engineers were expected to come 
up with new ideas, not only for existing products, but also new products, production processes, 
and even the design and functioning of the HP organization itself. Although Hewlett and Packard 
were crucial in shaping the R&D direction of HP, Hewlett and Packard did not exercise unilateral 
authority over HP’s R&D direction – indeed, the R&D direction of HP was often shaped by HP’s 
own engineers. As an example, House and Price 2009 argue that HP made six major shifts in its 
product portfolio over the course of HP’s existence with David Packard resisting all six major 
changes and Bill Hewlett resisting all but one. House and Price credit the success of the product 
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transformations against Packard and Hewlett’s objections to HP’s corporate culture of encouraging 
“maverick” engineers to develop and pursue their own ideas (House & Price, 2009, pp.33). 
 
Beyond HP routine of looking inward for new ideas, HP also often looked inward for new 
leadership. Hewlett and Packard both believed that HP’s management and senior leadership should 
come from people who had been with the company for many years and who were embedded in 
and would promulgate HP’s culture (and Core Capabilities). Hewlett and Packard both disfavored 
hiring executives from the outside, and the company as a whole disdained outside management 
fads and popular business practices (House & Price, 2009, pp.30). Monthly executive meetings 
and annual summits would be focused on internal business practices and performance – there 
would never be any visiting speakers presenting on new, interesting topics. As former HP 
Executive Vice President Bill Terry put it, “it was technology and business – it was not visiting 
speakers talking about interesting things.” (House & Price, 2009, pp.30) The survival of HP’s 
preference for pulling leadership from its own veteran employees would become apparent decades 
later when current and former employees rankled at the HP board’s decision to hire first Carelton 
Fiorina and then Mark Hurd, “guru” executives who were total outsiders to HP (House & Price, 
2009, pp.30). 
 
3.5.1.2 The change in the US R&D business environment that occurred in the 1980s 
 
 
Since Nelson and Winter’s theory requires a changing business environment to demonstrate the 
differences in fitness between firms and their Core Capabilities, this section characterizes the 
changing R&D business environment of the late 20th century. While the US dominated global 
R&D – both in funding and performance – from the late 1940s to the early 1970s, a rise in global 
competition in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s challenged the position of US firms in 
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R&D-intensive industries. Non-US firms’ technological competencies began to match or outpace 
those of US firms, leading to increased competitive pressure on US firms. US firms that only rarely 
collaborated with one another or with non-US firms during the age of US dominance responded to 
the 1970s rise in global competition with increased inter-firm collaboration. After a wave of US 
policy responses throughout the 1980s, the new normal of the R&D business environment emerged 
– featuring a diversification of research funding structures and performers. 
 
3.5.1.2.1 The 1940s-1960s anti-collaborative R&D policy environment 
 
The environment after World War II and prior to 1980 featured US funding and US firms 
dominating R&D performance around the world. US firms performed much of their own R&D 
and captured most of the benefits of university R&D. Corporations also performed most of the 
R&D in the US by a wide margin, in contrast to universities18. Moreover, most of the world’s 
R&D was performed by US firms, and non-US firms sought to follow the US firms’ technology 
leadership. Most R&D during the post-World-War-II environment drew support from US federal 
funding, and the US provided more support to R&D than any other nation. (Mowery & Rosenberg, 
1989, pp.205). Most US exports after World War II consisted of R&D-intensive goods (Gruber, 
Mehta, & Vernon, 1967; Mowery & Rosenberg, 1989). 
 
The US federal government’s role in funding R&D meant that US policy had significant impact 
on the world’s R&D performance, and this was particularly important for inter-firm R&D 
collaboration. Importantly, US policy deterred inter-firm collaboration on R&D through a variety 




18 Universities would later grow to take a large share of R&D performance, and US corporations’ share of total US 
R&D performed would later decline. 
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federal funding for R&D performance. Firms that collaborated on R&D activities could be 
prosecuted by the federal government under anti-trust law for conspiring to manipulate markets. 
Moreover, many US R&D funding programs made non-collaboration with other firms a condition 
of R&D funding. As such, firms who wished to receive US funding for R&D – the primary source 
of funding for the world’s R&D – were deterred from collaborating with other firms by the policy 
environment existing from the 1940s through the 1970s. 
3.5.1.2.2 The 1970s move toward inter-firm collaboration and international competition 
 
Toward the end of the 1970s, however, it became clear that the era of US policy’s influence over 
R&D performance had come to an end – both through the rise of non-US R&D performers and 
through a rise in inter-firm collaboration, both domestically and internationally. A trend toward 
technological equality between the US, Western Europe, and Japan emerged during the late 1970s 
and continued into the 1980s, with scholars noting the prior period of US dominance as exceptional 
and unsustainable (Langlois, Pugel, Harklisch, Nelson, & Egelhoff, 1988; Mowery & Rosenberg, 
1989, pp.237). Increasing rates of international technology transfer in the 1980s brought special 
challenges to the US economy, whose exports were based more on R&D-intensive goods than the 
exports of other industrialized nations (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 
1986). Improvements in the technological capabilities of non-US firms and non-US economies 
strengthened their ability to learn from and transfer US-firm and US-economy R&D and 
technologies to the non-US firm’s own markets – increasing the “global mobility” of technology 
(OECD, 1979; Mansfield and Romeo, 1980; Mansfield, 1985; Abramovitz, 1986). In contrast to 
the low international competition during the period of exceptional US dominance in world trade, 
70 percent of US manufacturing output faced international competition during the 1980s (Aho, 
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1988). The drastic increase in international economic competition led many to predict the demise 
of US regional technology hubs, such as silicon valley (Arora, Branstetter, & Drev, 2013). 
 
In addition to international competition, inter-firm collaboration began to increase both 
domestically and internationally. US firms sought to leverage the new expertise of non-US firms 
in collaborative R&D partnerships that increased drastically in number throughout the 1970s and 
1980s. While joint ventures weren’t new to US firms, nor even joint international ventures, the 
joint ventures of the 1980s differed in substantial ways from joint ventures typical of the 1950s 
and 1960s (Mowery and Rosenberg 242). Mining and extraction industries, such as the coal, oil, 
and natural gas industries, have long made use of traditional joint ventures (Stuckey 1983). But 
during the 1970s and 1980s, joint ventures began to appear in many industries that had not before 
seen much interfirm collaboration (Harrigan 1984; Harrigan 1985; Hladik 1985). While 
international collaboration was rare during 1945-1970 in the commercial aircraft industry, for 
example, the industry featured some of the highest rates of international inter-firm collaboration 
by the late 1980s (Mowery, 1987). Figure 2 shows the trend of a rapidly rising number of R&D- 






Figure 2: Contrary to the anti-collaborative period of the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, the 
number of R&D-focused inter-firm collaborations (here the term “alliances” is used) 
increased dramatically throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Source: (David C. Mowery & 
Rosenberg, 1989) 
 
3.5.1.2.3 US policies establish new R&D structures in the 1980s 
 
The 1980s saw US federal legislators reacting to the rise in US firm collaborations with US and 
non-US firms through a variety of new laws. The US began by encouraging its constituent states 
to hold and license patents from federally funded research through the Stevenson-Wydler 
Technology Innovation Act of 1980. Federal legislators hoped the Act would reduce technology 
transfer to non-US firms and increase the returns to US-funded research received by US firms 
(Hounshell, 1996, pp.54). In 1981, US legislators passed the Bayh-Dole Act to allow universities 
to hold patents from federally funded research and further slow technology transfer to non-US 
firms. Despite the seeming retrenchment effort by the two acts, however, the US soon began a 
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string of policies intended to capitalize on and accelerate participation of US firms in the global 
market for technology. For example, the 1983 Modified Final Judgement in the case of US v 
AT&T ended the AT&T monopoly on telecommunications but also enabled AT&T to begin 
competing in foreign telecommunications markets. Perhaps the most symbolic US policy, the 1984 
National Cooperative Research Act, forbade anti-trust action against firms engaged in 
collaborations focusing on pre-commercial R&D (David C. Mowery & Rosenberg, 1989, pp.253). 
Later acts focused on government-performed R&D; the 1986 Federal Technology Transfer Act 
and the 1989 National Competitiveness Technology Transfer Act enabled US national 
laboratories, including contractor-operated laboratories, to globally market the laboratories’ 
technologies (Hounshell, 1996, pp.54). The US also encouraged university-industry partnerships 
via funding support, for example through SEMATECH and the National Center for Manufacturing 
Sciences. However, Mowery and Rosenberg (1989) found government funding absent from 
collaborations between US firms and between US and non-US firms. The lack of government 
funding for inter-firm collaboration in the US contrasted the experience in Western Europe and 
Japan, where public funding played a strong role in supporting inter-firms collaborations such as 
the Airbus Industrie consortium (Mowery & Rosenberg, 1989). 
3.5.1.2.4 The 1990s and onward favor inter-firm collaboration 
 
The rise of global trade competition and global technological competence shocked the US R&D 
system into a transformation away from a federally funded, corporation-dominated model and 
toward a matrix model of collaborations between firms, universities, and governments. The US 
government and its corporations established many diverse new R&D structures such as: 
• firms pooling money together in R&D collaborations, sometimes with funds from 
government, sometimes with involvement of foreign firms 
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• subcontracting to a different firm or a separate R&D unit 
• keeping all R&D in-house (as with Intel) 
• partnering with universities or funding university-based consortia, and 




Increasing global diversification of the opportunities and mechanisms for performing R&D 
marked the 1980s and 1990s (Hounshell, 1996, pp.57). Hounshell writes that “…the 1980s and 
early 1990s brought about a crazy quilt of avenues, approaches, and opportunities for corporate 
R&D managers. The array of ways to spend money on R&D became staggering, especially in light 
of the increasing globalization of business, which had begun before the end of the cold war.” 
(Hounshell, 1996, pp.54). Contemporary examples of Hounshell’s “quilt” that may be familiar to 
the reader include: 
• The US National Nanoscience Initiative 
• The US National Science Foundation’s EPSCOR program 
• The US Department of Energy’s Energy Frontier Research Centers (EFRCs) 
• The US National Science Foundation’s Engineering Research Centers (ERCs) 
• Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs) 
• Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) between partners to an R&D effort 




3.5.1.3 Differences between HP and Philips in terms of inter-firm collaboration 
 
 
While both Philips and Hewlett-Packard responded to rising international competitiveness by 
increasing collaborations with other firms during the 1980s, the two companies’ Core Capabilities 
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drove them to differ in both degree and kind of inter-firm collaboration. Philips’ Knowledge- 
exchange capability enabled Philips to begin collaborating early in the onset of inter-firm 
collaborations that would mark a trend in the 1980s. Conversely, Hewlett-Packard’s attempted 
shift in Core Capabilities from failed to boost the company’s collaboration. Hewlett-Packard’s 
Innovating from Within in particular drove the company away from collaboration, and only after 
the mid-1980s conversion to Integration and to the computer systems industry did the company 
increase collaboration. The influences of the two companies’ respective Core Capabilities on 
collaborative behavior reveal themselves in data from a key academic study of 1980s inter-firm 
collaboration. 
 
A definitive empirical study of Strategic Technology Alliances throughout the 1980s provides 
information on the R&D collaboration activities of major individual firms, including both Philips 
and Hewlett-Packard. Researchers John Hagedoorn and Jos Schakenraad (1992) performed an 
extensive study of inter-firm collaborations throughout the 1980s related to strategic technologies. 
The study used the Cooperative Agreements and Technology Indicators (CATI) database19, which 
contains records of about 10,000 agreements between about 3,500 parent firms. Among the 
CATI’s thousands of records, Hagedoorn and Schakenraad identified 4,000 of the agreements as 
Strategic Technology Alliances, a term the researchers use to characterize agreements related to 
R&D and technologies. Hagedoorn and Schakenraad further characterize strategic Technology 




19Researchers formed the CATI by collecting records from newspaper and journal articles, business/industry press, 
and books on inter-firm collaborations. The CATI’s curators used company annual financial reports, Financial Times 
Industrial Companies Yearbooks, and Dun & Bradstreet’s Who Owns Whom to figure out identities of dissolved joint- 
ventures and similar collaborations. 
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through R&D. The researchers write further that Strategic Technology Alliances include joint 
ventures centered on technology, research corporations, joint R&D pacts, and minority holdings 
attached to research contracts. Hagedoorn and Schakenraad acknowledge the purposive omission 
of any agreements related to marketing, production, or sales. Moreover, the researchers also 
exclude government-funded cost-sharing programs, such as the US SEMATECH program or the 
EU’s ESPRIT and EUREKA programs, to better-understand patterns of privately supported 
collaborations. Hagedoorn and Schakenraad also make one further restriction on the data studied 
– that of limiting their analysis to various subfields of the Information Technology industry. The 
researchers focus on Information Technology because other work finds 42% of Strategic 
Technology Alliances in the CATI database come from the Information Technology industry. The 
study therefore covers 1,700 of the agreement records in the CATI database from the Information 
Technology subfields of computers, industrial automation, micro-electronics, software, and 
telecommunications (Hagedoorn & Schakenraad, 1992). Hagerdoorn and Schakenraad’s analysis 
shows Philips to have outpaced Hewlett-Packard in inter-firm collaboration. 
Hagerdoorn and Schakenraad’s analysis shows that Philips is among the leading firms for inter- 
firm collaboration in both 1980-1984 and in 1985-1989, showing that Philips Knowledge- 
exchange capability enabled the company to collaborate early and often. Conversely, 
Hagerdoorn and Schakenraad’s results show Hewlett-Packard only ranking in the middle for 
Software from 1980-1984 and climbing to the top only for Software during 1985-1989. 
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Table 6, taken from Hagerdoorn and Schakenraad’s analysis, shows the collaboration numbers for 
Philips and Hewlett Packard by subfield. It is revealing that Hewlett-Packard’s collaboration in 
software drives the company’s upswing in collaboration overall. While Hewlett-Packard had been 
present in the computer industry – and even in all of the subfields listed here – only in the 1980s 
did the company shift toward the Integration Core Capability and accept its new path as a software 
and systems integration leader. Conversely, Philips shows as a strong collaborator in multiple 
subfields of IT – Industrial Automation, Computers, and Micro-electronics. 
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Table 6: Inter-firm collaboration ranking results from Hagedoorn & Schakenraad (1992). 
 
Information Technologies Software 
 
1980-84 1985-89 1980-84 1985-89 
1. Motorola 53 Siemens 134 1. CDC 18 HP 47 
2. Siemens 51 Philips 127 2. NCR 16 DEC 45 
3. IBM 48 Olivetti 110 3. Honeywell 14 Siemens 36 
4. Sperry 47 IBM 108 4. Motorola 14 Bull 34 
5. Fujitsu 46 HP 96 5. HP 13 AT&T 33 
6. Olivetti 42 DEC 95 6. Sperry 13 Philips 32 
7. CDC 41 AT&T 90 7. Allied 12 SUN-microsys. 31 
8. Intel 41 Thomson 83 8. AMD 12 NCR 29 
  9. Philips  40 Fujitsu 78 9. DEC 12 Volmac 29 
10. NEC 39 Motorola 68 10. Harris 12 Olivetti 28 
Computers  Microelectronics  
1980-84 1985-89 1980-84 1985-89 
1. Sperry 27 Olivetti 22 1. INTEL 34 Thomson 51 
2. IBM 19 CDC 19 2. Motorola 23 INTEL 46 
3. CDC 18 Unisys 17 3. Philips 20 AMD 42 
4. Olivetti 17 Bull 14 4. Thomson 19 Motorola 40 
5. Fujitsu 15 Philips 13 5. Toshiba 18 Philips 39 
6. NEC 12 Fujitsu 12 6. Siemens 17 Texas Inst. 37 
7. Burroughs 11 NEC 12 7. Fujitsu 16 Siemens 36 
8. Toshiba 10 SUN-Microsys. 11 8. NEC 16 IBM 30 
9. DuPont 10 DEC 10 9. EXXON 15 Toshiba 27 




1. Siemens 17 Siemens 45 
2. AT&T 15 CGE 32 
3. ITT 14 Sumitomo 29 
4. Fujitsu 10 Mitsubishi 28 
5. IBM 10 Fujitsu 27 
6. Plessey 10 AT&T 26 
7. Hitachi 9 Philips 26 
8. ANT 8 IBM 24 
9. NEC 8 NEC 23 




Hagedoorn and Schakenraad (1992) also map the network of inter-firm collaborations during the 
study period, shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4. The maps support the numbers in Table 6, showing 
71  
HP relatively 
isolated in early 
1980s 
Philips already 
collaborating in early 
1980s 
Hewlett-Packard (HP) isolated during 1980-1984 but integrated during 1985-1989. Conversely, 
Figure 3 and Figure 4 show Philips integrated in both periods. 
 
 
Figure 3: Structure of collaborative partnerships between firms between 1980 and 1984. 







Figure 4: Structure of collaborative partnerships between firms between 1985 and 1989. 





In their own analysis of the data, Hagedoorn and Schakenraad find evidence that collaboration is 
indeed tied to firm-specific characteristics, such as Core Capabilities: “In sub-fields of information 
Philips performing 
multi-industry 
collaboration in late 
1980s 
HP in a software cluster 
in late 1980s 
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technologies, where the number of potentially relevant firms can be expected to be smaller, we 
found significant rank correlations [i.e. correlations between 1980-1984 rankings and 1985-1989 
rankings, i.e. persistence of certain firms in each ranking], with the exception of software [in which 
HP rises to the top from having not ranked at all]. This means that in computers, industrial 
automation, microelectronics, and telecommunications, some firms indeed do leave and others 
enter the group of most collaborative companies, but the rankings of the remaining companies did 
not change significantly.” (Hagedoorn & Schakenraad, 1992, pp.183) “In general the conclusion 
has to be that there is no clear correlations between both rankings [of sales leadership and of 
collaboration in IT], it is obvious that the leading companies are well-represented among the most 
collaborating companies, without quantitatively dominating the general network of strategic 
technology alliances.” (Hagedoorn & Schakenraad, 1992, pp.185) 
 
Why had Hewlett-Packard collaborated in software, and in no other sectors? Why did such a 
prominent technology firm as Hewlett-Packard not engage in more collaborative joint-ventures, 
when comparable firms around the world were doing just that? Conversely, why had Philips 
collaborated in so many industries and with such great effort? Hewlett-Packard had attempted a 
change in its Core Capabilities in efforts to transform into a firm compatible with the computer 
systems industry. Hewlett-Packard’s efforts were only successful in part – the firm’s original Core 
Capabilities remained within it after the transformation, and continued to chafe at the firm’s new 
directions. Hewlett-Packard’s lack of collaboration came from the firm’s early history that biased 
it against collaboration and instead encouraged the firm to look for new ideas from within. Hewlett- 
Packard’s collaboration only in software represented the firm’s recent attempts to change its 
culture, to change its Core Capabilities, and its recent acquisition of a leadership team from IBM. 
Unlike Hewlett-Packard, IBM ranks near the top on more than one of Hagedoorn and 
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Schakkenrad’s tables. Conversely, Philips’ strong collaboration throughout the 1980s in multiple 
industries represents the early history of Philips’ NatLab which guided the firm toward 
collaboration and knowledge-exchange with R&D workers at other firms. 
 
3.5.2 Findings for rival hypothesis R1 on HP’s expected net returns from SSL technology 
development 
 
Primary sources on Lumileds reveal four indicators of HP’s expected returns from SSL 
technology: (1) Lumileds’ successful new product releases and product performance milestones, 
(2) Lumileds’ new sales contracts and revenue, and (3) Lumileds’ litigation over patent disputes 
and the associated risk, and (4) forecasts of the LED market’s future growth. The primary sources 
also offer direct reporting on Agilent’s decision to sell its stake in Lumileds and the reasons behind 
the sale. Each of the following four sections is organized chronologically so that the reader may 
place in time developments in Lumileds’ history. 
 
3.5.2.1 Technical progress: New product releases and performance improvement recognitions 
 
 
Lumileds’ early history capitalized on HP’s success in entering the automotive lighting product by 
further developing the red, orange, and yellow LEDs’ performance but also sought to take the 
firm’s technology in slightly new directions. For example, Lumileds sought to introduce LED 
streetlighting as an expansion beyond just automotive lighting (Toupin, 1999). In addition to 
automotive taillights, Lumileds introduced in 2001 LED products for emergency services supplies 
firm EP911, including lightbars for police squad cars (Stockton, 2001). In 2000, Lumileds 
announced that it had achieved a record luminous efficacy (lumens per watt) with its orange-red 
LEDs of 100 lumens per watt. This efficacy exceeded conventional fluorescent tubes and was 
achieved much earlier than the industry expected (“Tech Briefs,” 2000). Lumileds was reported 
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in 2000 as having improved efficacies of LEDs through a novel die formations called the truncated 
inverted pyramid (S. Bush, 2000). Lumileds’ own George Craford noted that the red LED, the 
first LED technology to enter high-brightness applications, has increased its brightness 30-fold per 
decade and decreased its cost-per-lumen 10-fold per decade. The report mentioned an LED 
industry norm for LED brightness improvement - similar to the Moore’s Law for integrated circuit 
performance – in which red LEDs were expected to double in brightness every 18 months (Mills, 
2001). 
 
Beyond building on HP/Agilent’s experience with red, orange, and yellow LEDs, however, 
Lumileds also sought to expand the performance of other colors – notably green and blue. In late 
2000, Lumileds reported having achieved the brightest blue LED product for sale at the time (“Blue 
LEDs brighten up,” 2000). In March 2001, Lumileds also reported achieving record blue LED 
“wall-plug efficiency” of 25%, surpassing the prior record of 22% (DeMeis, 2001). In early 2001, 
Lumileds indicated a major breakthrough in its blue and green LED products that Lumileds 
expected to serve as a major stepping stone toward using LEDs for general illumination (i.e. 
lightbulbs). Lumileds announced that it had doubled the brightness of its AlInGaN blue and green 
LEDs, which enabled twelve of Lumileds’ new LEDs blue and greento do the work of 180 
conventional LEDs (“Double-brightness AIInGaN LEDs,” 2001). 
 
The goal of pursuing blue and green AlInGaN LEDs was to combine them with red-orange LEDs 
in pursuit of a white-light LED product, however. In summer of 2001, Lumileds revealed its new 
high-brightness white LED product line (“Lumileds launches high-brightness LEDs,” 2001). 
Lumileds branded its new high-brightness white-light LED products under the trademark name 
“Luxeon,” and at the 2001 LightFair conference and expo Lumileds revealed three Luxeon 
products: 
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• Luxeon Star, which provided a white light source but no optical components to manage or 
enhance the light 
• Luxeon Ring, which came as 6 or 12 Luxeon light sources and optics to deliver 194 lumens 
of white light 
• Luxeon Flood, which came as a small board of many Luxeon sources delivering 324 
lumens of white light 
 
In 2001, Lumileds sought to capitalize on its new high-brightness white LEDs and signalled that 
it soon would penetrate a new market with its white LED products – that of backlighting Liquid 
Crystal Displays (LCDs). LumiLeds announced that its new white-colored, high-brightness 
Luxeon LEDs could be used in the place of the incumbent technology, cold-cathode fluorescent 
lamps (CCFLs), with many advantages such as increased durability and longer life (“High-flux 
LED backlights for LCD displays,” 2001). To temper expectatinos about the advantages soon to 
come from LEDs, Lumileds CEO Mike Holt sought in an April 2001 article to set some realistic 
boundaries on what LEDs could accomplish in the near-term, what challenges LEDs would need 
to overcome before becoming adequate for replacing conventional lightbulbs, and when that would 
happen. Holt expected that LEDs would only suitable for lightbulb replacements after 10 to 15 
years of R&D and – importantly – after filling other niche applications in the meantime. Holt 
expressed concern that many technical accomplishments with LEDs to-date had been achieved at 
low currents, which masked how well LEDs would perform at typical high-current applications 
such as general illumination. By this point, the efficiency losses LEDs exhibited at high current 
were well known, and Holt reminded the industry that these efficiency losses and other technical 
challenges needed to be overcome before LEDs could “beat the bulb.” In the meantime, Holt laid 
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out strong optimism for LEDs to begin featuring strongly in applications for automotive lighting 
and LCD and mobile phone display backlighting (Holt, 2001). 
 
After Holt outlined these expectations for LED product performance in 2001, the year 2002 saw 
new releases of Lumileds’ Luxeon products, affirmation of Lumileds’ product life claims, and new 
applications of Lumileds’ old standby, the red LED. In early 2002, Lumileds announced a new 
white-light LED assembly called the “LuxeonStar/O” available in many colors for supplying 
flashlights and bicycle lights (S. Bush, 2002a). On April 15 2002, Lumileds announced its release 
of the Luxeon 5-Watt, at the time the world’s brightest LED light source (“5W LED delivers new 
benchmark in brightness,” 2002, “Lumileds Announces Luxeon 5-Watt, the World’s Brightest 
LED Light Source,” 2002). Lumileds later exhibited the Luxeon 5-watt and its record 120 lumen 
whilte-light output at LightFair in San Francisco in June 2002 (“World’s Brightest LED from 
Lumileds Lighting Debuts at LightFair in San Francisco,” 2002), for which Lumileds was granted 
the “Best of LightFair 2002” award (Conway, 2002). Moreover, while ability to maintain light 
output over long periods of operation had been a concern for earlier LED technologies, 
independent tests performed by Rensselaer Polytechnic scientists confirmed that Lumileds Luxeon 
products maintained 90% of their light output after being on for 9,000 hours (S. Bush, 2002b). In 
2002, Lumileds’ high-brightness red LEDs were reported as being implemented in radio tower and 
television tower flashing lights used to warn low-flying aircraft at night (“Applied Technology: 
Dialight tower lighting,” 2002). 
 
The year 2003 saw national recognition of Lumileds’ scientists for their contributions to LED 
technology, more novel applications, new low-wattage white-light LED products, the release of 
the industry’s first “warm-white” LED, and exciting news of designs to use LEDs in camera phone 
flashes. In November 2003, Lumileds’ Chief Technology Officer George Craford was awarded a 
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2002 national medal of technology for his contributions to LED research (“President Bush Awards 
Lumileds Lighting’s Chief Technology Officer Dr. M. George Craford The 2002 National Medal 
of Technology,” 2003). Alongside Craford, another 2002 medal was also awarded to Nick 
Holonyak – Craford’s advisor in graduate school. Holonyak created the first LED in 1962, and 
Craford created the first yellow-emitting LED in 1972 (“IEEE engineers earn national medals of 
science, technology,” 2003). Lumileds’ blue LEDs achieved a novel niche application in February 
2003 when they were reported as appearing in products designed to cure dental fillings (“Literally 
Bluetooth,” 2003). In summer 2003, Lumileds announced soon-to-be-released 2W-50-lumen and 
3W-70-lumen LED products (“Lumileds details 3W Luxeon LEDs,” 2003). In Fall 2003, Lumileds 
announced the release of “Luxeon-III,” a new generation of white-light LED products lasting for 
100,000 hours and providing 65 to 80 luments of brightness (“Lumileds Introduces Luxeon III, an 
80-Lumen Long-Life LED,” 2003). Lumileds announced in August 2003 the firm’s development 
a reference design for its first LED-based flash for camera phones. Able to produce 72 lumens at 
distances up to 6.5 feet by using a single Luxeon emitter, the new LED-based flash enabled camera 
phones to approach digital still cameras in terms of flash capability for the first time (Sullivan, 
2003). The brightness of the LED-based camera phone flash also enabled dual use as a flashlight 
(“Lumileds Releases Reference Design for LED-Based Camera Phone Flash,” 2003). The design 
was later reported in 2004 as having been implemented, achieving illumination of subjects at 1 to 
2 meters with two Luxeon LEDs. Cell phones containing the new Luxeon camera phone flashes 
were expected for the 2004 holiday season (“Camera-phone flash LEDs illuminate subjects at 1 to 
2 m,” 2004). In October 2003, Lumileds was reported as selling the LED industry’s first high- 
brightness “warm-white” LED. Based on its Luxeon technology, Lumileds’ warm-white LED 
achieved a warm-toned whit light that contrasted the common cool-toned white light of most 
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white-light LED products to date. Development of a warm-white LED was seen as a key 
breakthrough as it overcame objections from architects and lighting designers to the cool-white 
colors dominant in white-light LED products (“Lumileds Ships Industry’s First Warm White 
LED,” 2003, “Warm white Luxeon LEDs by Lumileds Lighting,” 2004). 
 
2004 marked an unfortunately dark year for product performance, as Lumileds had to undertake 
great efforts to assuage customers regarding problems with non-LED components of its lighting 
fixtures made by other firms – firms who were attracted to LED revenues but who lacked 
experience building the proper components. In 2004, reporting revealed an emerging problem 
within the LED market and that Lumileds, holding most of the market share, would bear the most 
burden in resolving. Fittings for many LED lighting products had apparently been made incorrectly 
by firms recently attracted by the high-brightness LED industry’s growth, and the failure of such 
fittings was sowing doubt among those who had bought into the new LED technologies. Lumileds 
Director of Market Development Keith Scott was quoted as saying “So many people are getting 
involved, and we are at a point where not everybody is doing it right… Architects are getting 
burned," To combat the issue, Lumileds formed an organization called the Lumileds Lighting 
Network (“LED companies respond to doubts over fitting quality,” 2004). The Lumileds Lighting 
Network provided training, certification, and technical support to lighting professionals and gave 
architects and designers access to suppliers meeting a high standard of quality and having proven 
their expertise in making LED-based products (“Lumileds Forms Luxeon Lighting Network to Aid 
Lighting Specifiers in Executing Projects Utilizing LED-Based Illumination Program Enables 
Manufacturers and Solution Providers to Exploit Exploding Market,” 2004). 
 
Building from this new expertise network, the year 2005 saw brighter times for Lumileds’ 
technical progress, in which Lumileds and Agilent rolled out new mid-power LED products, 
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Lumileds reported improved Luxeon performance, and Lumileds received many points of 
recognition for advancing LED-based technologies. In March 2005, Lumileds and Agilent 
announced the rollout of their first three mid-power LED products under the new product line 
brand “Envisium.” The products targeted automotive applications, particularly automobile 
taillights, turn signals, and mirror turn signals (Roos, 2005). In April 2005, Lumileds reported 
improvements to its InGaN LEDs, the Luxeon I line, improving light output from 31 lumens to 45 
lumens in white, blue, cyan, green, and royal blue color (“Lumileds Touts New Luxeon I High 
Power LEDs,” 2005). Lumileds also reported improvements to the Luxeon III line, including 
record-breaking lumens-per-package numbers of 110 for amber, 140 for red and 190 for red- 
orange (“Lighting firm develops 190 lumen LEDs for use in vehicle stop lights and indicators,” 
2005). Lumileds announced in June 2005 that the firm’s Luxeon LCD backlight technology had 
been awarded the silver prize in the 2004 Society for Information Display/Information Display 
Magazine competition (“Lumileds’ Luxeon Garners Recognition,” 2005). And finally, reporting 
in May 2005 credited Lumileds with much of the recent advances in mobile phone technology for 
displays and camera flashes (Nass, 2005). 
 
After Agilent sold Lumileds to Philips, Lumileds’ scientists still remained confident about the 
prospects of the company’s LED technological progress. At a conference on optoelectronics in 
December 2006, Philips Lumileds CTO George Craford forecast that the efficiency of white-light 
LEDs would soon exceed that of fluorescent bulbs and that cost reductions would soon be 
accelerating LED adoption for general illumination (“OIDA Annual Forum Promotes Energy and 
Industrial Optoelectronics Applications,” 2006). 
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3.5.2.2 Dealings with other businesses: Sales contracts, expansions, new revenues 
 
 
The early years of Lumileds – 1999 to 2001 – saw the joint venture engaging in multiple new 
business contracts and expansions of its own lines of business, including receiving new resources 
from Agilent and Phililps, partnering with display-makers, and selling to traffic-light vendors. 
Agilent expressed high optimism about the future of Lumileds through Agilent’s early decisions 
to allocate its existing facilities. In forming Lumileds, Agilent gave the joint venture control of 
HP’s San Jose fabrication facilities for producing AlInGaP and InGaN LEDs instead of giving the 
facilities to Agilent’s Semiconductor Products Group (Szweda, 1999). After two years of 
collaborating through Lumileds, both HP and Philips agreed to expand the joint-venture in 1999 
through a combined investment that would move the scope of Lumileds beyond automotive 
taillights. Philips executive VP John Whybrow expressed optimism regarding the future market 
for LED products: “Philips and HP have had more than two years of successful cooperation in the 
LumiLeds joint venture…Extending this relationship demonstrates our confidence in the 
technology applied to an increasing range of applications.” (“HP and Philips expand joint venture 
advance LED adoption,” 1999). In 2000, Lumileds entered into a marketing contract with Dialight 
Corp to offer Lumileds’ LED traffic signals at 40% price reductions to increase conversions from 
conventional signals and reduce payback periods for municipal buyers. Lumileds also formed in 
2000 a separate “Components Busines Unit” within itself to pursue applications of LEDs toward 
signage lighting (“Lumileds forms new Components Business Unit,” 2000). Menko Deroos, 
Lumileds’ VP of New Business Development, stated that Lumileds had begun negotiations with 
several display-makers and intended to ramp up production of its new LED-powered LCD 
backlighting products in to the tens of thousands by the end of 2001 (Chin, 2001). At LightFair 
2001, Lumileds also announced an extension of a partnership with backlight manufacturer 
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WooYoung Co. Ltd of South Korea to enter the LCD and TV markets (“Lumileds launches high- 
brightness LEDs,” 2001). Business reporting revealed that Lumileds had contracted with a 
subsidiary of lens-maker Fraen to develop technologies for focusing beams from Lumileds’ 
Luxeon white-light LED devices, based on combinations of red, blue, and green LEDs. The color 
of the Luxeons could be adjusted by varying the current driven to each color of LED (S. Bush, 
2002c). 
 
Later years saw Lumileds earn more sales contracts for displays, move into new markets such as 
architectural lighting and automotive headlamps (not taillights), deal with contractions, and partner 
with national laboratories. In March 2002, Lumileds announced a sales contract it had earned with 
Mitsubishi to develop and vend LED backlights for Mistubishi’s LCDs (Szweda, 2002). Lumileds 
announced in August 2002 that the firm had earned a sales contract with Color Kinetics, maker of 
color-changing LED-based light fixtures (“Color Kinetics Selects Lumileds’ Luxeon Light 
Sources for New bColor Fixtures, Citing Luxeon's Industry-Leading Intensity Per LED,” 2002). 
Lumileds’ Luxeon LEDs would replace CCFTs in backlighting Mitsubishi’s TFT-LCD products, 
which would be manufactured by Mitsubishi subsidiary Advanced Display Incorporated (Ball, 
2002; “Lumileds’ LED-based Backlight System Will Power TFT-LCD Modules for Mitsubishi 
Electric, Offering Key Benefits for Monitor Manufacturers,” 2002). In December 2002, Mitsubishi 
announced plans to release the Luxeon-powered TFT-LCD products in 2003 (“Mitsubishi Electric 
Announces Three LED-Based TFT-LCD Modules Powered by Lumileds’ Luxeon Technology, 
Scheduled for 2003 Release,” 2002). In 2003, broader contractions in its telecommunications 
product markets led Agilent to close or relocate certain facilities, with Lumileds remaining as 
Agilent’s only manufacturer in the US (“Agilent Shifts Sites,” 2003). Lumileds gained positive 
press in 2003 for releasing Luxeon LED products specifically designed to be fitted onto Amish 
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buggies, after partnering with a part-Amish-owned solar energy firm (Sadin, 2003; Teresko, 2003). 
Lumileds also earned sales with Cadillac, as demonstrated by Cadillac’s release of the XLR luxury 
roadster featuring LED taillights and brakelights (“Cadillac’s XLR Luxury Roadster Showcases 
Innovative HID and LED Lighting,” 2003). Beyond taillights and brakelights, however, Lumileds’ 
LED products were first reported as appearing in automobile headlights in May 2003. While 
Lumileds’ products had long appeared in automobile taillights and brakelights, Lumileds’ products 
had not yet been featured in headlights until Ford’s Model U and Audi’s Nuvolari concept cars 
debuted with LED headlights (“Headlights Go Digital,” 2003, “LEDs Light the Way for New Car 
Headlamp Designs,” 2003). In February 2003, LEDs also made their first architectural debut when 
Lumileds’ Luxeon products were used to illuminate Whiteleys Shopping Centre in London. The 
installation used 2000 LEDs and consumed less than one-third of the energy consumed by 
conventional light sources for the similar applications (S. Bush, 2003a). In July 2003, Lumileds 
was reported as being engaged with Sandia National Laboratories in a federally funded 
collaborative research project to measure the efficiency of quantum dot phosphor technologies for 
making white light (S. Bush, 2003b). 
 
In 2004, Lumileds formed two separate sales partnerships with its parent firms – one with Philips 
and one with Agilent. In July 2004, Agilent announced that it would partner with Lumileds in the 
name of developing mid-power LED technologies. Agilent remained a strong supplier of low- 
brightness LEDs for telecommunications applications, and Lumileds technology continued to 
dominate high-brightness applications. The new mid-power LEDs were to be between 200mW 
and 1W and were to target the automotive, mobile phone, and lighting markets. In the partnership 
between Agilent and its joint-venture, Lumileds was to provide the LED die and Agilent was to 
design whole products and provide manufacturing expertise. Mid-power LED products from the 
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new partnership were expected to be delivered in Q4 2004 (“Agilent Technologies and Lumileds 
Lighting Announce Agreement to Co-Develop New LEDs,” 2004, “Around the Circuit: Industry 
News,” 2004; S. Bush, 2004b). In addition to Agilent’s partnership with Lumileds, Philips also 
partnered with its own joint-venture. In November 2004, Philips and Lumileds announced a 
partnership to develop modular LED products for the automobile industry. Reporting named 
Philips as the world’s leader in automotive lighting products, and it was to be the specialty division 
Philips Automotive Lighting who would provide design, development, and integration capabilities 
to the new partnership. Lumileds was to provide the already popular Luxeon LED products and 
related expertise (“Lumileds Lighting and Philips Announce New Partnership,” 2004). 
 
Later years saw Lumileds products featured in automobile running lights, expanding further into 
display markets through Mitsubishi partnerships, expanding its production capacity, and being 
hailed as a money-maker by financial analysts. In January 2004, reporting revealed that, for the 
first time, high-brightness LED products would be used as automobile daytime running lamps in 
the Audi A8 W12 model. The lamps, using Lumileds’ Luxeon products, were manufactured by 
the German firm Hella, who expressed optimism about the future of high-brightness LEDs despite 
European regulations preventing their use in certain automobile lights. Hella claimed to have 
initiated discussions with European regulators to get the rules changed (S. Bush, 2004a). 
Capitalizing on its successful contracts with Mitsubishi for developing LED-based LCD 
backlighting technologies, Lumileds announced in March 2004 that it had developed and released 
a stand-alone, ready-to-use LCD backlighting technology called “Luxeon DCC.” Rather than 
purchasing Lumileds’ time and expertise to design specialty Luxeon-powered LCD backlights, 
LCD makers could now simply order a Luxeon DCC for easy integration into their LCD designs 
(“Lumileds Releases the First Ready-to-Use RGB LED Light Sources for Backlights,” 2004, 
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“NEC-Mitsubishi’s LED Backlit LCD Display,” 2004). Mitsubishi debuted new Luxeon-powered 
TFT-LCDs from the Lumileds booth at the Society for Information Display conference in May 
2004 (“NEC-Mitsubishi Electronics Display Launches Its First LED Backlit LCD Display at SID 
2004,” 2004). To meet growing demand for its Luxeon LEDs, Lumileds announced in May 2004 
that it would be tripling its Luxeon production capacity by opening a new 200,000 sqft 
manufacturing plant in Malaysia (“Lumileds to Open New Plant in Malaysia, Tripling Production 
Capacity for Luxeon LEDs,” 2004). Finally, at a conference call on Q3 2004 performance, Philips 
executives reported that the Lumileds joint-venture with Agilent “again had excellent performance 
in sales and earnings and cash flow” (“Event Brief of Q3 2004 Royal Philips Electronics Earnings 
Conference Call - Final,” 2004). 
 
The final years of Agilent ownership and early post-Agilent period saw Lumileds partnering with 
distribution firms, earning further sales from Mitsubishi, continuing its work on mid-power LEDs, 
and continuing to be hailed as a money-maker by financial analysts – after the split with Agilent. 
In May 2005, Lumileds announced a joint venture with product distributor Future Electronics that 
would capitalize on the success of the Lumileds Lighting Network. Called “Lumileds Future 
Electronics,” the joint venture would provide several services to third parties including Luxeon 
product assembly, design of lighting systems, new custom optical products, technologies for 
managing heat and optimizing power usage, and technical support. Moreover, Lumileds Future 
Electronics partnered with several firms within the Luxeon Lighting Network to expand the firms’ 
services using trusted LED industry suppliers (“Lumileds Joint Venture Delivers Luxeon-based 
Products,” 2005). Mitsubishi announced in March 2005 that it would release a pocket-sized 
projector later that summer and that the projector would make use of Lumileds’ Luxeon LEDs for 
lighting (Sauer, 2005). Reviews of Mitsubishi’s Pocket Projector were mixed, but the reportedly 
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device performed well in dark or low-light conditions (Jantz, 2019). After Agilent’s sale of 
Lumileds, Lumileds continued work on the Envisium line of mid-power LED products through a 
partnership with Avago Technologies (“Avago Technologies’ Envisium family of LEDs receive 
EE Times' ACE ultimate products of the year award,” 2006). Finally, At a conference call to review 
Philips’ Q2 2006 financial performance, Philips representatives noted that Lumileds had grown 
sales 22% above Q2 2005, which itself had been quite high. Philips representatives expressed 
optimism for future margins (returns) on their lighting operations, including Lumileds (“Q2 2006 
Royal Philips Electronics Earnings Conference Call - Final,” 2006) 
 
3.5.2.3 Patents: Licensing, disputes, litigation, and risk 
 
 
While Lumileds earned patent licensing revenues through multiple separate contracts, Lumileds’ 
history saw multiple patent disputes – some of which were inherited from HP/Agilent and most of 
which concerned die-makers based in Taiwan and China, In October 2001, Lumileds successfully 
settled a lawsuit it had filed against United Epitaxy Corporation of Taiwan (UEC) for patent 
infringement. The settlement awarded Lumileds new income from significant patent licensing fees 
and royalty payments in exchange for allowing UEC to produce device components similar to a 
window for improving luminous output from LEDs that HP had patented and Lumileds had 
inherited (“UEC settles lawsuit - licenses Lumileds’ T/S LED patents,” 2001). Business reporting 
in 2002 revealed that Lumileds and Nichia had settled a patent dispute with a cross-licensing 
agreement for white-light LED technologies (S. Bush, 2002d; “LED companies achieve IP cross- 
license accord,” 2002, “Major LED companies Nichia, Lumileds sign cross-licensing deal,” 2002). 
Nichia and Lumileds announced another cross-licensing agreement in February 2003 (“Progress 
on display,” 2003). 
87  
Shortly after news of its camera phone flash design, Lumileds filed suit against Epistar for 
infringing Lumileds’ patents on its AlGaInP LED products. Lumileds had earlier filed suit against 
Citizen Electronics Ltd. and its subsidiary Cecol, Inc. for importing and selling the infringing 
Epistar products, but those claims were settled separately from the Epistar case (“Lumileds Sues 
Epistar for Patent Infringement,” 2003). In August 2003, Lumileds announced a successful license 
of several of its AlInGaP technology patents to Shin-Etsu Handotai in exchange for undisclosed 
royalty revenues (“Shin-Etsu Handotai Obtains License Under Lumileds Patents,” 3AD). In July 
2004, Lumileds and Epistar settled the earlier lawsuit brought about by Lumileds for infringement 
of Lumileds’ AlGaInP LED technologies. Lumileds granted Epistar a license to practice some of 
Lumileds’ patents, but financial terms of the agreement were not disclosed (“Lumileds and Epistar 
Settle Lawsuit,” 2004). 
 
In August 2004, reporting revealed that Lumileds had earned an R&D contract from US Display 
Consortium to develop LED products for projectors. The $2 million R&D project was to be cost- 
shared equally between Lumileds and US Display Corporation (“Also in the news...,” 2004). In 
February 2005, Lumileds announced a forthcoming advisory regarding the making of mirror 
substrate LED products. Lumileds signalled that it believed many in the LED industry were 
infringing on the company’s patents, warning industry members that both LED users and LED 
makers have the obligation to avoid infringing Lumileds’ patents (Mills, 2005). 
 
In April 2006, Lumileds and Toyoda Gosei announced a major patent cross-licensing agreement. 
Toyoda Gosei continued to hold patents on low-power blue LEDs, while Lumileds held patents on 
high-power blue LEDs. The two firms agreed to allow each to use the other’s patents, granting 
each greater freedom to explore new designs and possibilities for advancing LED technology 
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(“Philips Lumileds Lighting and Toyoda Gosei Ink Pact to Share LED Patents,” 2006, “Toyoda 
Gosei and Philips Lumileds Share LED Patents,” 2006). 
 
3.5.2.4 The LED market: expected future growth and interactions with business cycle 
 
 
Throughout the entire history of Agilent’s part-ownership of Lumileds, the market for Lumileds’ 
products was always forecast to be growing strongly. In 1999, Semiconductor market research 
firm Strategies Unlimited forecast that the market for high-brightness LEDs would grow by $1 
billion in five years (“Strategies Unlimited Announces Program for Feb. 10-11, 2000 Conference 
On Business Opportunities in Advanced LEDs,” 1999). In 2000, Strategies Unlimited was reported 
as forecasting high-brightness LED market growth of $2.3 billion in 1999 to $3.3 billion in 2003 
(“LED market lights up,” 2000). 
 
Reporting on the Intertech LED-2000 conference on November 13-15 2000 in San Mateo, CA 
expressed strong confidence in future growth of the market for LEDs and claimed that Agilent led 
other suppliers in market share. The report lists several categories of new applications expected to 
create opportunities for new LED sales growth, including “traffic lights, automotive brake signals, 
instrument displays, video displays, airport runway, hazardous lighting, and exit signs” (Mills, 
2001). At the conference, Stan Brudele of Dataquest forecast annual sales of optoelectronic 
semiconductor devices to grow from $6 billion in 1999 to $12 billion in 2004. Among other 
optoelectronic semiconductor devices, Brudele’s presentation forecast growth in annual LED sales 
to increase from $1.5 billion in 1999 to roughly $2.5 billion in 2004 (Mills, 2001). Figure 5 





Figure 5: Forecast market growth for LEDs and other optoelectronic semiconductors. 
Source: (Mills, 2001) 
 
Brudele’s presentation also provided a leaderboard of the top firms supplying LED lamps and 
displays by 1999 sales, shown in Figure 6. In this ranking, Agilent claimed the top position with 




Figure 6: Market leaders in the sales of LED lamps and displays. Source: (Mills, 2001) 
 
The Intertech conference report’s coverage of new firms entering the LED market further 
underscored the expected growth potential for LED sales. The report listed several recently 
emerged LED suppliers such as the firms Mingstar, Kingbright, Ledtech, Everlight and Lite-On. 
The report also mentioned that, beyond Lumileds, other LED-focused joint ventures had been 
formed between major lighting suppliers and smaller semiconductor firms. The report named the 
General-Electric-and-EMCORE partnership called GELcore and the Osram-Sylvania-and- 
Infineon partnership called Osram Optoelectronics as two other joint ventures indicating major 
lighting firms’ interest in the potential LED market shares. The report further underscored major 
firms’ expectations for strong future LED sales growth by mentioning Uniroyal Corp’s purchase 
of Sterling Semiconductor, a cooperative agreement between Uniroyal and EMCORE, Uniroyal’s 
LED-focused start-up NovaLux, and Toyota’s 41% stake in LED manufacturer Toyoda Gosei 
(Mills, 2001). 
 
LED growth even survived economic downturn in the early 2000s and was expected to continue. 
Through 2001’s economic downturn, which severely impacted many technology firms, Strategies 
Unlimited forecast LED sales to grow by $400 million to a total of $1.6 billion. Strategies 
Unlimited’s president John Day explained that while the economic downturn had slowed cell 
phone sales and with it the sales of cell phone’s LED components, LEDs’ other markets remained 
strong. Day explained that car sales in particular, which continued to drive LED sales for 
automotive brakelights and taillights, were not affected by the downturn, and LEDs’ presence in 
many consumer goods helped the lighting technology continue thriving amidst the economic 
struggles of the early 2000s. Moreover, LED prices were expected to continue declining at a rate 
of 10% per year (“LED outlook favors buyers,” 2001). 
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In Summer of 2002, Strategies Unlimited released forecast the high-brightness LED market to 
grow to $6 billion in sales by 2006. Strategies Unlimited forecast $1.6 billion in high-brightness 
LED sales by the end of 2002 and forecast high-brightness LED prices to fall 10-15% through 
2002. Strategies Unlimited’s Bob Steele pointed to backlights for LCDs in cell phones as a major 
driver of new LED sales growth (Chin, 2002; “LED tags fall despite growing market demand 
(Optoelectronics),” 2002). In a 2002 interview, CEO of Agilent Ned Barnholt stated that Lumileds’ 
white light technologies needed another 10 years to get costs comparable to fluorescent lighting 
technologies. Barnholt mentioned that most traffic signals had converted to SSL and that the 
automobile taillight business was still strong. The general economic depression of the early 2000s 
had given Agilent some market growth in industries that were depressed, but industries that 
boomed in the early 2000s were dominated by small start-ups and edged Agilent out (Sperling & 
Chappell, 2002). In January 2003, Strategies Unlimited’s Robert Steele forecast steady 
improvement in LED technology performance and price through the remainder of that year (Steele, 
2003). 
 
In March 2004, the LED lighting market was forecast to grow to $5 billion in annual sales by 2007 
(“Lumileds Forms Luxeon Lighting Network to Aid Lighting Specifiers in Executing Projects 
Utilizing LED-Based Illumination Program Enables Manufacturers and Solution Providers to 
Exploit Exploding Market,” 2004). Later, a 2005 report from firms NanoMarkets and CIR forecast 
the market for high-brightness LEDs and new ultra-high brightness LEDs to grow from sales of 
$5 billion in 2006 to sales of $11 billion in 2010 sales and to sales of $17 billion in 2013 (“High- 
Brightness LED Market to Reach $10.8 Billion by 2010, According to New Report,” 2005). 
 
Strategies Unlimited was reported in 2005 as having released new predictions of the future size of 
the high-brightness LED market. Strategies Unlimited forecast the market to grow to $7.2 billion 
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in sales by 2009, almost doubling from 2004 sales of $3.7 billion – see Figure 7. Strategies 
Unlimited also calculated the total portfolio of LED uses for 2005, revealing the dominance of 
mobile phone applications – shown in Figure 8. Rensselaer Polytechnic University’s Lighting 
Research Council’s Director of Solid-state Lighting Research Nadarajah Narendra spoke of a 
“global roadmap” that forecast the efficiency of LED products to reach 150 lumens per watt by 
2012 (Costlow, 2005). 
 
 
Figure 7: Forecast of high-brightness LED market’s sales revenues for 2004-2009, as 





Figure 8: Applications for high-brightness LED products in 2005, as calculated by 
Strategies Unlimited. Source: (Costlow, 2005) 
 
In August 2006, Strategies Unlimited released its forecast that the LED market would grow to $4.2 
billion in sales by the end of 2006 and would grow to $8.3 billion by 2010. Strategies Unlimited 
also forecast LED product costs to decline by 10-15% over 2007 due to “tremendous overcapacity 
in Asia” (“LED market brightens; tags fall,” 2006). 
 
3.5.2.5 Direct reporting on Agilent’s decision to sell Lumileds 
 
 
On August 15 2005, Agilent announced that it would sell its stake in Lumileds to Philips. The 
announcement made it into the pages of the Wall Street Journal, who characterized the sale as part 
of a series of steps in favor of Agilent’s core test and measurement business (Tam, 2005). A 
conference call on Q4 earnings revealed that Agilent expected to earn $1 billion from the sale of 
Lumileds (“Q4 2005 Agilent Technologies Inc. Earnings Conference Call - Final,” 2005). In 
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October 2005, Lumileds was reported as having sold its 47% stake to Philips for $950 million plus 
 
$50 million to repay Lumileds for cash borrowed by Agilent. While Lumileds employees would 
continue to own 3.5% of Lumileds, Philips now held a 96.5% stake in Lumileds. Lumileds was 
reported as having had $324 million in revenue and $83 million in profits from October 2004 to 
October 2005 (Overton, 2005). Agilent was reported as planning to return proceeds of the sale to 
its shareholders through a share repurchase program to commence immediately upon the sale 
(“Agilent Technologies to spin off SOC and memory test businesses,” 2005). At the same time as 
the Lumileds sale, Agilent was reported as planning to sell its semiconductor products group 
(SPG), its SOC business, and its Memory Test business. Signaling the intent behind the planned 
divestitures, an unnamed Agilent executive was quoted as saying “We believe the decisions we 
made today will allow our organization to be 100% focused on the measurement market” 
(McElligott, 2005). Later reporting confirmed the completion ofAgilent’s sale of its stake in 
Lumileds to Philips on November 29, 2005. The reporting specified that the sale of Lumileds, and 
several of Agilent’s other businesses, were “designed to enhance the company's focus as a pure- 
play measurement company” (“Agilent Technologies Completes Sale of Its Stake in Lumileds,” 
2005). Further reporting noted that “Some engineers [saw the sale of Lumileds] as one company's 
attempt to return to its roots as a test and measurement instrument maker” (Ohr, 2005). 
 
In a conference call to financial analysts on Agilent’s recent performance, Agilent’s executives 
expressed great satisfaction with the sale of Lumileds and other of Agilent’s former business lines 




3.6.1 Comparing the findings for each hypothesis: which best explains HP’s decision to leave 
Lumileds? 
 
3.6.1.1 Hypothesis H1: HP/Agilent abandoned the Lumileds joint venture because 
 
HP/Agilent’s lacked Core Capabilities suitable for inter-firm collaboration 
 
 
Hypothesis H1 appears to hold under the relevant evidence presented. HP/Agilent and Philips 
appear to have evolved in very different environments and appear to have developed very different 
Core Capabilities with regard to inter-firm collaboration. While Philips appears to have developed 
a strong Core Capability of Knowledge-exchange enabling collaboration with outside 
organizations, HP appears to have developed an innovate-from-within Core Capability focusing 
on developing its own employee’s ideas at the expense of external collaboration. What’s more, 
these Core Capabilities appear to have persisted over each firms’ history, as demonstrated by the 
differences in inter-firm collaboration exhibited by the two firms throughout the 1980s. Review of 
Agilent’s early history finds strong evidence suggesting that Agilent had inherited HP’s Core 
Capabilities despite being a spin-off firm, including those Core Capabilities that hampered external 
collaboration. Given the evidence, Hypothesis H1 continues to stand as having strong potential for 
explaining the decision of Agilent to sell Lumileds. 
 
3.6.1.2 Rival Hypothesis R1: HP/Agilent abandoned the Lumileds joint venture because 
 
HP/Agilent’s expected net returns on SSL technology development fell below 
 
HP/Agilent’s desired net returns from remaining in the joint-venture 
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The primary sources reviewed for this chapter make it difficult to assert that Agilent’s decision to 
abandon the Lumileds joint-venture was motivated by low expectations for future returns on SSL 
technology. Through the various metrics assessed above – technological progress, deals with other 
businesses, patent-related issues, and forecasted growth for the LED market in general – it seems 
that Lumileds performed quite well. Throughout the period of Agilent’s co-ownership, Lumileds 
frequently released new products, entered new markets, struck new deals with firms to expand its 
capacity or sell more of its products, and received wide recognition for its accomplishments. All 
this occurred against a backdrop of continually forecasted strong growth in the LED market 
overall. While Lumileds struggled with certain patent disputes, none of the disputes appeared to 
have been egregiously costly to the firm and many of the disputes were inherited from Agilent 
itself – thus making it unlikely that Agilent could shield itself from litigation by losing Lumileds. 
Moreover, the direct reporting on Agilent’s decision seems to indicate that Agilent’s goal was to 
re-focus its efforts on its measurement instruments business. Even more convincing is the financial 
reporting by Philips analysts that Lumileds continued to be a money-maker for the joint-venture’s 
co-owners before Agilent sold its stake, and continued to be a money-maker for Philips with strong 
expected future growth after Agilent sold its stake. 
 
Given the weight of this evidence, Rival Hypothesis R1 cannot stand. It seems implausible to argue 
that Agilent sold its stake in Lumileds due to low expected revenues from SSL technology 
development. All evidence revealed through review of primary sources on Lumileds, Agilent, and 
Philips indicates that Lumileds enabled Agilent to hold a dominant share in a rapidly growing 
market and earn additional revenues from patent licenses. No evidence indicates reason to believe 
Lumileds would be a money-loser or that SSL R&D would not enable Lumileds and its owners to 
earn future revenues in the LED market. 
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3.6.2 Synthesis: Organizational Capabilities explain Agilent’s sale of Lumileds to Philips 
 
When faced with the question of why Hewlett-Packard’s spin-out Agilent abandoned its LED 
joint-venture with Phillips, Nelson and Winter’s evolutionary theory of economics provides key 
explanatory insights. This study examined relevant data on each firm’s early history, decision- 
making routines, and collaboration behavior during the 1980s, finding links between each firm’s 
established decision-making routines (i.e. “Core Capabilities”) and each firm’s 1980s inter-firm 
collaboration. The study finds that Nelson and Winter’s hypotheses regarding evolutionary 
economics hold under evidence from the histories of Hewlett-Packard, Philips, and each firm’s 
inter-firm collaboration behavior. Moreover, the study finds that the specific history of Agilent 
and its Core Capabilities inherited from Hewlett-Packard explain the decision by Agilent to 
abandon its joint-venture with Philips in 2005. 
 
Having found Nelson and Winter’s theory to withstand evidence from the histories of Philips and 
Hewlett-Packard and to provide explanation for the fate of their joint venture Lumileds, future 
work could apply the theory to Lumileds’ own behavior. What are the Core Capabilities of 
Lumileds itself? What capabilities did it inherit from Philips or from Hewlett-Packard/Agilent? 
How did those Core Capabilities impact Lumileds’ performance? Since Philips divested Lumileds 
in 2017, how has Lumileds exhibited its Core Capabilities? 
 
3.6.3 Lessons for policy-making 
 
Policymakers who design policies to affect R&D performed by firms and academics who study 
R&D performed by firms should care about this chapter because it reveals a key latent factor, Core 
Capabilities, that affects how a firm performs R&D and whether it will collaborate on R&D with 
other firms. This chapter highlights how Core Capabilities hampered the collaboration between 
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two firms, Hewlett-Packard and Philips, on developing new technology for SSL. Hewlett-Packard 
and Philips were an ideal match for developing SSL technology and assisting SSL innovation 
because of Hewlett-Packard’s expertise in optics and solid-state materials and Philips’ expertise 
in designing and manufacturing consumer lightbulbs. Moreover and more importantly, many 
policies had been put into place to foster inter-firm collaboration, a major policy shift from the 
post-World-War-II era in which inter-firm collaboration within the US had been discouraged by 
policy. Yet despite policies favoring an advantageous case of interfirm R&D collaboration, 
Hewlett-Packard and Philips collaborated through a joint-venture only a short while before 
Hewlett-Packard abandoned the joint-venture and SSL altogether. The analysis presented in this 
chapter reveals that Core Capabilities were to blame for the infringed collaboration between 
Hewlett-Packard and Philips. 
 
Since this chapter’s analysis reveals a factor affecting firms’ R&D performance, policymakers and 
academic researchers focusing on this area should alter their policy designs and research designs 
accordingly. Policymakers should take assessments of the Core Capabilities of the firms whose 
R&D they seek to influence and design policies so as to take advantage of – or at least not get 
thwarted by – firms’ Core Capabilities. In a similar manner, academic researchers interested in 
what drives firm R&D should look further into the Core Capabilities of firms of interest. 
Researchers should account for a firm’s Core Capabilities when estimating the influence of any 
other factor on the firm’s R&D performance. Moreover, publicizing analyses that establish 
individual firms’ Core Capabilities would be of great use to policymakers seeking to design 




CHAPTER 4. PATH-DEPENDENCIES AND PATENT LICENSING: 




4.1 Research Question 
 
This chapter seeks to answer the following question: Did the DOE SSL’s compulsory licensing 
policy have a negative impact on patent production among affected leaders of DOE-SSL-funded 
projects? Through legislation passed in 2005, Congress required the DOE SSL program to solicit 
input in determining R&D priorities from major lighting industry firms and, in exchange, to give 
these major firms licensing guarantees to any patents arising from program-funded R&D. To meet 
this requirement, the DOE SSL program required owners of patents on program-funded R&D to 
enter into license negotiations only with any member of the group of firms who provided input in 
determining the program’s R&D priorities – a compulsory licensing policy. The DOE wrote that 
instituting the compulsory licensing policy would help ensure that research funded by the program 
ultimately resulted in new products introduced in markets (McCabe & Gottlieb, 2006). Prior 
literature suggests that compulsory licensing policies can reduce researchers’ overall patenting, 
however, which could lead to a reduction in patent licensing and reduction in new product 
introduction – thus thwarting DOE’s expectations of the policy. In particular, some theories 
articulate a path-dependency affecting researcher patenting in which the history of expropriation 
and reverse-engineering in an industry determines the degree to which inventors are willing to 
patent their discoveries. Given the conflict between the DOE’s expectation for the policy and the 
100  
academic literature, this study seeks to identify the impact of the DOE’s policy on affected 
researchers’ patent production. 
 
4.1.1 Origins of the compulsory licensing policy: The Energy Policy Act of 2005’s directive and 
the NGLIA 
 
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 instituted the DOE SSL program’s distinctive rules towards issues 
of intellectual property and patenting. The Energy Policy Act’s Section 912(h), 
“INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY,” empowered the US Secretary of Energy to make special 
requirements of any patented invention whose supporting R&D was funded by the DOE SSL 
program’s grants. In particular, Section 912(h) empowered the Secretary to grant exclusive first 
rights to negotiations with the patent owner for non-exclusive patent licenses and royalties. Section 
912(h)(1) named the members of an Industry Alliance, defined elsewhere as for-profit firms 
representative of US SSL R&D and manufacturing efforts, as the first-rights recipients. 
Furthermore, Section 912(h)(2)(A) prohibited the patent owners from licenses negotiations with 
any non-members of the Industry Alliance, a prohibition to last for one year after a patent’s first 
granting. During the patent’s initial year, Section 912(h)(2)(B) requires the patent owner to engage 
in good faith negotiations with any interested member of the Industry Alliance – preventing patent 
owners from refusing license negotiation outright. Finally, Section 912(h)(3) granted the Secretary 
the power to enumerate further undefined terms governing patent licensing “as the Secretary 
determines are required to promote accelerated commercialization of inventions made under the 
initiative.” (109th Congress, 2005) 
 
To fulfill the authorizing legislation’s requirements for an “Industry Alliance,” a number of lead 
firms in the lighting industry joined together to form a group called the Next-Generation Lighting 
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Alliance (NGLIA). Table 7 provides data on NGLIA membership between 2003 and 2014. As 
written in the legislation, the NGLIA constituted a diversity of firms with knowledge regarding 
different parts of the SSL value chain. Firms represented in the NGLIA included both large firms 
with global manufacturing presences and small firms with niche specialty in the semiconductors 











































20 According to conversations with PNNL scientists, most of the major firms in solid-state lighting were members of 
the NGLIA at one point or another. 
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Table 7: Membership in Next Generation Lighting Industry Alliance, 2003-2014. Source: Wayback Machine research; NGLIA 





Year of firm’s membership in Next Generation Lighting Industry Alliance 
(1=member, 0=non-member) 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
3M 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Acuity Brands Lighting 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Applied Materials, Inc. 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
Bayer MaterialScience, LLC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
CAO Group Inc. 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Color Kinetics 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Corning, Inc. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Cree Inc. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Dow Corning Corporation 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Eastman Kodak Company 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
EYE Lighting 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
GELCore LLC 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
GELcore, LLC 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
General Electric Company 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
GLO USA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Light Prescriptions Innovators,             
LLC 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
LSI Industries 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
Lumileds Lighting, LLC 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Luminus Devices, Inc. 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 



























       1 1 1 1 0 0 
       1 1 1 1 0 0 
       1 1 1 1 1 1 
QuNano, Inc 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Ruud Lighting, Inc. 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Universal Display Corporation 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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4.1.2 Details of the DOE SSL Program’s compulsory licensing policy 
 
The DOE implemented the 2005 Energy Policy Act’s requirement for special licensing 
privileges by first obtaining an exemption to the Bayh-Dole act; and second, instituting a 
compulsory licensing policy. Passed in 1980, the Bayh-Dole Act Bayh-Dole Act (35 U.S.C. 
202(a)(ii)) reversed the stakes in patenting federally funded R&D by placing rights to the 
patent with the funded entity instead of with the federal government and its agencies. As 
such, the Bayh-Dole Act stood in the way of the US DOE’s 2005 Energy Policy Act 
directive to control the licensing of patents on R&D the program had funded. To 
circumvent the Bayh-Dole act, the US DOE prepared and published an analysis justifying 
its exemption to the Bayh-Dole Act on the grounds that, in this circumstance, enforcement 
of the Bayh-Dole Act would conflict with the act’s intent (McCabe & Gottlieb, 2006). This 
enabled DOE to acquire an exemption to the Bayh-Dole Act under the Act’s own rules. 
 
Having obtained the exemption to the Bayh-Dole Act, the US Department of Energy 
proceeded to institute a form of compulsory licensing policy for the DOE SSL program. 
Under this policy, any holders of patents based upon research funded by the new SSL 
program were required to engage in non-exclusive licensing negotiations arbitrated by the 
US DOE (McCabe & Gottlieb, 2006).21 Researchers supported by the SSL program’s 
 
21 The Department determined that the Exceptional Circumstances Determination would last for 10 years 
from the date first approved. However, the Department qualified that it would retain the right to end the 
Exceptional Circumstances Determination if the Industry Alliance were to end the memorandum-of- 
understanding stipulating the Alliance’s collaborative support for the SSL program. In other words, the 
Department conditioned the Exceptional Circumstances Determination and the guarantee of licenses on 
the Industry Alliance’s continued support for the program. The Department also reserved the right to 
transfer the Exceptional Circumstances Determination and its license guarantees onto any group that 
replaced the Industry Alliance if the original Alliance were to dissolve (US Department of Energy, 2006). 
The NGLIA (the Industry Alliance) and the US DOE have signed a number of memorandums of 
understanding that have extended the original compulsory licensing provision throughout the life of the 
DOE SSL program (Risser & Cook, 2010, 2012, 2014). 
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“Core Technologies Program” (“Core Technologies”), a division of the DOE SSL program 
dedicated to basic research for SSL products, were allowed to retain title to any patents 
made from Core Technologies projects. Contrary to the Bayh-Dole Act, however, the EC 
required that patent-holding Core Technologies researchers would engage in license 
negotiations with the NGLIA members. Core Technologies researchers could negotiate 
licenses with only the NGLIA members during the year following the creation of a patent 
from a Core Technologies project. The EC specified that the terms of the licenses, 
including royalty payments, were to be “reasonable under the circumstances” (McCabe & 
Gottlieb, 2006, pp.2). Moreover, the EC required NGLIA members and Core Technologies 
researchers to negotiate non-exclusive licenses, meaning that more than one NGLIA firm 
could acquire a license to the patent at stake22. If the negotiations did not produce a license 
agreement after 9 months, the NGLIA members could file suit against the Core 
Technologies researchers to compel licensing. The Core Technologies researchers retained 
title to their patents during the license negotiations. After a year had passed since the 
creation of the patent, the EC released the Core Technologies researchers from having to 
negotiate only with NGLIA members and allowed the researchers freedom to negotiate 
licenses with any party. The EC also recognized that the membership of the NGLIA would 
change over time as new firms joined NGLIA and old firms left NGLIA. In recognition of 
fluctuating membership, the EC only allowed firms to negotiate licenses to patents for 
which Core Technologies researchers had applied during the firm’s membership in NGLIA 




22 An exclusive license was allowed when only one NGLIA member expressed interest to the DOE in 
licensing the Core Technologies patent. 
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4.2 Literature review: Prior findings on patent licensing and patent production 
 
Given the novel patent licensing policy put in place by the US Department of Energy, the 
analysis begins with a review of prior studies for guidance on the impacts of intellectual 
property policies in general. This section describes prior studies and their findings on 
compulsory licensing and patent production. 
 
4.2.1 Prior studies analyzing patent licensing policies and patent production 
 
Scholarship on intellectual property policies and researchers’ patenting help to guide 
expectations regarding what the impact of the DOE SSL Program’s compulsory licensing 
policy might have been. Studies of intellectual property policies in general and specific 
kinds that bear semblance of compulsory licensing policies can help us understand what 
factors policies seek to affect and the reasoning behind policy design. Of great importance, 
such policy studies can help us understand the general effects of the policies themselves 
and what effects we might expect from the DOE SSL Program’s compulsory licensing 
policy. Moreover, studies of patenting behavior in general help us understand what factors 
other than intellectual property policies affect patenting behaviors. Studies of patenting 
behaviors provide the crucial context of rival hypotheses to the idea that an intellectual 
property policy alone has impacted patenting behavior in a certain context. Studies of 
patenting behavior suggest alternative explanations of any apparent patent behavior – 
suggestions that something other than the policy in question produced the apparent 
behavior. We must address the alternative explanations exploring the impacts of the DOE 
SSL Program’s compulsory licensing policy. This subsection summarizes selections of 
prior research into intellectual property policies and general patenting behavior. 
107  
4.2.1.1 Studies of compulsory licensing 
 
 
Scholarly disposition on the impacts of compulsory licensing has been mixed, with some 
scholars arguing that compulsory licensing will undermine innovation and technological 
progress. Some scholars argue that patent-holders will likely receive a lesser reward for the 
expense endured during research and development if their licensing compensation is 
dictated by governing bodies. As a result, researchers may be less likely to pursue patents 
as a means of exploiting their inventions. Less patenting could slow innovation overall by 
restricting the public disclosure of discoveries provided by the patent system (Epstein & 
Kieff, 2011). Scholars also point out that the US Supreme Court has many times interpreted 
the patent provisions of US code as not requiring any utilization of the patent or the 
knowledge embedded in the patent (Tyler, 2014). 
 
Conversely, other scholars argue that reduced compensation for licensing increases the 
likelihood that a patent will be licensed and worked into a commercial product that could 
deliver social benefits. Patent-owners could still earn high returns on low-compensation 
licenses by investing in patent licensees, and accelerated commercialization of patents 
could even stimulate innovation by creating greater technological competition (Tullis, 
2005; Tyler, 2014; Yosick, 2001). As such, compulsory licensing could maintain or even 
accelerate the pace of innovation while accelerating societal returns from research and 
development efforts. Moreover, some cases of compulsory licensing have in the past 
stimulated greater production of patents (Moser & Voena, 2012), falsifying the assertion 
that compulsory licensing will always diminish overall patent productivity. FM Scherer’s 
1977 monograph on compulsory licensing concludes that, while the policy may 
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disadvantage smaller innovators, the innovation economy would likely not be affected 
(Scherer, 1977) . 
 
4.2.1.2 Studies of patent production 
 
 
Scholars have long-studied the production of patents by both firms and individuals, and 
studies of patenting have shown a handful of key categories of variables to bear relevance. 
Given the lengthy history of the patent system as a policy, studies of patenting can make 
use of data from centuries ago (e.g. Moser & Nicholas, 2013). The literature identifies at 
least eight key categories of factors that influence patenting: Collaborations, Expected 
Returns, Firm Size, Industry of Innovator, Individual Inventor Features, Internal Firm 
Features, Government Policy, and Competition. The following paragraphs describe each 
of these categories in more detail. 
 
While literature recognizes that R&D collaborations between firms accelerate patenting, 
findings indicate some nuance to the types of collaboration necessary. Firms do appear to 
produce more patents and increase their overall R&D activity when participating in a 
collaborative inter-firm partnership (Brouwer & Kleinknecht, 1999). While being in a 
partnership tends to accelerate patenting, however, the effect does not appear to scale; 
having a greater number of collaborators does not appear to accelerate patenting in 
proportion (Fornahl, Broekel, & Boschma, 2011). Instead, the complementarity of 
knowledge held by two partnering firms seems to do more to accelerate patenting. Having 
an optimal cognitive distance, i.e. an intermediate level of differences between each firm’s 
core R&D capacities, seems to accelerate patenting. Finally, being located within an 
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industry cluster seems to accelerate patenting, possibly due to the availability of potential 
collaborators (Fornahl et al., 2011). 
 
Research finds that patent applicants are also motivated by money. While academic 
inventors may be motivated to pursue patents for a variety of reasons, the expected royalty 
payments for licensing a patented technology motivate universities to patent (Baldini, 
2011). For corporate inventors, monetary motivations still play a role; however, the 
distribution of motivation is somewhat nuanced. Small, R&D-intensive firms appear most 
likely to patent for reasons of extracting royalty payments. Firms in biotechnology, 
pharmaceuticals, and computing also appear more likely to patent for monetary reasons, as 
do firms located in the US (de Rassenfosse, Guellec, & de la Potterie, 2008). 
 
When attributing patents to firms, the simple size of the firm affects whether and with what 
intensity the firm pursues patenting; yet nuance persists in this area, as well. First, large 
firms in general are more likely to pursue a patent than small firms (Chabchoub & Niosi, 
2005; Holgersson, 2013), even after control for the innovative effort of the firm (Brouwer 
& Kleinknecht, 1999). Among firms that choose to patent, however, being a smaller firm 
increases the number of patent applications by the firm on average (Brouwer & 
Kleinknecht, 1999). The existence of small firms oriented around R&D activities in some 
sectors creates the trend of small firms pursuing patents with more vigor than large firms 
(de Rassenfosse et al., 2008). 
 
Effects related to the technology used by an entire industry influence the patenting of a 
given firm or individual within that industry (Brouwer & Kleinknecht, 1999). Literature 
has established some industries as dominant patent-producers, such as pharmaceuticals and 
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biotechnology (and chemistry writ-large). Service-based industries, such as marketing, also 
tend to produce fewer patents. Being in industries that produce a great deal of patents, such 
as pharmaceuticals and biotechnology, increases the number of patents that a firm produces 
on average. Not being in a service-based industry increases the number of patents that a 
firm produces on average (Chabchoub & Niosi, 2005). Similar group-level effects extend 
to academic inventors, in which the academic inventor’s field of research plays a role in 
determining the academic inventor’s patenting (Hussler & Penin, 2012). 
 
Below the field-level and the sector-level, scholars have found several individual-level 
factors that influence the patent propensities of individual inventors. Among academics, 
for example, having greater non-university work experience begets greater patenting. Age 
also increases the likelihood of having acquired a patent due to accumulated discoveries 
and accumulated knowledge of the patent system (Grimm & Jaenicke, 2012). As with many 
things in science and knowledge, a Matthew Effect exists for patenting; prior successful 
technology transfer increases an individual’s likelihood of patenting (Hussler & Penin, 
2012). An intergenerational Matthew Effect may also exist for patenting, as an inventor’s 
father’s patenting appears to increase the patenting of an inventor (Link & Ruhm, 2013). 
 
Certain attitudinal factors influence patenting, but other attitudinal factors have no 
influence. Having a desire for prestige and reputation or a desire for knowledge exchange 
increases the likelihood of an individual academic to patent (Baldini, 2011). Conversely, 
having a positive perception of patenting or being willing to work on patentable research 
does not affect an individual’s patenting (Baldini, 2011). 
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Finally, an individual’s immersion in scientific activity – that is, production and 
consumption of scientific publications – has a nuanced effect on that individual’s patenting. 
On the one hand, production of scientific publications has no effect on patenting. On the 
other hand, making a greater number of citations to scientific publications appears to 
increase an individual’s patenting (Suzuki, Gemba, Tamada, Yasaki, & Goto, 2006). 
 
Research finds that the characteristics of the firms in which individuals work also affects 
the individuals’ patenting. The extent to which a firm and its constituents have knowledge 
of the patent process or have personnel and other resources dedicated to working the patent 
process increases the firm’s patenting (Holgersson, 2013). Similarly, a greater extent of 
training on how to use the patent system offered by firms increases the patenting of the 
firms, as well as offering rewards within the firm for patenting (X. Li & Ni, 2012). A 
greater level of firm’s innovation effort or R&D spending also increases the firm’s 
patenting (Perez-Cano & Villen-Altamirano, 2013). 
 
Beyond training, expenditure, and knowledge related to patenting, a more subtle way in 
which knowledge is treated within the firm influences a firm’s patenting. A greater extent 
to which knowledge is codified increases the firm’s patenting (Perez-Cano & Villen- 
Altamirano, 2013; Perez-Luno & Valle-Cabrera, 2011). When new knowledge is written 
down, documented, archived, organized, and in other ways made accessible to a firm’s 
constituents beyond those who developed the knowledge, the codification of that 
knowledge increases. Codification enables constituents of a firm to more easily innovate 
by building upon one another’s knowledge. Codification also augments the positive effect 
of R&D expenditure by the firm upon patenting (Perez-Luno & Valle-Cabrera, 2011). 
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Beyond provisions for IP, research finds other government actions that have effects on 
patenting. Subsidies to single firms seem to have little effect; yet in tandem with the 
literature on research collaboration, subsidies to multiple firms engaged in research 
partnerships increases patenting (Fornahl et al., 2011). Also, policies that restructure, 
dissolve, merge, or otherwise overhaul major patent producers – such as large corporations 
or government laboratories – decrease patenting (Vanecek, 2008). 
 
The influences of competition upon patenting are complex, numerous, and nuanced. 
Knowledge disclosure risk lies at the forefront of competition-based effects upon patenting. 
When inventors acquire patents, they disclose the workings of their innovations in ways 
that could be useful to competitors seeking to innovate in similar ways. An increased 
perception of high disclosure risks reduces patenting (Duguet & Kabla, 2000; Heger & 
Zaby, 2013). Much of the perception of risks from disclosure hinges on the inventor’s 
understanding of how useful the disclosed information could be to competitors (Heger & 
Zaby, 2013). The exclusionary power of patents can balance the risks of disclosure, 
however; moreover, the exclusionary power may become salient when a firm faces threats 
from imitators. Elevated competitive threats from imitators increase patenting (de 
Rassenfosse et al., 2008; Hu, 2010). Barriers to entry into the firm’s market decreases 
patenting, however, because barriers lessen the threats from would-be competitors 
regardless of whether they acquire the inventor-firm’s knowledge (Heger & Zaby, 2013). 
 
Beyond knowledge-protection and exclusion, however, competition influences inventor’s 
decisions to acquire patents in contexts having more to do with negotiations. Where 
inventors desire to improve their negotiating positions in technology transfer negotiations, 
patenting tends to increase (Duguet & Kabla, 2000). The exclusionary power of patenting 
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acts as leverage for the firm to exploit more from their negotiating counterparts. 
Conversely, when an inventor-firm’s desire to avoid lawsuits increases, patenting increases 
as well (Duguet & Kabla, 2000). 
 
4.2.2 Path-dependency and patenting: The Theory of Appropriability Regimes 
 
Teece and others provide a path-dependent explanation for the role that government 
policies and actions toward innovation efforts affect firm and individual patent production. 
In particular, Teece emphasizing the degree to which the patented technology could 
otherwise be easily reverse-engineered, imitated, and thus appropriated. An overarching 
theme of literature is that a government’s offering of stronger intellectual property (IP) 
protection and IP enforcement increases patenting (Dechezlepretre, Glachant, & Meniere, 
2013; Machlup, 1958). Frameworks by Teece and others posit that the offering of IP 
protection and enforcement increases inventor’s perceptions of favorable “appropriability 
conditions,” i.e. environmental conditions in which benefits from patenting can be derived 
(Teece, 1993, 1998). The increase in perceived appropriability in turn motivates the 
inventor to pursue a patent. Appropriability conditions influence much of the expected 
returns on patent licenses via royalty payments (Cohen, Nelson, & Walsh, 2000; Teece, 
1998). Teece’s framework offers the concept of “observability-in-use” to explain 
competitive threats; the greater degree to which the knowledge embedded in an innovation 
can be observed in the innovation itself, the greater the imitation threat (Teece, 1998). Of 
most importance, Teece’s Appropriability Regimes framework supports this assertion in 
hypothesizing that relaxing intellectual property (IP) protections through policies such as 
compulsory licensing reduces innovators’ pursuit of patents (Teece, 1993, 1998). 
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4.3 Hypothesis and rival hypotheses on the effects of the DOE SSL’s compulsory licensing 
policy on patent production 
 
Much of the prior work on patent production gives a clear impression that scholars expect 
any policy introducing restrictions on the use and licensing of patents to discourage 
researchers from pursuing patents. 
 
4.3.1 Hypothesis H1: The compulsory licensing policy decreased patenting among 
inventors whose work was funded by the DOE SSL program 
 
Moreover, from the work by de Rassenfosse, Guellec, & de la Potterie (2008) and their 
finding on the patent-centricity of some smaller firms, we can add a corollary hypothesis: 
 
4.3.2 Hypothesis H1a: The compulsory licensing policy reduced the patenting of 
researchers at smaller firms more than the patenting of researchers at larger firms. 
 
From other findings on patenting behavior, however, we can derive rival hypotheses of the 
policy’s effects on funded researchers’ patenting behavior. In particular, the works of 
Moser & Voena (2012) and Scherer (1977) indicate that compulsory licensing will not 
affect patenting and could even increase patenting. This gives us one rival hypothesis: 
 
4.3.3 Rival hypothesis R1: The compulsory licensing policy had no effect on inventors 
whose work was funded by the DOE SSL program 
 
The literature reviewed also identifies several intervening inventor-level and firm-level 
factors that influence patent production. While it is likely impossible to develop a 
hypothesis that accounts for all of these factors, one factor found to influence patenting 
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deserves its own hypothesis – that of a researcher’s years of experience. Since Grimm & 
Jaenicke (2012) find that age and experience increase the number of patents a researcher is 
likely to produce, we can add a second rival hypothesis. With this second rival hypothesis, 
instead of a contrary prediction, this hypothesis offers a conflating explanation as the 
grounds for disconfirming other hypotheses: 
 
4.3.4 Rival hypothesis R2: Any observed differences between researchers subject to the 
compulsory licensing policy and researchers not subject to the compulsory 
licensing policy are due to age differences between the two groups and not to the 
effects of the compulsory licensing policy. 
 
Finally - from Teece’s Appropriability Regimes framework, we can derive hypotheses on 
the impact of a compulsory licensing policy on affected researchers’ patenting behavior. 
Important to note is that compulsory licensing amounts to a relaxation of IP protection. 
Because the government entity offering IP is now compelling the inventor to share rather 
than exclude certain others from use of the patent, the government is relaxing the IP 
protections. In Teece’s framework, this increases the inventor’s technology’s 
appropriability (Teece, 1998). Increasing appropriability decreases the inventor’s incentive 
to file a patent, since the patent no longer empowers the inventor to keep others from 
appropriating the patented technology. 
 
4.3.5 Hypothesis H2: The compulsory licensing policy decreased patenting by 
researchers facing high Appropriability Regimes more than it decreased patenting 
by researchers facing low Appropriability Regimes in the industries of the 







To test the hypotheses derived from our literature review and model of patent production, 
we compare patent productivity at a given point in time between researchers funded by the 
DOE SSL program and researchers that the program hadn’t yet funded. Because program 
funding subjects a researcher to the compulsory licensing policy described in earlier 
sections, program funding represents a change to the researcher’s Appropriability Regime. 
Measuring changes in productivity before and after funding for a given researcher could 
measure the impact of the Appropriability Regime change. Our model derived from the 
literature suggests that the Appropriability Regime change would have discouraged 
researchers from patenting. As such, the operationalization of the effect of the compulsory 
licensing policy is that, at a given point in time, we expect the researchers who have not 
yet been funded to be producing more patents than the researchers who have been funded. 
 
4.4.1 Advantages of comparing patent productivity between sampled researchers 
 
Comparing patent productivity within a group of researchers that were all funded but who 
were funded at different points in time enables control of key factors, other than the 
Appropriability Regime, that may have influence patent productivity. By the term “key 
factors,” this methodology refers to rival hypotheses, i.e. alternative explanations for any 
findings confirming any of the hypotheses being tested. Specifically, studying only 
researchers who were eventually funded by the program controls for any variables that may 
have influenced both patent productivity and the US Department of Energy’s decision to 
fund the selected researchers. Social scientists refer to the effects of factors falling into 
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both categories as “selection effects.” Assume, for example, that the Department of Energy 
had chosen to fund researchers that somehow inherently produce fewer patents than is 
average for researchers. If we were to compare funded researchers to non-funded 
researchers, any effect of the compulsory licensing program and the associated 
Appropriability Regime change would be conflated with the inherent productivity of the 
selected researchers. In other words, we would be severely challenged in determining 
whether any difference in patent production observed between eventually-funded 
researchers and never-funded researchers was due the compulsory licensing policy or to 
the fact that the US Department of Energy had chosen low-patent-productivity researchers. 
Conversely, because our study compares patent productivity only among researchers that 
were eventually chosen by the US Department of Energy, we would in this hypothetical 
example be comparing low-patent-productivity researchers to other low-patent- 
productivity researchers. Any difference observed could therefore more arguably be 
attributed to the compulsory licensing policy’s Appropriability Regime change and not to 
the US Department of Energy’s proclivity toward choosing low-patent-productivity 
researchers. The approached to measuring and comparing researchers’ patent productivity 
requires data on what patents each researcher produced and data on the researchers 
themselves, and this study collects both kinds of data. The next two sections describe the 
study’s data collection processes. 
 
4.4.2 Gathering data on patents produced by DOE SSL PIs 
 
For data on the number of patents produced by each funded researcher, I use the Fung 
Institute’s set of patents disambiguated by inventor. Researchers at the UC Berkeley Fung 
Institute used a patent disambiguation algorithm to process US Patent and Trademark 
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Office (USPTO) records into a structured database (G. C. Li et al., 2014). The database 
includes a table containing each USPTO-granted patent assigned to a unique inventor ID 
that the researchers constructed using a sophisticated algorithm to disambiguate inventors 
from the USPTO records. US patent grant records frequently list the name of a single 
inventor in a variety of forms; for example, if this author were to be granted multiple 
patents, one might expect to see some patents granted to “Alexander M. Smith” and other 
patents granted to “Alex Smith.” The problem clearly becomes compounded when one 
considers the possibility of a patent being filed by a different person with the same name, 
or a sufficiently similar name – consider an “Alexandra Smith,” e.g.. Such small 
differences in recorded names create major problems for researchers seeking to uniquely 
identify each inventor from a set of patents, so the Fung Institute’s inventor-disambiguated 
patent database provides huge advantages to studies using unique inventors as a unit of 
analysis, such as the present study.23 
The inventor-disambiguated database alone does not solve all problems, however, as it 
remains necessary to identify each inventor from the DOE SSL program’s list of funded 
principal investigators within the Fung Institute’s database. For this purpose, I first acquire 
via email exchange the list of funded principal investigators via an email exchange with 
Navigant Consulting, the consultancy hired by the DOE to administer portions of the DOE 
SSL program. Next, I research each funded principal investigator via Google searching for 
information on the professional background of each funded principal investigator, focusing 
on CVs posted to the internet or LinkedIn profiles as primary sources.24 Using the 
 
23 For further details on the Harvard/Fung Institute disambiguated patent database, consult Li et al., 2014. 
24 This methodology follows that used by Melkers, Panomariov, and other premier researchers in 
bibliometrics. 
119  
professional background information gathered, I then query the Fung Institute’s table of 
patents disambiguated by inventor (downloaded via the file “grant_inventor.tsv”) for the 
first and last name of each funded principal investigator.25 I cross-reference the query 
results with professional background information and identify the Fung Institute data 
table’s unique inventor ID number representing a funded principal investigator. Using the 
list of all Inventor IDs representing funded principal investigators, I then use SQLite3 to 
query the Fung Institute’s data table for all patents granted to Inventor IDs in the list. This 
forms the initial data set. 
 
Since I acquired Navigant’s list of funded principal investigators in 2015, it only lists 
funded investigators through 2014. To balance the observations before and after the 2005 
implementation of the DOE SSL program’s patent licensing policies, I set the timeframe 
of my analysis as 1996 to 2014 – providing 9 years’ worth of observations before and after 
2005. 
 
Because the Fung Institute’s data table does not include the year of the patent, I cross 
referenced USPTO data from the USPTO’s PATFT online database.26 Patent numbers are 
chronological, so I identified the first and last patent of each year from 2000 to 2015 and 
then used SQLite3 to assign a year to all patents in the initial data set. I then use SQLite3 
to sum all patents for each investigator-year, making the unit of analysis the investigator- 




25 I used MS Access, Python’s SQLite3, and SQLite Management studio to perform this task. Each 
software program functions on a SQL foundation and returns the same results, but the interface and ease of 




4.4.3 Gathering data on DOE SSL PIs themselves 
 
Given that many patent production factors identified via the literature review relate to either 
the individual inventors or to the organizations employing inventors, I also gather data on 
the professional backgrounds of each funded principal investigator. Since I have already 
gathered data on the principal investigators for purposes of identifying them in the Fung 
Institute’s database, I use the same data gathered to identify features of each principal 
investigator and the organizational affiliation history of each principal investigator. I drop 
from my sample any principal investigators whose data do not contain information on the 
investigator’s organizational affiliation history, reducing the number of investigator-year 
observations in my dataset. For the remaining investigators, I use a combination of manual 
data entry and automated web-scraping techniques to extract and organize each 
investigator’s organizational affiliation history. 
 
4.4.3.1 Scraping LinkedIn using Python 
 
 
To automatically extract and organize information on each investigator’s organizational 
affiliation history, I use the Python programming language and commands from the 
BeautifulSoup software package.27 BeautifulSoup provides Python-based commands for 
extracting data from HTML and XML web pages, a process known as “web-scraping.” 
Since web pages from the online professional networking service LinkedIn serve as the 
key data sources for many of the investigators’ professional backgrounds, I design and 
implement a Python script using BeautifulSoup commands to web-scrape LinkedIn web 
 
 
27 More information about the BeautifulSoup software package can be found at the package’s 
documentation website: https://www.crummy.com/software/BeautifulSoup/bs4/doc/ 
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pages. The script finds certain HTML tags that the LinkedIn websites use to encode 
information about a LinkedIn user’s professional history and collects the organization 
name and dates associated with the tags. In a normal web browser, the information 
associated with the tags appears as each organization at which a LinkedIn user worked or 
studied and over what specific years and months the user worked or studied at that 
organization. The script uses the collected information to prepare a file that contains the 
name of each investigator, each year of interest in my data set, and the name of each 
organization at which the investigator worked or studied during that year.28 I apply standard 
data-cleaning procedures to the file, e.g. removing useless affiliations such as “Eagle Scout 





To the organizational affiliations data gathered through web-scraping principal 
investigator’s LinkedIn pages and other background sources, I then apply several codings 
related to key factors thought to influence patent production. I research each affiliation 
individually and determine, for example, whether the affiliation is domestic (based in US) 
or foreign; whether the affiliation is a government, private industrial, academic, or non- 
profit organization; and whether the affiliation is in one of many sectors relevant to 
lighting. A list below describes the code-variables and how I determined the value of each 
code-variable. I then cross-reference between my affiliation-codings and each inventor’s 




28 As mentioned above, investigators whose professional background sources (whether LinkedIn web pages 
or some other source) lacked an annual level of detail as to where the inventor worked or studied were 
dropped from my sample of investigators. 
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if an investigator was at a university for part of one year and an non-US-based firm for 
another part of the same year, I apply codings to indicate that the investigator-year involved 
affiliations with both an academic organization and a foreign firm. This example is not 
exhaustive, and I apply many more codings to each investigator-year. In addition to coding 
each affiliation, I also create new variables to track the investigator’s time at each affiliation 
and whether the inventor changed affiliations in a given year. 
 
The list of code-variables applied to each affiliation, how the value of each variable is 
determined, and an example of each variable is as follows: 
 
• “PI_Status” – set to 1 for any year after which a given investigator became funded by the 
DOE SSL program. This coding used data acquired from the DOE SSL program itself on 
when each investigator became funded. 
 
• “CL_Provision” – set to 1 for 2006 and every year after. The DOE SSL program’s 
compulsory licensing provision came into existence in response to the EPAct of 2005, and 
as such all PIs became subject to the provision by 2006. The compulsory licensing 
provision affects retroactively the PIs who became funded by the program prior to 2006. 
 
• “ACADEMIC” – set to 1 for an organization that is a university, college, or other academic 
institution; set to 0 otherwise. For example, I code California Institute of Technology as 1 
and General Electric as 0. 
 
• “LARGE_FIRM” – set to 1 for an organization that is a private industrial firm having 
existed for more than two decades or self-identifying as having operations in multiple 
123  
technology sectors; set to 0 otherwise. For example, I code General Electric as 1 and Soraa, 
Inc. – a small SSL start-up – as 0. 
 
• “SMALL_FIRM” – set to 1 for an organization that is a private industrial firm having 
existed for fewer than two decades or self-identifying as having specialization in only one 
technology sector. For example, I code Soraa, Inc. as 1 and General Electric as 0. 
 
• “GOVERNMENT” – set to 1 for an organization affiliated with the national government 
or a local government of any nation, 0 otherwise. For example, I code Sandia National 
Laboratories as 1 and General Electric as 0. 
 
• “NON-PROFIT_INSTITUTE” – set to 1 for an organization that represents the interests of 
multiple private firms or is responsible for lobbying on behalf of other organizations. Few 
organizations fall into this category. For example, I code the American Institute of 
Aeronautics and Astronautics as 1 and General Electric as 0. 
 
• “USA” – set to 1 for any organization self-identifying as headquartered in the United 
States, 0 otherwise. For example, I code General Electric as 1 and Nippon Telephone and 
Telegraph as 0. 
 
• “California” – set to 1 for any organization self-identifying as headquartered in the state of 
California, 0 otherwise. For example, I code UC Berkeley as 1 and Princeton University as 
 
• “NE” – set to 1 for any organization headquartered in the Northeastern United States, which 
includes only the following states: Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New 
Hampshire, Vermont, and Maine. Set to 0 otherwise. Organizations headquartered in New 
124  
York are set to 0. For example, I code Massachusetts Institute of Technology as 1 and 
University at Buffalo as 0 
 
• “EU” – set to 1 for any organization headquartered in the continent of Europe, and set to 0 
otherwise. For example, I code Bayer Material Science as 1 and General Electric as 0. 
 
• “Japan” – set to 1 for any organization headquartered in the nation of Japan, and set to 0 
otherwise. For example, I code Nippon Telephone and Telegraph as 1 and General Electric 
as 0. 
 
• “EastAsiaOther” – set to 1 for any organization headquartered in an East-asian nation other 
than Japan, and set to 0 otherwise. Organizations headquartered in China, South Korea, 
and Taiwan are set to 1. For example, I code Peking University as 1 and Nippon Telephone 
and Telegraph as 0. 
 
• “Lighting” – set to 1 for any organization who self-identifies as having operations in the 
manufacture or sale of lighting technologies and who has a relationship to SSL through 
producing or selling SSL devices (e.g. bulbs, luminaires, etc.), and set to 0 otherwise. For 
example, I code the lighting manufacturer General Electric as 1 and materials research firm 
Applied Materials as 0. 
 
• “Materials” – set to 1 for any organization who self-identifies as having operations in 
materials science and technologies and who has a relationship to SSL through researching 
materials for lighting applications, and set to 0 otherwise. This does not include 
organizations involved in the production or sale of complete LED devices. For example, I 
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code the major chemical firm Eastman Kodak as 1 and lighting manufacturer General 
Electric as 0. 
 
• “LED” – set to 1 for any organization who self-identifies as having operations in producing 
completed inorganic LED devices, and set to 0 otherwise. Most of the organizations that I 
code as 1 for the “Lighting” variable are also coded as 1 for the “LED” variable, because 
only inorganic LED technologies have reached production as lighting devices. Conversely, 
organic LED (“OLED”) technologies haven’t yet been turned into devices for manufacture 
and sale. For example, I code General Electric as 1 and OLEDworks as 0. 
 
• “OLED” – set to 1 for any organization who self-identifies as having operations in research 
supporting organic LED technologies, and 0 otherwise. In contrast to the “LED” variable’s 
overlap with the “Lighting” variable, most organizations coded 1 for the “OLED” variable 
are also coded 1 for the “Materials” variable. For example, I code OLEDWorks as 1 and 
CREE as 0. 
 
• “Electronics” – set to 1 for any organization who self-identifies as having operations in 
electronics, including the assembly of non-lighting devices and research into non-lighting 
electronics technologies. Set to 0 otherwise. For example, I code Hewlett-Packard as 1 and 
Eastman Kodak as 0. 
 
In addition to the variable codings above, I also added to the dataset several calculated 
variables. The calculated variables use functions acting on the other variables or codings 
in the dataset. The calculated variables are as follows: 
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• “SubjectToCL” – calculated as 1 for all investigator-years having a 1 for PI_Status and a 
1 for CL_Provision, in essence forming a single coding to identify which investigator-years 
were subject to the DOE SSL program’s compulsory licensing provision. I added this 
indicator to simplify interpretation and because tests showed improved regression model 
fits when the CL_Provision variable was removed. 
 
• “YearsSinceEarliestData” – calculated as the number of years since the investigator’s first 
year of available affiliation data. I added this variable to approximate age differences 
between investigators, under the assumption that investigators whose affiliation data 
stretches back further in history are older than investigators with shorter affiliation 
histories. 
 
• “YearsSinceFirstAcademic” – calculated as the number of years since the investigator’s 
earliest academic affiliation. I also added this variable to approximate age differences. 
 
• “AffilChange” – calculated as 1 for a year in which an investigator’s affiliations changed, 
and 0 otherwise. I added this variable in an attempt to identify whether job changes were 
affecting investigators’ patent production, hypothesizing that the time-consumption of job 
changes or willingness to leave a current job would reduce an investigator’s patent 
production. 
 
• “CUM_ACADEMIC,” “CUM_LARGE_FIRM,” etc. – for each coding, I calculated the 
cumulative number of years that an investigator has had an affiliation with that coding. For 
a given year, these cumulative-codings represent the investigator’s total experience with 
an affiliation of the given coding. I hypothesized that more cumulative experience in an 
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affiliation of a given coding would multiply whatever effects an affiliation of a given 
coding would have on patent production. 
 
4.4.4 Advantages of chosen data-collection methodology versus alternatives 
 
The approach used in this study has many advantages and superior qualities to alternative 
approaches. Foremost, web-scraping the LinkedIn profiles and using other professional 
background sources dominates the use of a survey of the funded principal investigators on 
pure grounds of response rate. Since the current study was not conducted in association 
with the DOE SSL program, the study has no power to compel high response rates among 
the investigators to a professional background survey. The same condition prevents any 
sort of mass request for the investigators’ resumes or CVs from having much more success 
than a survey. Having no rapport, let alone a mere professional connection, with any of the 
investigators strongly diminishes the likelihood that any would respond to inquiries or 
requests for resumes and CVs. Interviewing each participant for his or her professional 
background is out of the question on the grounds of financial costs and time-consumption 
alone. Even interviewing the same number of investigators as for which I was able to get 
good background information through web-scraped pages and online sources would 
present prohibitive costs and a far less efficient use of resources. As to the accuracy of 
information obtained through online sources, the transparency of public web pages and 
CVs versus privately shared resumes and CVs arguably provides greater incentives for 
those presenting their backgrounds through public web pages and CVs to present truthfully. 
As demonstrated by the famous case of RadioShack CEO Dave Edmonson’s falsified 
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resume,29 good reason exists to believe that resumes and CVs don’t always provide more 
accurate information than public sources. 
 
To those who might try to convince themselves that the use of LinkedIn profiles and online 
sources on professional backgrounds creates a selective effect similar to that of analyzing 
funded principal investigators – this is a foolhardy proposition. The proposition rests on an 
assumed causal mechanism between curating an online professional background source – 
e.g. a LinkedIn profile or online resume – and patenting. Prima facie, no such mechanism 
exists. The USPTO’s process for granting patents takes no account of the applicant’s 
“online presence,” of whether the applicant has a LinkedIn profile or posted a CV to the 
web, or the applicant’s knowledge and ability to take such actions. Since there is clearly 
no causal mechanism, the doubter is reduced to offering conflating correlations – for 
example, that of persons working at a small firm. The small firm may have an intellectual- 
property-focused strategy and thus drive their employees toward patenting, and the small 
firm may also drive employees to curate professional “online presence” in order to attract 
seed funding. Thus, the worker’s online presence does not cause patenting, but the worker 
is more likely to both patent and have an online presence (and thus be present in the sample 
of investigators) because he or she works at a small firm. As will be shown, small firms do 
not dominate the sample of principal investigators, and my coding scheme represents small 
firms and therefore allows the data to account for any effect of working at a small firm both 




29 Morrison, M. “RadioShack’s Lesson: Trust, but verify” Bloomberg, Feb. 22, 2006. Available at 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2006-02-21/radioshacks-lesson-trust-but-verify 
Norris, F. “RadioShack Chief Resigns After Lying.” The New York Times, Feb. 21, 2006. Available at 
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/21/business/radioshack-chief-resigns-after-lying.html 
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clearly see that such a proffered story for correlational conflation stretches the limits of 
believability to the breaking point. 
 
As for the patent data collected, the Fung Institute’s disambiguated patent database 
represents the superior choice. Certainly, having a prepared database of patent record 
information reduces costs relative to web-scraping the USPTO’s online records, the most 
accessible of which allow querying of only one full record at a time.30 Beyond the 
advantages of having a database already prepared, the Fung Institute database overcomes 
the most crucial challenge for any study using inventors as a unit of analysis – that of 
disambiguating patent records by inventor. Indeed, the disambiguation by inventor 
represents a key and fundamental contribution of the Fung Institute database to research 
using patents, and the contribution enables a host of future inventor-centered research to 
come. Disambiguating any existing database of un-disambiguated patent record 
information would present a far costlier alternative and simply doesn’t make sense. 
Moreover, whatever the merits and demerits the Fung Institute’s database are, they are well 
known because the database is public. Acquiring a database that must be licensed presents 
greater epistemic risks at the study’s outset because the merits and demerits of the database 
are not known. Moreover, by the time the merits and demerits are known, the licensing 
costs are sunk and irreversible – not to mention that the licensing costs can be completely 
avoided by using the Fung Institute database, another advantage. 
4.4.5 Results of data filtering: Reducing patents to only those made by authors with professional 





The data collection procedure used here leaves intact a significant number and share of the 
set of patents and investigator-years that make up the dependent variables. As shown in 
Table 8 below, the large majority of funded principal investigators have adequate 
professional background information to make them worthy of inclusion in the study. 
Similarly, Table 8 also shows that the large majority of patents were made by funded 
principal investigators with adequate professional background information. Table 8 also 
shows that the majority of patents granted to investigators after they became funded by the 
DOE SSL program belong to investigators with adequate professional background 
information. All of this information gives ample reason to believe that the data collection 
procedure for this study clearly outperforms some of the alternative procedures discussed 
above, such as a simple survey. Moreover, Table 8 also shows that the data collection 





Table 8: Counts and proportions of patents, investigators, and patents granted to 
investigators post-funding produced by the study’s data collection procedure. 
 
 
Patents (1996 to 2014) 
3260 Number of total patents in the dataset 
1145 Number of total patents made by an inventor with adequate professional background data 
35% percentage of patents from CL investigators with adequate professional background data 
Patents granted to funded principal investigators 
1789 total patents from post-funding investigators, all 
534 total patents from post-funding investigators with adequate professional background data 
 
30% 
percent of patents from post-funding investigators with adequate professional background 
data 
Principal investigators 
146 Total investigators (through 2014 of DOE SSL program) 
 
71 
Total investigators with adequate professional background data (i.e. the sample 
investigators) 
49% Percent of total investigators with adequate professional background data 
Sample dataset size 
20 Years of data used for each investigator 
 
1420 
Total investigator-year observations (N) for Pis whose bios contain adequate professional 
background data 
 
Similarly, the data collection procedure also leaves intact a balanced selection of patents 
produced before and after each principal investigator became funded by the DOE SSL 
program. If only a small portion of the patents in the study’s dataset were to have been 
granted after the principal investigators became funded, for example, the skewed 
distribution would make it challenging to identify factors that increased patenting among 
funded investigators. Moreover, we would have great opportunity to conclude that DOE 
SSL program’s patent licensing policy did reduce patenting among funded principal 
investigators on the grounds of such skewed data alone. Fortunately, as Table 9 shows, the 
sample dataset retains a balance of patents that were made before an investigator became 
funded and after an investigator became funded. Table 9 shows that the patents in the 
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sample dataset represent inventions by principal investigators prior to funding and after 
funding in roughly even measure. Importantly, Table 9 also shows that the evenness of 
representation applies to inventors with adequate professional background information, so 
that the final sample data set retains good representation of pre-funding patents and post- 
funding patents. 
 
• Before PI status 
 
• After CL provision (i.e. after 2005) 
 
• Before CL provision 
 
• Under treatment (i.e. after CL provision AND after PI status) 
 
• Under control (i.e. before CL provision OR before PI status) 
 
Table 9: Counts and proportions of patents granted before and after funding of 
each principal investigator 
 
 
Patents granted after funding 
1789 total post-funding patents 
534 total post-funding with CL patents from investigators with professional 
background data 
30% percent of patents from post-funding with CL investigators with professional 
background data 
Patents granted prior to funding 
860 total pre-funding patents 
611 total pre-funding with CL patents from investigators with data 
71% Percent of patents from pre-funding with CL investigators with data 
 
4.5 Data analysis and findings 
 
4.5.1 Aggregations of patent data 
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First, I show the gross result of differences in patent count between funded investigators 
and non-funded investigators. Teece’s Appropriability Regimes hypothesis leads us to 
expect that post-funding investigators would produce fewer patents than pre-funding 
investigators because of the DOE SSL program’s policy towards patent licensing. Table 
10 shows the total patents granted to pre-funding investigators and the total patents granted 
to post-funding investigators. The total produced by sample investigators before they were 
funded by the DOE SSL program slightly exceeds the total produced by the same 




Table 10: Total patents produced by sample investigators and percentages of total 







from sample investigators between 
1993 and 2014 
1145 100% 
...before funding by DOE SSL 
program 
611 53% 
…after funding by DOE SSL program 534 47% 
 
Examination of the patents from principal investigators per year of the analysis period 
shows some expected trends. First, as shown in Figure 9, patents from investigators not yet 
funded by the DOE SSL program rise over time prior to the program’s inception – from 
1996 to 2005, representing growing interest in SSL intellectual property commensurate 
with the development of white-light LEDs. Investigators who would later be funded by the 
DOE SSL program were, before 2005, actively pursuing patents. Second, as more and more 
of the investigators become funded by the DOE SSL program from 2005 to 2014, more of 
the patents produced come from funded investigators and fewer patents come from non- 
funded investigators. Later in the study period, there are simply fewer and fewer non- 





Figure 9: Total patents granted to investigators before and after being funded by 
the DOE SSL program 
 
To provide further context on the composition of the investigators, Figure 10 displays the 
investigator-affiliations with breakouts by four main categories: Academic, Large firm, 
Small firm, and Government. Over time, the investigators move from a majority of 
Academic affiliations in 1996 to a plurality of Small firm affiliations in 2014. Figure 10 
shows that, after the inception of the DOE SSL program in 2005, the majority of the 






Figure 10: Investigator affiliations during the analysis period. The results sometime 
exceed the number of sample investigators because, in a given year, each 
investigator may have more than one affiliation. 
 
Similarly, Figure 11 displays the number of investigator affiliations with breakouts by four 
main geopolitical categories: “US,” “EU,” “Japan,” and “East Asia – Other.” The “East 
Asia – Other” category represents affiliations with organizations located in South Korea, 
China, and Taiwan. Figure 11’s results show that the wide majority of investigators have 





Figure 11: Investigator affiliations during the analysis period. “USA” represents 
affiliations with US-based organizations; “EU” for the European Union; “JPN” for 
Japan; and “EastAsia_other” for China, South Korea, and Taiwan31 
 
The sample of investigators grows with time, as shown in Figure 12. Observed increases 
in patenting by post-funding investigators might represent an increase in the total number 
of investigators in the sample. In other words, because the actual sample of investigators 
is growing with time, we may have a greater number of patents post-funding while the 











31 The results sometime exceed the number of sample investigators because, in a given year, each 





Figure 12: Time series of total sample investigators per year. An investigator 
“enters the sample” in the earliest year for which adequate background information 
on the investigator is available.32 
 
To examine patent production without interference from the total number of sample 
investigators, I compare patents-per-investigator over time between the pre-funding and 
post-funding categories and examine total investigators over time. Figure 13 shows average 
patents-per-investigator over time, with breakouts for before-funding and after-funding. 
Figure 13’s results indicate that (1) average patenting per investigator generally increased 
over the study period, and (2) average patenting by funded investigators largely kept pace 
with average patenting of non-funded investigators after the DOE SSL program’s licensing 





32 The “pre-funding” bars for each year represent the number of sample investigators who had yet to be 
funded by the DOE SSL program, while the “post-funding” bars represent the number who had become 
funded by the program. 
139  
DOE SSL program 
licensing policy 
introduced in 2005 
licensing policy’s introduction, patenting by non-funded investigators exceeds patenting 
by funded investigators. 
 
Figure 13 shows that, for most years of analysis, the investigators subjected to the licensing 
policy were granted fewer patents than investigators not yet subjected to the licensing 
policy. However, the differences between the two groups are not very large, especially 
relative to year-to-year variation in average patents per investigator for both groups and 
across all investigators. The results of Figure 13 challenge the hypothesis that the 
program’s licensing policy discouraged patenting. 
 
 
Figure 13: Time series of patents per investigator, with breakouts by whether the 
patents came from a funded investigator (i.e. after program funding) or an 
investigator who had yet to be funded (i.e. before program funding) 
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Next, we pursue a modified version of the hypothesis. Since certain firms (usually small 
firms) have strategies that depend more heavily upon intellectual property than other firms 
(usually large firms), I hypothesize that the licensing policy may have had a discouraging 
effect among small firms but not among large firms. 
 
To test the hypothesis on firm size, I calculate an average patents-per-inventor categorized 
by the size of the firm with which the investigator affiliates. The calculation necessarily 
only includes patents from investigators affiliated with firms, as opposed to e.g. 
investigators affiliated with government institutions. Figure 14 below shows that, contrary 
to the idea that small firms more frequently have an intellectual-property-driven strategy 
and therefore patent more than large firms, small firm sample investigators generally 
patented on average as much or less than large firm sample investigators. Rarely do sample 
investigators affiliated with small firms patent more on average than sample investigators 





Figure 14: Average patents-per-investigator categorized by small-firm investigators 
and large-firm investigators. 
 
Despite the contrary finding on average patenting per investigator between large and small 
firms, the modified hypothesis holds that a negative effect on average patenting per 
investigator could still be larger for small firm investigators than for large firm 
investigators. Figure 15 and Figure 16 show the average patenting per investigator during 
the analysis period for small firm investigators and for large firm investigators, 
respectively. While funded investigators for both large and small firms experience a large 
increase in patents-per-investigator during 2006, the funded investigators generally patent 
slightly less than the yet-to-be-funded investigators for all years except 2013 and 2014 – 
for both categories of firms. Figure 15 does not show greater differences between before- 
funding and after-funding investigators affiliated with small firms than the differences 










Figure 16: Average patents per investigator for large firms 
 
Table 11 provides the average patents-per-investigator for investigators affiliated with 
large firms and small firms, before and after funding by the DOE SSL program. For both 
large-firm-affiliated and small-firm-affiliated investigators, the average patents per 
investigator of post-funding investigators exceeds that of pre-funding investigators. 
 
Table 11: Average patenting per investigator, 1996 to 2014, categorized by funding 
status and firm size 
 
 
 large firm small firm 
before funding 1.111498 0.697248 




To begin inference as to the probability distribution appropriate for parametric analysis of 
patent production by sample investigators, I prepare some histograms showing the 
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distribution of patent production across all sample investigator-years. Figure 17 and Figure 
18 show the total distribution of all values of patent production (e.g. 0 patents granted, 1 
patent granted, 2 patents granted, etc.) for all investigator-years with breakout by pre- 
funding and post-funding. Figure 18 focuses on a subset of patent production values to 
allow the viewer to observe with clarity the distribution of less-frequently-occurring values 
of patent production, which are values in the upper ranges. The distributions show several 
features of the data that contradict assumption of common regression analysis but that also 
may be easily expected from understanding the US patent process: 
 
• No investigator produced a negative number of patents in any investigator-year 
 
• The most common number of patents produced by a given investigator in a given year is 
zero, and the second-most-common number is one 
 
• The distribution falls dramatically as the number of patents produced increases; only very 
rarely do investigators in a given year produce a number of patents as high as, say, 10 or 
15. 
 
• Without checking for correlation with a normal distribution, we can see clearly that the 
patent production data are not normally distributed 
 





Figure 17: Raw distribution of observed values for patents produced by a given 





Figure 18: Data from Figure 17, restricted only to patent production values of 6 or 
greater (provided for clarity into distribution of less-frequently-observed patent 
production values). 
 
Contrary to matching a probability density function (PDF) described by the normal 
distribution, the patents-per-investigator-year data appear to more closely match the PDF 
of an exponential distribution with a relatively low lambda value. Figure 19 shows the 
patent data aggregated across both pre-funding and post-funding investigators overlaid by 
an exponential distribution PDF having a lambda value of 1.8 and a scalar value of 2700.33 
Instead of a normal distribution PDF, the patent data appear to much more closely match 






33 The lambda value of 1.8 and the scalar value of 2700 were determined via trial-and-error to offer an 





Figure 19: Distribution of observations across values of patents-per-investigator- 
year, with fitted exponential distribution superimposed 
 
A typical exponential probability density function takes the form 
 
Pr(𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥) = 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ∗ ʎ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒−ʎ∗𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 
 
Where s represents a scalar value and ʎ represents the distribution’s defining parameter. 
As shown in Figure 19, the value s = 2700 and ʎ = 1.8 provide adequate fit for the 
observations of patents-per-investigator. 
 
4.5.2 Regression models fitted to patent data 
 
In further effort to detect and observe any clear negative effect on patent production from 
the DOE SSL program’s policy, I construct from the data a model via ordinary least squares 
regression. To construct the model, I use the open-source software package R. I interpret 
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the model’s coefficients and related statistics for insights into the effects on investigator 
patenting behavior of the DOE SSL program’s compulsory licensing policy. 
 
I chose to form a linear model from the predictors collected, coded, and calculated in the 
dataset, particularly with interest in interaction terms between other predictors and the 
compulsory licensing indicators. I chose to use linear combinations of the variables (i.e. a 
“linear model”) on grounds of adequacy and that more complex combinations (e.g. non- 
linear models) brought further modeling and computational complexities without 
proportionate benefits and therefore lacked reasonable justification. My interest in the 
interaction effects (i.e. secondary effect) between certain predictors and the compulsory 
licensing indicators stemmed from intent to verify whether a marginal effect of the 
compulsory licensing provision on patent productivity occurred only under certain 
conditions. Including interaction terms among the model’s predictors might reveal whether 
the compulsory licensing provision affected only investigators affiliated with small firms, 
for example. The use of interaction terms to identify such circumstantial marginal effects 
is generally referred to as a “difference-in-differences” approach. 
 
4.5.2.1 Model selection via stepwise regression 
 
 
To find a regression model of superior fit and predictive capability, I use stepwise 
regression model selection. One can build a number of models approaching infinity from 
a given dataset, but only models with superior predictive capability offer meaningful 




34 A regression model may have several “statistically significant” coefficients, but if the model has low fit 
and predictive capability relative to other models one can build from the same data, the model offers little 
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important for decision-making, policy-making, and hypothesis testing. Automated 
processes have long existed for identifying from a given dataset’s portfolio of all possible 
regression the models of superior fit, and AIC-based Stepwise Regression has long been a 
standard and more-than-adequate approach for identifying models of best fit. AIC-based 
Stepwise Regression proceeds in an iterative fashion by forming a regression model, then 
adding or removing a variable from the current model to form a new model, and then 
computing and comparing the two models’ AIC35 statistics. If the AIC statistic has 
decreased, the new model’s fit is substantially better than the old model’s fit. The process 
then starts over using the new model as the base of comparison; the process continues 
iterating until the AIC statistic stops decreasing, at which point the process has identified 
a best-fitting model. 
 
Because a high number of interaction terms create computational challenges for AIC-based 
Stepwise Regression and fitting regression models in general, I restricted the number of 
interaction terms allowed in the AIC-based Stepwise Regression process. I started the AIC- 
based Stepwise Regression process using a small model with only three variables and two 
interaction terms,36 and allowed the process to add or remove single variables until 
reaching an optimum AIC. I did not allow the process to add or remove any interaction 
terms, however, and instead performed manual stepwise regression with interaction terms. 
 
 
insight into the dataset’s actual patterns. Moreover, it is misleading to present interpretations of a poor- 
fitting model when one can easily construct and interpret a better-fitting model. 
35 AIC stands for Akaike Information Criterion and is an estimate of the information lost by a given 
regression model relative to a hypothetical best model. As such, when the AIC statistic is minimized, 
statisticians consider information loss to have been minimized and a best-fitting model to have been found. 
While other statistics and estimators have been applied to the same problem (e.g. BIC, the Bayesian 
Information Criterion), AIC is of standard use and for my dataset presents no challenges or disadvantages. 
36 The variables were LARGE_FIRM, SMALL_FIRM, and SubjectToCL; the interaction terms were 
LARGE_FIRM*SubjectToCL and SMALL_FIRM*SubjectToCL 
150  
After I used stepwise regression to identify a model of good fit, I further used manual 
experimentation with adding and subtracting certain interaction terms in order to identify 
a model of better fit. Such manual adding of interaction terms produced models of 
substantially better goodness-of-fit, as measured by the adjusted R-squared statistic. 
Through such experimentation, I identified a model of superior fit that also had reasonable 
interpretative value, and I report that model in the results below.37 
4.5.2.2 Model statistics and interpretations 
 
 
















37 Moreover, the reported model’s goodness-of-fit is more than acceptable for the field of study. Scholars 
from prestigious institutions (Cambridge/MIT/CalTech) at leading events (the GaTech S&T Policy 
Conference) using regression models of patent data report adjusted r-squared statistics of similar or lower 
value. 
 
We should also recognize that this is the best fit for the given dataset and that different data might produce 
a different model. Alternate data might come from interviews of each investigator before, during, and after 
their funded projects (all funded projects), which would reveal step-by-step what decisions were made to 
try and patent something from their research. But, such interviews are cost-prohibitive for me and tread on 
the income streams of various consulting firms, so what I can say – which is enough for a study – is that I 
looked at some relevant data, and here’s what I found of relevance to the theory. So get over yourselves. 
 
Also the reported model does not use all variables collected in the dataset. The AIC-based Stepwise 
Regression process revealed that many of the variables, including codings and calculations, did not add 
useful information when included in a regression model, so these variables were excluded from the 
reported model. 
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Table 12: Statistics for the best-fitting regression model 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Patents per investigator-year  
Subject to Compulsory Licensing (CL) -0.398 
Affiliated with Large Firm 0.643*** 
New-England-based Affiliation 0.127 
Affiliated with Small Firm 0.042 
Years since earliest data available -0.009** 
Materials Research Affiliation -0.065 
Year 0.056*** 
Japan-based Affiliation -0.817** 
EU-based Affiliation -0.086 
California-based Affiliation -0.078 
Lighting Industry Affiliation 1.859*** 
At Large, New-England-based Firm 0.449 
At Large Firm and Subject to CL 0.036 
New-England-based Affiliation and Subject to CL 3.245*** 
Small, New-England-based firm -0.757 
At Small Firm and Subject to CL 0.142 
Materials-science Affiliated and Subject to CL 0.511* 
EU-based Affiliation and Subject to CL 1.855*** 
At Large, EU-based Firm -2.145*** 
California-based Affiliation and Subject to CL 1.216 
At Small, California-based Firm 0.726* 
Lighting Industry Affiliation and Subject to CL -1.906*** 
At Large, New-England-based Firm and Subject to CL -0.960 
At Small, New-England-based Firm and Subject to CL -2.793*** 
At Large, EU-based Firm and Subject to CL -0.080 




Adjusted R2 0.171 
Residual Std. Error 1.895 (df = 1215) 
F Statistic 10.811*** (df = 26; 1215) 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Further figures help to visualize the regression model. Figure 20 compares the best-fitting 




Figure 20: Coefficients and 99% confidence intervals for the best-fitting regression 
model 
 
Of greatest note within the model’s coefficients is that the coefficient on SubjectToCL is 
not statistically different from zero at the 99%, 95%, or even the 90% confidence intervals. 
 
To provide useful interpretations of the model, the following sections provide charts 
displaying groups of model coefficients’ confidence level. While the coefficient implies 
lower predicted patent production by investigators subject to the Compulsory Licensing 
provision  in  some  comparisons  with  otherwise-similar  investigators,  the coefficient’s 
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confidence intervals imply that this effect is not robust and would occur only in relatively 
few cases. Conversely, the model’s coefficients imply much stronger effects from other 
variables in the dataset, including and importantly interaction terms between other 
variables and SubjectToCL. 
 
Interpretation of the statistically weak coefficient on SubjectToCL offers the finding that, 
in and of itself, the DOE SSL Program’s Compulsory Licensing provision had no 
discernible effect on investigator patent. Contrary to the hypothesis derived from Teece’s 
Appropriability Regimes framework, the regression model evidence suggests that the 
forced sharing of inventions in and of itself did not cause the investigators to produce fewer 
patents. 
 
4.5.2.3 Large firms and New-England-based organizations 
 
 
The model includes interaction terms to explore what effects the DOE SSL programs’ 
Compulsory Licensing provision had on investigators affiliated with Large Firms based in 
New England. Many of the NGLIA members are large firms based in the Northeastern 
United States (e.g. General Electric). As would-be recipients of any patent licenses forcibly 
shared, the New-England-based Large Firms may have given their employee-investigators 
subject to the Compulsory Licensing provision special direction on how to patent. 
 
Figure 21 shows confidence intervals for the model’s coefficients applied to the 
LARGE_FIRM, NE, and SubjectToCL variables. As shown in Figure 21, only 
LARGE_FIRM and the interaction term SubjectToCL:NE have 99% confidence intervals 
that do not include zero. The effects for both coefficients are positive. The model 
coefficient applied to LARGE_FIRM implies that, in 99 out of 100 comparisons with 
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otherwise-comparable investigators who are not affiliated with Large Firms, we can 
reasonably expect investigators affiliated with Large Firms to produce more patents. The 
model coefficient applied to SubjectToCL:NE implies that, in 99 out of 100 comparisons 
with otherwise comparable investigators, we can reasonably expect those subject to the 
Compulory Licensing provision and affiliated with a New-England-based organization to 
produce more patents. 
 
The other coefficients imply that, for investigators within the dataset, the following 
conditions have had no discernable effect on patent production: 
 
• Being affiliated with a New-England-based organization (NE) 
 
• Being subject to the Compulsory Licensing provision (SubjectToCL) 
 
• Being affiliated with a Large Firm based in New England (LARGE_FIRM:NE) 
 
• Being affiliated with a Large Firm based in New England while also being subject 
to the Compulsory Licensing provision. 
 
The coefficients offer the general interpretation that being affiliated with a Large Firm or 
being subject to the Compulsory Licensing provision while affiliated with a New-England- 
based organization that is not a Large Firm have had positive effects on patent production. 
The coefficients imply no effect for Large, New-England-based Firm affiliations, whether 
or not the investigator is subject to the Compulsory Licensing provision. The coefficients 
do imply a strong positive effect for investigators affiliated with New England 
organizations while also subject to the Compulsory Licensing, however. Together, the set 
of coefficients imply that only investigators who are not affiliated with Large Firms while 
subject to the Compulsory Licensing provision and having a New England affiliation 
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exhibit increased patent production. In other words, investigators subject to Compulsory 
Licensing while at small firms or academic institutions based in New England exhibit 
greater patent production relative to comparable investigators at Large Firms. As such, it 





Figure 21: 99% confidence intervals for the model’s coefficients applied to the 
LARGE_FIRM, NE, and SubjectToCL variables 
 
4.5.2.4 Small Firms and California-based organizations 
 
 
Because many US firms in SSL have grown out of the semiconductor expertise present in 
California’s Silicon Valley and manifests particularly in small start-up firms, the model 
includes interaction terms to reveal the effects of Small Firm, California-based affiliations 
on patent production. Small Firms, particularly start-up firms in R&D-intensive industries, 
often pursue an intellectual-property-intensive strategy, seeking to be first-movers in 
acquiring a large number of patents on a specific, novel technology. These firms often hope 
to then make significant revenues by licensing the patents to larger firms. Forced patent 
sharing would clearly undermine such a strategy. As such, Small Firms based in California 
may have been particularly sensitive to the forced patent sharing of DOE SSL Program’s 
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Compulsory Licensing provision and may have directed their investigators to produce 
fewer patents. 
 
Figure 22 shows confidence intervals for the model’s coefficients applied to the 
LARGE_FIRM, NE, and SubjectToCL variables. Figure 22 shows only 90% confidence 
intervals, as opposed to the 99% confidence intervals used in other figures, to illustrate a 
less likely but potentially strong negative effect of the Compulsory Licensing provision on 
patenting by investigators affiliated with California-based Small Firms. Particularly, the 
confidence interval and coefficient applied to SubjectToCL:SMALL_FIRM:California 
implies that, in 9 out of 10 comparisons with otherwise-comparable investigators, we can 
reasonably expect investigators at Small, California-based firms to produce fewer patents. 
Moreover, the coefficient and confidence interval extend much further into negative values 
than coefficients and confidence intervals applied to other variables – suggesting that, when 
this effect does occur, it may be quite strong. Also, the coefficient and confidence interval 
on SMALL_FIRM:California imply that, in 9 out of 10 comparisons with otherwise- 
comparable investigators, we can reasonably expect investigators affiliated with Small, 
California-based firms to produce more patents. Such statistics comport with the 
hypothesis that Small, California-based firms – some of whom are likely start-ups – pursue 
a patent-intensive strategy and encourage their employees to patent. 
 
While the confidence interval applied to SubjectToCL:California still spans zero, its near- 
zero lower bound suggests some less likely but strong positive effect of the Compulsory 
Licensing provision when applied to investigators with California affiliations that are not 
small firms. The coefficient and confidence interval imply that, in perhaps in 8 out of 10 
comparisons with otherwise-comparable investigators, we can reasonably expect 
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investigators subject to Compulsory Licensing and with California affiliations that are not 
small firms to produce more patents. Indeed, the high upper bound of the confidence 
interval suggests that, when the effect is observed, such investigators may produce more 
patents to a substantial degree. Since the effect does not apply to Small, California-based 
firm affiliations, the effect likely applies to affiliations with academic or government 
institutions based in California. Notably, prior work has found academic institutions in 
California to be strong patent producers relative to academic institutions elsewhere 




Figure 22: 99% confidence intervals for the model’s coefficients applied to the 
SMALL_FIRM, California, and SubjectToCL variables 
 
4.5.2.5 Large Firms and EU-based organizations 
 
 
Because many members of the NGLIA (see Table 7) were large firms based in the 
European Union (e.g. Philips, Osram-Sylvania), the model includes interaction terms to 
identify the effect of the Compulsory Licensing provision on investigators affiliated with 
Large, EU-based firms. As would-be recipients of any patent licenses forcibly shared, the 
EU-based Large Firms may have given their employee-investigators subject to the 
Compulsory Licensing provision special direction on how to patent. 
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Figure 23 shows confidence intervals for the model’s coefficients applied to the 
LARGE_FIRM, EU, and SubjectToCL variables. Aside from LARGE_FIRM (discussed 
in section on Large Firms based in New England), only LARGE_FIRM:EU and 
SubjectToCL:EU have coefficients statistically different from zero at the 99% confidence 
level. The coefficient and confidence interval applied to LARGE_FIRM:EU implies that, 
in 99 out of 100 comparisons with otherwise-comparable investigators, we can reasonably 
expect investigators affiliated with Large Firms based in the EU to produce fewer patents. 
Conversely, the coefficient and confidence in-terval applied to SubjectToCL:EU implies 
that, in 99 out of 100 comparisons with otherwise-comparable investigators, we can 
reasonably expect those affiliated with any EU organizations and subject to Compulsory 
Licensing to produce more patents. 
 
The two statistically significant coefficients of this set offer the following interpretation. 
First, Large Firms based in the EU may have less interest in acquiring patents from the US 
Patent and Trademark Office than in acquiring patents from the European Patent Office. 
Perhaps due to a weaker influence in US courts, the EU firms may pursue a patent strategy 
that places less weight on the US patent system. Second, while the Compulsory Licensing 
provision may have had a positive effect on patenting for investigators affiliated with EU- 
based organizations, the bulk of the EU-based organizations in the sample dataset are 
indeed Large, EU-based firms. As such, the negative effect of being affiliated with a Large, 
EU-based firm would in most cases cancel out the positive effect of being subject to 
Compulsory Licensing while also affiliated with an EU-based firm. All together, the 
coefficients and confidence intervals imply that we could reasonably expect investigators 
not subject to Compulsory Licensing and affiliated with Large, EU-based firms to patent 
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less than their counterparts, and after becoming subject to Compulsory Licensing to patent 
 
comparably with to their counterparts. 
 
Finally, the lack of statistical significance on SubjectToCL:LARGE_FIRM:EU suggests 
that the Compulsory Licensing provision had no particular effect on investigators affiliated 
with Large, EU-based firms. In other words, the provision brought no special effect for 




Figure 23: 99% confidence intervals for the model’s coefficients applied to the 
LARGE_FIRM, EU, and SubjectToCL variables 
 
4.5.2.6 Lighting sector versus Materials sector affiliations 
 
 
Out of consideration for the varying importance of patents to different industries and for 
Teece’s Appropriability Regimes framework, the regression model also includes 
interaction terms to capture the impact of the Compulsory Licensing provision to two very 
different industries – Lighting, and Materials. Of the two, Lighting clearly faces greater 
appropriability risks. The industry’s products ship directly to the public, meaning any 
unknown third party can purchase and reverse-engineer a Lighting product. Moreover, the 
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intense patent alliances and conflicts of the Lighting industry’s early history38 demonstrate 
the relatively high (nigh critical) importance of patents to the Lighting industry. 
Conversely, the Materials industry faces lesser appropriability risks. It rarely ships products 
to the public, because “materials” in and of themselves have relatively little use to the vast 
majority of consumers. The Materials industry’s products derive much of their value from 
the intensive processes used to engineer novel materials. Contrary to a Lightbulb, a novel 
material cannot be as easily disassembled, inspected, and reverse-engineered without prior 
knowledge of how the material was assembled in the first place (which would defeat the 
point of reverse-engineering the material). While the Materials industry may still use 
patents to defend its asset portfolio and mitigate risks, the relatively low appropriability of 
the industry’s products make patents less important to the industry. Given these 
considerations, Lighting industry affiliations may have been more sensitive to the 
Compulsory Licensing provision and may have directed their employee-investigators to 
patent less after becoming subject to Compulsory Licensing. Conversely, Materials 
industry affiliations may not have had the same sensitivity and may have given their 
employee-investigators no special direction on patent production under Compulsory 
Licensing. 
 
Figure 24 shows confidence intervals for the model’s coefficients applied to the Lighting, 
Materials, and SubjectToCL variables. Only the coefficients applied to Lighting and 
SubjectToCL:Lighting have values statistically different from zero. Moreover, the 
coefficient on lighting is strong and positive, while the coefficient on 
 
 
38 See chapter comparing Philips and Hewlett Packard, specifically sections on Philips’ early history, for a 
description of such examples as the Patentsgemeinschaft and the PHOEBUS cartel. 
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SubjectToCL:Lighting is strong and negative. All other coefficients are not statistically 
different from zero. The coefficient and confidence interval on Lighting implies that, in 99 
out of 100 comparisons with otherwise-comparable investigators, we can reasonably 
expect those with Lighting industry affiliations to produce more patents. Moreover, the 
high strength of the coefficient and confidence interval suggest that Lighting-industry- 
affiliated investigators would produce between 1 and 3 patents more than otherwise- 
comparable investigators. The coefficient and confidence interval on 
SubjectToCL:Lighting implies that, in 99 out of 100 comparisons with otherwise- 
comparable investigators, we can reasonably expect those subject to Compulsory 
Licensing and having Lighting industry affiliations to produce fewer patents. Moreover, 
the extremely negative values of the coefficient and confidence interval on 
SubjectToCL:Lighting implies that such investigators could easily be expected to produce 
between 1 and 3 patents fewer than their counterparts. 
 
The set of coefficients comports perfectly with the hypothesis that Lighting industry 
affiliations would exhibit greater sensitivity than Materials industry affiliations to the 
Compulsory Licensing provision. We see that Lighting-industry-affiliated investigators 
are very likely to patent more than other, comparable investigators. We also see that the 
Compulsory Licensing provision had a strong negative effect specifically for Lighting- 
industry-affiliated investigators. Taken together, the regression model implies that the 
Lighting-industry-affiliated investigators produced more patents than their counterparts 
prior to being subject to Compulsory Licensing, whose negative effect brought the 
patenting of Lighting-industry-affiliated investigators down to a level comparable with 
their counterparts. Conversely, we see no effects negative or positive for the Materials- 
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industry-affiliated investigators, either before or after becoming subject to Compulsory 
Licensing. This is exactly the behavior we expect given the greater Appropriability risks 
in the Lighting industry relative to the Materials industry. 
 
 
Figure 24: 99% confidence intervals for the model’s coefficients applied to the 
Lighting, Materials, and SubjectToCL variables 
 
4.5.3 Summary of findings and comparisons to initial hypotheses 
 
Taken together, the evidence found in this study provides insights on the Compulsory 
Licensing provision’s effects and nuanced findings for theory on Appropriability Regimes. 
Appropriability Regimes theory predicts that forced sharing of intellectual property, such 
as compelled by the DOE SSL Program’s Compulsory Licensing provision, will 
universally reduce production of intellectual property. Conversely, this study uncovers 
nuanced evidence suggesting that other factors, such as a firm’s size, strategy, and sector, 
dictate the intellectual-property-sharing policy’s effects. 
 
The findings of this study come from multiple examinations of evidence on the dataset, 
and Table 13 summarizes the findings in context of the study’s hypotheses. Bar charts and 
time trends showed little noticeable difference in patenting between investigators with 
small firm affiliations and investigators with large firm affiliations. Fitting of an optimal 
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regression model and analysis of the model statistics showed no effect coming solely from 
Large Firm affiliations or Small Firm affiliations alone. Rather, several other factors played 
a strong role in moderating the effect of Compulsory Licensing on patenting behavior. 
Affiliation with a sector facing high Appropriability risk, such as the Lighting sector, 
produced a strong negative effect on patenting when the investigator was under 
Compulsory Licensing. Affiliation with a Small Firm from California, likely to be an 
intellectual-property-focused start-up, produced a less robust but similarly strong negative 
effect on patent production when under Compulsory Licensing. Conversely, affiliation 
with a Small Firm from California without Compulsory Licensing produced a strong 
positive effect on patenting. Being affiliated with a non-Large-Firm organization from New 
England produced a strong positive effect on patenting regardless of whether the 





Table 13: Summary of hypotheses and findings of the study 
 
 
Hypothesis Finding Relevant Evidence 
   
H1: The compulsory licensing policy 
decreased patenting among inventors whose 
work was funded by the DOE SSL program 
Reject Regression shows insignificant 
effect of being subject to the 
compulsory licensing policy 
alone 
H1a: The compulsory licensing policy reduced 
the patenting of researchers at smaller firms 
more than the patenting of researchers at 
larger firms. 
Reject Regression coefficients near 
zero for both Small and Large 
firm affiliations; time series and 
bar charts show no obvious 
difference 
R1: The compulsory licensing policy had no 
effect on inventors whose work was funded by 
the DOE SSL program 
Fail to 
reject 
Regression shows insignificant 
effect of being subject to the 
compulsory licensing policy 
alone 
R2: Any observed differences between 
researchers subject to the compulsory 
licensing policy and researchers not subject to 
the compulsory licensing policy are due to age 
differences between the two groups and not to 
the effects of the compulsory licensing policy. 
Reject Regression shows no significant 
effect of the proxy for age, 
“years since earliest data;” i.e. 
there is no significant effect of 
age on patenting in this sample 
H2: The compulsory licensing policy 
decreased patenting by researchers facing 
high Appropriability Regimes more than it 
decreased patenting by researchers facing low 
Appropriability Regimes in the industries of 
the researchers’ respective firms. 
Fail to 
reject 
Regression shows strong 
negative effect for Lighting 
industry affiliations under 
Compulsory Licensing, and 
strong positive effect before 
Compulsory Licensing; 
regression shows no effect for 






Overall, the study’s evidence from sampled researchers’ patenting behavior indicates 
support for a path-dependent explanation for reduced patenting in the face of a policy 
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designed to spread knowledge embodied in patented technologies. Teece’s Appropriability 
Regimes hypothesis holds and provides part of the explanation, but there are further 
nuances – specifically with regards to which sector a researcher is working in. As with 
related path-dependency studies, the path-dependency focus helps highlight factors that 
have contributed to countervailing effects against policy design and, in so doing, aid the 
design of more effective policies for change. 
 
From this study, the relevance of path-dependency to the specific case of the DOE SSL 
program is abundantly clear. The DOE SSL program reflects path-dependency by being 
grounded in the R&D environment of its origin and through the program’s innovative 
patent policy, which works against a broader path-dependency of policies supporting patent 
rights and protections. While the DOE SSL Compulsory Licensing policy sought to 
encourage sharing of R&D-produced knowledge by compelling the sharing of patents, 
much prior US policy toward patents discouraged patent sharing and encouraged US 
federal agencies to allow researchers to retain patents. Specifically, in response to 
challenges form non-US firms and policies implemented by non-US governments, the US 
R&D industry successfully pressed throughout the 1980s for an array of new policies 
towards patents. The Bayh-Dole Act, the Federal Technology Transfer Act, the National 
Competitiveness Technology Transfer Act, and the Stevenson-Wydler Technology 
Innovation Act represent examples of the US R&D system’s patent policy transition. 
Concurrently, non-US governments implemented their own patenting policies and made 
patent policies a major issue during WTO negotiations. Moreover, the DOE SSL program’s 
design reflects its origins in a highly competitive and cross-institutional R&D business 
environment. The DOE SSL program came into existence in a new era of global R&D 
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competition; R&D performance by universities, small firms, and government laboratories; 
industry-academic-government alliances; and complex intellectual property 
configurations. Given the SSL Program’s environment, the SSL Program facilitated 
cooperation from large, established firms and R&D performance by universities, small 
firms, and government laboratories through a complex patent policy. Fulfilling Nelson and 
Winter’s hypothesis, the design of the DOE SSL Program reflected a newfound 
environment of global R&D competition and advocacy for intellectual property rights. 
Moreover, the program’s design triggered participation from certain firms that had 
succeeded in the pre-World-War-I era of global R&D competition and complex patent 
arrangements. 
 
4.6.1 Conclusions on compulsory licensing’s interaction with Appropriability Regimes 
 
The study begins with an apparent conflict between policy design and prior findings but 
ends with a conclusion that suggests refinement to both policy and theory. The DOE SSL 
program’s compulsory licensing policy motivated the research question of the policy’s 
impacts on funded researchers, as prior literature indicates that reducing the freedom of 
patent-holders to licenses patents as they may wish would reduce the incentives for 
researchers to produce patents. In particular, Teece’s work on Appropriability Regimes 
suggests that when patent protections are reduced through compulsory licensing policies, 
researchers will become less likely to patent technologies that are easier to reverse- 
engineer. Taken together, however, the evidence found in this study provides insights on 
the Compulsory Licensing provision’s effects and nuanced findings for theory on 
Appropriability Regimes. From patterns in the sampled researchers’ patent production, 
especially a reduced level of patenting by researchers in the lighting sector relative to 
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researchers in the materials sector, the analysis concludes that path-dependent variables 
influenced the extent to which patenting was affected by the compulsory licensing policy. 
 
The study also finds a strong role for path-dependent factors in explaining the observed 
outcomes and providing a broader perspective on designing policy to foster sector-specific 
innovation. Teece’s Appropriability Regimes work predicts that forced sharing of 
intellectual property, such as compelled by the DOE SSL Program’s Compulsory 
Licensing provision, will universally reduce production of intellectual property. 
Conversely, this study uncovers nuanced evidence suggesting that other path-dependent 
factors, such as a firm’s size, strategy, and sector, dictate the intellectual-property-sharing 
policy’s effects. In particular, the data showed that the path-dependent affiliation of a 
researcher with a sector facing high reverse-engineering risk, such as the Lighting sector, 
exhibited a strong negative effect on patenting when the investigator was under 
Compulsory Licensing. Similarly, the researcher’s path-dependent affiliation with a Small 
Firm from California, likely to be an intellectual-property-focused start-up, produced a less 
robust but similarly strong negative effect on patent production when under Compulsory 
Licensing. The path-dependent factors of affiliation with a given sector and the amount of 
reverse-engineering risk a sector’s technology faces appeared to have played a strong 
countervailing role to the knowledge-sharing effect of Compulsory Licensing intended by 
the policy. 
 
4.6.2 Conclusions on path-dependency’s lessons for lighting R&D policy 
 
The study highlights the relevance of path-dependency concepts to innovation in lighting 
R&D policies. The studies highlight that innovative R&D and energy policies often stand 
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against strong path-dependencies, as much or more so than technologies for R&D and 
energy sectors. Futhermore, the studies reviewed also show how a path-dependency 
framework would identify relationships within the R&D and energy policies studied in this 
dissertation. Applied to the R&D and energy policies, path-dependency highlights the 
following: 
 
1. Policies generally assume the existence of actors whose behaviors the policy wishes to 
change. In this case, the actors are individual researchers and the wished-for behavioral 
change is increasing knowledge-sharing. 
 
2. The behavior of these actors is influenced by certain key variables, and the policy in 
question aims to manipulate these key variables. In this case, the key variables are patent 
protections afforded under Bayh-Dole Act policies and attempts at manipulating key 
variables are the program’s Compulsory Licensing policy. 
 
3. The policy in question does successfully manipulate the targeted key variables. In this case, 
the policy mandates patent licensing negotiations. 
 
4. However, the successful manipulation of key variables by the policy does not ultimately 
lead to behavioral change because of extant, path-dependent variables. In this case, the 
extant path-dependent variables are the Appropriability Regimes faced by inventors in 
different sectors. 
 
5. In highlighting the extant variables in part (4) above, the path-dependency framework helps 
us understand that policies to promote knowledge-sharing should account for extant path- 
dependent variables such as Appropriability Regimes may affect knowledge-sharing, such 
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as by promoting knowledge-sharing through other means such as joint-ventures, MOUs, 
and other collaborative partnerships. 
 
The study’s use of a path-dependency framework highlighted path-dependent variables 
such as Appropriability Regimes that fluster innovative R&D policies. The study illustrates 
the influence of path-dependency on outcomes from innovative policies stimulating 
innovation in the lighting sector. By applying path-dependency to patent licensing 
requirements, the study builds upon prior findings in path-dependency. In highlighting 
factors that frustrate the aims of contemporary innovation policies towards lighting, this 
dissertation aims to inform the design of future innovation policies such that future policies 
may account for influential factors and design strategies that nullify or take advantage of 
such factors to enact change. 
 
As with any study of path-dependency, the overall finding must be one of nuance. A policy 
attempting to force sharing of patents may not necessarily discourage patent production in 
every case, but may have disparate impacts among those affected because of path- 
dependent factors governing patent production. Theory predicted that the forced sharing of 
patents would discourage the affected parties from producing patents, but only in certain 
cases did this turn out to be true. We can conclude, for example, that if the DOE SSL 
Program expected technology expedition to occur through forced sharing of patents 
produced by Lighting-industry-affiliated investigators, the program may have defeated 
itself through a policy that discouraged Lighting-industry-affiliated investigators from 
producing patents. Conversely, if the DOE SSL Program held the same expectation for 
Materials-industry-affiliated investigators, the program may rest easy knowing that its 
Compulsory Licensing policy is not likely to have defeated this goal. Moreover, if the 
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program hung its hopes on patents produced by Small Firms, the program needn’t worry – 
unless the program had specifically hoped for small, California-based startups to acquire 
and then share patents. This study has revealed many such nuances in the relationship 
between policies for forced patent sharing and affected parties’ decisions to produce 
patents. The study underscores the fact that path-dependency concepts help researchers 
understand the factors and patterns that have contributed to persistent circumstances and 
in so doing aids the design of more effective policies for change. The study uses a path- 
dependency research lens to highlight factors that an innovative policy effort did not 
capture and aids in the crafting of more effective means of creating change. 
 
4.6.3 Who should care and why 
 
Policymakers who design policies to affect patenting and particularly the sharing of patents 
and other forms of intellectual property and academics who the patenting behaviors of 
individual inventors should care about this chapter because it reveals nuances in how 
Appropriability Regimes interact with patent policies to influence patenting. Since this 
chapter’s analysis reveals a key factor affecting inventors’ patenting behavior, 
policymakers and academic researchers focusing on this area should alter their policy 
designs and research designs accordingly. A policymaker should assess the type of 
Appropriability Regime faced by the industry whose R&D sharing practices the 
policymaker seeks to affect. If the Appropriability Regime is strong, policies encouraging 
patent-sharing may not be a good means of encouraging overall R&D sharing. Conversely, 
if the Appropriability Regime is weak, encouraging patent-sharing may result in the actual 
sharing of more patents – with the caveat that most key R&D under a weak Appropriability 
Regime might not be captured in patents. Considering this caveat, the policymaker facing 
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a weak Appropriability Regime should consider other means of encouraging R&D sharing, 
such as requiring personnel transfers or encouraging joint-ventures. An academic 
researcher seeking to understand the drivers behind individual inventors’ patenting 
behavior should take care to assess the Appropriability Regime faced by the industry of the 
inventors the researcher is studying. Inventors facing a weak Appropriability Regime might 
produce fewer patents, and vice-versa, as the inventors may judge the importance of 
producing patents to be in proportion to the Appropriability Regime of the inventors’ 
industry. Also, publishing academic researchers’ assessments of the Appropriability 
Regimes at work in different industries would be of value to policymakers seeking to affect 
patenting behavior. 
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CHAPTER 5. PATH-DEPENDENCIES IN LIGHTING 
TECHNOLOGY AND ELECTRIC POWER INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
5.1 Research question 
 
This chapter addresses the question of whether SSL-driven lighting innovation and policy 
goals seeking societal benefits from lighting technology adoption can interfered with by 
differences in regional energy infrastructures. Policymakers who seek broad societal 
benefits through SSL-driven lighting innovation are usually banking on how the SSL 
lighting technology interacts with electric power infrastructure. While SSL technologies 
have many advantages, the most touted and and most often pursued by policies seeking 
SSL technology development and deployment is SSL’s energy efficiency. SSL’s energy 
efficiency contributes to public health and climate change mitigation by reducing carbon 
dioxide and other air pollution emissions from the electric power sector. By using less 
electric power to generate the same amounts of light used by various applications, SSL 
energy efficiency can assist these policy goals. However, this logic necessarily implies a 
dependency on existing energy infrastructure for SSL to have societal benefits. In 
particular, SSL interacts with air pollution and CO2 emissions through the buildings in 
which SSL devices are installed and through the electric power infrastructure servicing 
those buildings. If SSL technology is installed in buildings where lighting is not used very 
much, for example, SSL may not deliver much energy savings and emissions reduction. 
Similarly, if those buildings are serviced by a grid powered mainly by zero-emitting 
resources, SSL installations may not deliver very much emissions reduction. As such, there 
is reason to question the extent to which SSL technology can transforms societal outcomes. 
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To examine the extent to which SSL technology transforms societal outcomes, the analysis 
reports on a simulation study calculating the effects of expanded SSL device adoption 
under climate regulations on the electric power sector. Through the now-repealed US Clean 
Power Plan, the US had aimed to restrict the level of greenhouse gas emissions from the 
US electric power sector and encouraged US states to use energy-efficient consumer 
technologies to do so. Literature on the relationship between electric power sector 
outcomes and efficient energy-consuming technologies identifies several hypotheses on 
how SSL adoption might affect electric power consumption and production. The analysis 
compares outcomes from empirically grounded simulations of four geo-economic regions 
under scenarios of Clean Power Plan compliance with and without a subsidy for LED 
technologies. Results calculated from the simulations reveal to the intervening role of 
extant infrastructure present in each of the four regions, which moderates the effect of the 
adopted LED technologies. The chapter reaches conclusions regarding the role of path- 
dependency in the context of electric power infrastructure and lighting technology 
innovation and offers conclusions and guidance for future policymakers. 
 
5.2 Literature Review 
 
The Clean Power Plan’s recognition of energy efficiency – and by extension, SSL – as a 
valuable option for reducing the electric power sector’s CO2 emissions is supported by a 
wide range of literature. The amount of energy savings achievable through energy 
efficiency measures, as well as the associated CO2 emissions reductions, has been 
exhaustively studied. Wang & Brown (2014) provide an overview of this copious literature, 
which generally finds that energy efficiency measures provide cost-competitive options for 
reducing CO2 emissions and in substantial amounts (see also Brown & Sovacool, 2014). 
174  
Wang and Brown focus on standards, financial incentives, and information programs for 
promoting energy efficiency that specifically target residential, commercial, and industrial 
customers of electric power utilities. (M. A. Brown & Li, 2019) examine the extent to 
which policies toward demand-side technologies can complement the goals of carbon tax 
policies toward other sectors – including the electric power sector. (M. A. Brown, Kim, & 
Smith, 2016) make a similar study for carbon policies toward the electric power sector 
alone. (Rogelj et al., 2015) find energy efficiency to be a crucial instrument for meeting 
current goals of keeping global warming below 1.5 degrees Celsius by 2100. (M. A. Brown, 
Levine, Romm, Rosenfeld, & Koomey, 1998) compare demand-side options with supply- 
side options for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, finding demand-side options to be 
more cost-effective. Hanson & Laitner (2004) compare the impacts of investment in 
energy-efficient technologies against the impacts of a carbon tax between $48 to $98 per 
metric ton. 
 
Despite this literature on the relationship between CO2 emissions from the electric power 
sector and energy efficiency, however, a literature gap exists regarding the role of energy 
efficiency and specifically SSL in compliance with the electric power sector’s CO2 
emission regulations. As highlighted in Brown, Kim, Smith, & Southworth (2017), prior 
analysis of energy efficiency as an option for complying with CO2 emissions regulation for 
the electric power sector, such as the Clean Power Plan, has been poor. For example, 
representation of energy efficiency in prior studies of Clean Power Plan compliance was 
so primitive as to hardly constitute attempts at representing energy efficiency at all. 
Because of the limitations of their models, some studies have ignored energy efficiency 
entirely when examining options for mitigating the electric power sector’s greenhouse gas 
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emissions (Peters & Hertel, 2017). Other studies have taken crude and inadequate 
approaches to representing energy efficiency, such as assuming that energy demand is 
somehow mysteriously and exogenously reduced at some lump-sum cost to society. Such 
approaches obviously fail to answer the question of how the reductions are achieved and 
what implications those reductions have for the portfolio of technologies used to consume 
energy by the residential and commercial sectors. Moreover, such modeling approaches 
cannot reflect instances when supply-side investments for meeting greenhouse gas 
reduction requirements elevate electricity prices and make energy-efficient technologies, 
like LED-based lighting, more attractive to end-use consumers.39 Many studies use such 
inadequate models and approaches, attempting to make sweeping statements about energy 
policy without considering granular realities, including examples such as: 
 
• Integrated Planning Model (IPM) used by US Environmental Protection Agency 
(2014), MJ Bradley & Associates (2016), and the Bipartisan Policy Center (2016) 
• the Haiku model used by Resources for the Future (Burtraw, Linn, Palmer, & Paul, 
2016), 
• US-REGEN used by the Electric Power Research Institute (2016) 
 
• FACETS-ELC used by Wright & Kanudia (2016) 
 
While Brown et al. (2017) fill a crucial gap in rigorously modeling energy efficiency as an 
option for Clean Power Plan, their analysis fails to include any specific examination of the 
compliance role for SSL. Moreover, Brown et al.’s use of the EIA 2015 AEO High Tech 
 
 
39 For further detail on the design and advantages of GT-NEMS, consult (Brown, Kim, Smith, and 
Southworth, 2017) 
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case assumptions fails to provide a data-grounded characterization of LED technologies 
and also fails to capture recent forecasts of LED product cost and performance – i.e. using 
outdated information to represent SSL. As such, a literature gap exists regarding the role 
of SSL products in compliance with CO2 emissions reduction policies for the US electric 
power sector. 
 
Despite the established relationships between emissions reductions and efficient 
technologies in lighting and other consumer technology sectors, the literature still leaves 
questions open and gaps between known influential factors and reports on modeling. For 
example, while Brown et al., 2017 makes a general finding that energy efficiency reduces 
power sector operating costs under the CPP, that study applies that finding to the nation as 
a whole and fails to consider the significant heterogeneity across regions of the US. Power 
sector infrastructure varies significantly across US regions. For example, the Pacific 
Northwest is primarily powered by hydroelectric dams, while California is now powered 
almost entirely by natural gas, wind, and solar generators. Moreover, the portfolio of 
buildings into which adopted LEDs would be installed varies significantly between regions 
as well. Building codes vary considerably from state to state, with California codes 
requiring significantly more energy-efficient designs than southeastern building codes, for 
example. Buildings are designed with local climates in mind as well as such the lesser 
average insulation in a California home reflects the more temperate Pacific climate while 
the greater insulation in a Minnesota home reflects the harsh winters of the Upper Midwest. 
As such, there is good reason to expect that increased adoption of energy-efficient 
consumer technologies would have differing impacts from region to region within the US. 
Moreover, a finding of a relationship between energy-efficient consumer technologies and 
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power sector costs may mask true relationships at the regional level, since the national level 




As the literature identifies strong relationships between electricity consumption, the 
electric power sector’s CO2 emissions, electric power capacity construction, and 
deployment of energy-efficient consumer technologies like SSL, the literature lends 
several hypotheses to this study. This section lays out hypotheses that guide the remainder 
of the study. 
 
5.3.1 Hypotheses 1: Sectors whose building types are the most intensive users of lighting 
will exhibit the greatest LED adoption 
 
Given the direct relationship between energy costs, energy consumption, and use of energy 
services, it follows that sectors using a great deal of lighting service have the most money 
to save from installing LEDs. In particular, sectors whose buildings use the most lighting 
per square foot seem best-positioned to take advantage of LEDs’ energy efficiency. 
Intensive use of lighting within a building creates greater electric power consumption, 
which in turn creates high electric utility bills; adopting LEDs allows such buildings to 
maintain the same intensive use of lighting while lowering electricity consumption. 
 
Figure 25 provides data from the EIA’s Commercial Buildings Energy Consumption 
Survey (CBECS), showing each building type’s percentage of illuminated floorspace. 
From the EIA data, Healthcare, Food Sales, and Education appear to be the sectors whose 
building types use the most lighting. As such, a reasonable hypothesis would be to find that 
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these building types consistently rank near the top of LED adopters in the forecast. 
Moreover, it’s further reasonable to hypothesize that the building types will show the same 




Figure 25: Percent of illuminated floorspace (x-axis) by building type (y-axis). 
Source: US Energy Information Administration, 2017 
 
5.3.2 Hypothesis 2: Holding LED adoption constant, power sector outcomes will vary by 
region due to the influence of path-dependent factors 
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From the literature on path-dependency, the importance of the path-dependent context in 
which policies toward electric power consuming technologies for lighting services operate 
seems particularly relevant. The study possesses key tenets of a path-dependent situation: 
A policy here LED subsidies – may intend to manipulate outcomes – here costs, pollutants, 
or renewable power generation – by way of manipulating intermediate variables – here 
technology cost, which subsequently influences technology choice and ultimately 
electricity consumption. In spite of this causal relationship, however, there are other path- 
dependent variables – here the regional electric power infrastructure – that also influence 
the intermediate variables that the LED subsidy policy may not account for. Moreover, 
electric power infrastructure is extremely path-dependent because it cannot easily be 
transmuted or reversed or converted into new infrastructure. 
 
Many examples exist of how extant factors may affect the power sector impacts of adopting 
LEDs. A small set of such examples includes: 
 
1. Location of the LEDs on the power grid – if LEDs decrease load at a bus from 
which power already is net-flowing away (such as in upstate NY, in which power 
flows toward NYC), this may not matter much for regional capacity building since 
that capacity is built to serve peak load of the region (which in NY is NYC ) 
 
a. Moreover, load that balances a congested set of power lines is actually 
useful for reducing the amount of new generating and transmission capacity 
necessary to meet demand overall – thus reducing load at such an 
“upstream” bus (i.e. a bus proximal to generation) actually exacerbates the 
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need for transmission capacity, begetting further transmission investment 
and therefore increasing costs to consumers 
 
2. Fuel of generating portfolio – If LEDs are deployed in regions served largely by 
renewable or low-emitting power generating units, the LEDs will not result in as 
much of a reduction in emissions of harmful pollutants as they would if deployed 
in a region served by high-emitting power generating units. 
 
3. Long term power purchase agreements – even if LEDs reduce power demand in a 
given municipality, for example, the municipality in which LEDs are installed may 
have a long-term agreement (e.g. 10-year power purchase agreement) to purchase 
power from a high-emitting source and may choose to simply re-sell the purchased 
power it no longer needs. If this happens, the high-emitting source’s output remains 
unchanged despite LEDs successfully reducing power demand. Worse yet, the 
municipality may have a take-or-pay contract with the high-emitting generator and 
may have to pay for any reductions in purchased power – meaning that LEDs 
would reduce power demand but increase costs to consumers. 
 
4. Lighting use in buildings – if LEDs are installed in buildings that already do not 
use much lighting, per unit space and time, the overall impact on power demand 
will likely be minimal. 
 
5. Planned expansions of transmission or generating capacity – if infrastructure 
buildout is already planned for an expected increase in demand, LEDs may only 
defer rather than mitigate such expansions (and associated emissions). Deferral 
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may still have value but will fall short of meeting any policymaking goals to avoid 
completely the need for new infrastructure. 
 
Entities in the power sector have recognized the connection between demand-side energy 
efficiency and their operations and have developed various treatments of end-use efficiency 
in their strategic planning documents. In particular, major utility companies have brought 
their thinking to bear on this problem by trying to incorporate energy efficiency 
investments, such as LEDs, into their strategic investment planning. As one example, the 
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)’s efforts in developing its 2015 Integrated Resource 
Plan (IRP) attempted to treat energy-efficient demand-side technologies as a resource 
similar to a power plant. Investments in deploying energy-efficient demand-side 
technologies were aggregated into 10MW blocks and assigned various power-plant-like 
parameters, such as daily output profiles, capacity factors, and construction costs (Marilyn 
A. Brown & Wang, 2015; Rice, 2016). Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E)’s 2018 IRP 
implemented an alternative approach to integrating energy efficiency into the utility’s 
strategic planning. Instead of offering rebates and other subsidy-like incentives to 
customers purchasing efficient lightbulbs, as one example of a “widget-based” strategy 
common across many utilities, the utility now offers performance-based incentives that 
reward customers in direct proportion to actual energy saved (Pacific Gas and Electric, 
2018). In its Energy Efficiency Business Plan, a strategic planning document dedicated 
specifically to the company’s demand-side energy efficiency investment strategy, PG&E 
outlines expectations that such performance-based programs will do more to ensure actual 
energy efficiency gains and incentivize customers to go beyond the “widget-based” gains 
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by creating synergies between devices and changing energy consumption behavior (Pacific 
Gas and Electric, 2017). 
 
This path-dependency cannot be ignored and should inform our expectations of the results. 
It’s reasonable to hypothesize that, to any given level of LED adoption, regions with their 
own path-dependent infrastructure should respond differently. We should find both 
qualitatively different and quantitatively different outcomes for each region, despite any 
similarities in their levels of LED adoption. 
 
5.3.3 Hypothesis 3: Greater LED adoption results in lower Total Resource Cost 
 
Given the cost savings associated with LED adoption and the low cost of the “negawatts,” 
provided by efficient technologies, it follows that all regions should experience reductions 
in Total Resource Costs under a scenario with high LED adoption. By reducing electric 
power demand, LEDs provide an opportunity to reduce costs to the electric power sector 
of meeting new or existing demand – and all the more so when the costs are augmented by 
constraints such as those imposed by the Clean Power Plan. Importantly, the definition of 
Total Resource Cost captures only the costs to the electric power sector, including 
compliance with policies such as the Clean Power Plan. As such, any cost to government 
for e.g. a subsidy would be excluded from Total Resource Cost calculations.40 As such, it 
is reasonable to hypothesize that any level of LED adoption can result only in reductions 
in Total Resource Costs, and that scenarios with greater LED adoption should always 
exhibit lower Total Resource Costs than scenarios with lesser LED adoption. 
 
 
40 The TRC does include the costs of utility-funded energy efficiency programs, but not the cost of 
programs directly funded by federal, state, or local governments. 
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5.3.4 Hypothesis 4: Greater LED adoption displaces high-emitting power sources 
 
Because the Clean Power Plan requires regions to reduce emissions from the power sector, 
LED adoption will enable regions to meet Clean Power Plan emissions reduction demands 
at lower cost and enable regions to displace high-emitting power sources, which tend to be 
older and more expensive to operate. As such, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that LED 
adoption will primarily displace high-emitting resources like power plants that use coal- 
fired and oil-fired steam turbines. Moreover, it seems unlikely that LED adoption will 
displace clean generators like Renewables and Combined Cycle generators because of the 
premium the Clean Power Plan creates for those resources. The Clean Power Plan creates 
opportunities for relatively low-carbon-intensive capacity, and it seems reasonable to 
hypothesize that LED adoption will augment those opportunities by displacing primarily 
heavy greenhouse gas emitters. 
 
5.4 Methodology for testing hypotheses 
 
To examine interplay between LED adoption and power sector emissions regulations, we 
use the computational general equilibrium model GT-NEMS to compare LED adoption 
outcomes to electric power sector cost and capacity outcomes under a scenario of CPP 
compliance with a subsidy to LED technologies. We use a scenario of subsidy to LEDs 
under CPP compliance to increase LED adoption throughout the simulated economy and 
observe impacts on the power sector’s costs as represented by TRC metrics. TRC metrics 
include both operational expenses and costs related to financing and investment and are a 
common metric for the cost impacts of energy-efficient consumer technologies. Because 
the examined regions achieve CPP compliance both in the scenario with the LED subsidy 
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and the scenario without the LED subsidy, the total emissions reductions achieved remain 
constant while the costs of compliance and power sector operations vary across scenarios. 
By holding the total emissions reduced constant and allowing compliance costs to vary, we 
can make inferences about what relationships additional LED adoption has on the cost of 
CPP compliance and power sector operations. Moreover, we can compare the relationships 
between LED adoption and compliance costs across the examined regions. To make the 
appropriate comparisons, the analysis will compare LED adoption within the four regions 
of interest, expecting similarities between the regions in terms of increased total LED 
adoption under the LED subsidy. The analysis will also explore distribution of adopted 
LEDs within the four regions, particularly across building types within each region’s 
commercial building portfolio. Then, the analysis will examine regional TRC outcomes, 
highlighting both changes in power sector operating costs within each region and 
comparing across the regions, as well as comparing to the regions’ LED adoption. The 
analysis will search for difference and data that explain how two or more regions adopting 
similar levels of energy-efficient consumer technologies while complying with the CPP 
can exhibit significant differences in power sector cost outcomes. 
 
While most studies of electric power sector emissions apply different policies to observe 
emissions reductions outcomes, this study takes a novel approach by holding emissions 
reductions constant and observing variation in compliance costs under different scenarios. 
By allowing the examined regions to achieve CPP compliance in all scenarios and allowing 
compliance costs to vary by scenario, the study exposes relationships LED adoption has 
with the cost of CPP compliance and power sector operations. Finally, while the literature 
generally finds that efficient energy-consuming technologies provide cost-competitive 
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options for reducing CO2 emissions, the analysis presented here adds nuance by illustrating 
heterogeneous, path-dependent, region-specific impacts of introducing efficient 
technologies. The study’s comparison of regional LED adoption to Total Resource Cost 
(TRC) and electric power capacity outcomes under CPP compliance with a subsidy to LED 
technologies reveals the regional differences that nuance nation-level findings, such as that 
presented in Brown et al. (2017). 
 
5.4.1 Using GT-NEMS to model power sector and consumer sector interactions 
 
To estimate the impacts of subsidies for SSL lighting products upon electric power 
infrastructure under a greenhouse-gas emissions reduction policy, I use a computational 
general equilibrium model called GT-NEMS. GT-NEMS is a modified version of The US 
DOE’s National Energy Modeling System (NEMS), which models the U.S. energy 
economy and calculates a cost-minimizing resource investment strategy for meeting energy 
demand. The differences between NEMS and GT-NEMS lie entirely in the computer 
systems necessary to run NEMS on Georgia Tech computer systems. As such, GT-NEMS 
retains all of NEMS’ calculations and is functionally equivalent to NEMS, and hereinafter 
references to NEMS also refer to GT-NEMS and vice-versa. NEMS has been widely used 
by energy researchers for addressing important policy questions, including whether the US 
should ratify the Kyoto Protocol (M. a Brown, Levine, Short, & Koomey, 2001). The US 
DOE also uses NEMS annually to generate a three-decade forecast of the US energy 
economy called the Annual Energy Outlook. The version of GT-NEMS used in this study 
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is based on the version of NEMS that generated the 2015 Annual Energy Outlook (US 
Energy Information Administration, 2015).41 
 
GT-NEMS comprehensively represents the US energy economy through representing 
multiple sectors and their interactions. GT-NEMS represents four sectors, each 
computationally represented by its own module, that constitute US energy demand: 
residential, commercial, industrial, and transportation. GT-NEMS also represents four 
sector-modules for US energy supply: oil and gas, gas transmission, coal, and renewable 
fuels. GT-NEMS also represents via modules two US energy conversion sectors: electric 
power, and petroleum products. GT-NEMS also represents international energy supply and 
demand through an international module. GT-NEMS represents macroeconomic impacts 
on the US energy economy by using a macroeconomic model provided by IHS Global 
Insights, and GT-NEMS represents relationships between the sectors via an integrating 
module. 
 
Because this study focuses on SSL lighting technologies, the study focuses on the 
calculations made by GT-NEMS’ electric power module and commercial buildings 
module. GT-NEMS’ commercial buildings module offers comprehensive representation of 
technologies for meeting many energy services demanded by residential and commercial 
sectors. For example, the commercial module represents multiple kinds and vintages of 
both electric and natural gas technology options for providing space heating. Through sets 
of cost and performance parameters, the commercial buildings module represents an array 
of lighting technologies that the modules select from in order to minimize cost of meeting 
 
41 Comprehensive documentation of the GT-NEMS/NEMS calculation methodologies and computational 
structure can be found on the US DOE Energy Information Administration’s website: 
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demands for light. The commercial buildings module includes LED-based lighting 
technologies, allowing LED-based technologies to compete with incumbent and 
conventional lighting technologies such as filament bulbs and fluorescent tubes. 
 
Moreover, GT-NEMS includes parameters to reflect the “rebound effect” of deployment 
of energy-efficient technologies, i.e. the marginal increase to energy consumption that may 
occur because an energy-efficient technology makes energy consumption less costly to the 
consumer, leading the consumer to use the technology more and consume marginally more 
energy. GT-NEMS calculates the rebound effects of energy efficient products on energy 
consumption through the following formula:42 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸,𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏,𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟,𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦= 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸,𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏,𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟,𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 ∙ 𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸,𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟,𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦,𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 
 
∙1+ [1−𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟,,,/𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟,𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏,𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸] ∙ ℇ2 
 
· (1+[𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏,𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟,𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾] ∙ ℇ2 ) 
In which: 
• 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸,𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏,𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟,𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 is the projected consumption of fuel by end-use service, 
major fuel, building type, Census division, and projection year 
• 𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸,,, is the graduated short-term price elasticity function. Elasticity for a given 
major fuel, end-use service, and Census division in a given year is calculated as a 
weighted function of the price of the given fuel in the current year and the previous 
two years relative to the fuel price in CBECS year 
 
42 This formula is taken from the NEMS 2013 documentation for the Commercial module and is indexed as 
Formula B-109 
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• 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟,𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏,𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 is the effective average efficiency of the equipment mix 
by major fuel, end-use service, building type, and Census division for the current 
year, as calculated in the Commercial module’s “Technology Choice” subroutine 
• 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟,𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏,𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 is the effective average efficiency of the 
equipment mix by major fuel, end-use service, building type, and Census division 
during the CBECS base year, as calculated from the input equipment efficiencies 
and market shares 
• 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏,𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟,𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾 is the heating or cooling building shell efficiency factor for the 
current Census division, building type, and year 





In its essence, the formula above increases energy consumption whenever the average 
efficiency of the current scenario is greater than the average efficiency of the base case, 
and decreases consumption whenever the reverse is true. The second term in the formula, 
which applies to lighting (the third term does not and only applies to space 
heating/cooling), takes the marginal increase or decrease in efficiency between the current 
scenario and base case scenario and multiples that increase or decrease by -0.15. This 
means that 15% of the marginal increase (decrease) in efficiency gets added to (subtracted 
from) total energy consumption. Debates over the proper rebound magnitude assumptions 
have raged for years (Sorrell, Dimitropoulos, & Sommerville, 2009), with some arguing 
that rebound is underestimated (Frondel & Vance, 2013) and others arguing that rebound 
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is overestimated (Gillingham, Kotchen, Rapson, & Wagner, 2013). Simulations and 
theoretical works tend to predict high levels of rebound, such as an over 100% rebound 
effect calculated by Hicks & Theis (2014). Conversely, empirical works tend to observe 
lower levels of rebound, such as the 2% effect reported by Gillingham et al. (2013) Despite 
these debates, GT-NEMS’ representation of the rebound effect is on par or even overly 
conservative relative to recent work providing empirical estimates of rebound effects for 
lighting. For example, a 6% rebound effect was recently calculated from a representative 
survey of households that installed more efficient lighting products (Schleich, Mills, & 
Dütschke, 2014). 
 
In representing lighting products, GT-NEMS also offers the advantage of representing the 
load profile of lighting technologies in different building types. The term “load profile” 
refers to how much power a given technological device will consume over the course of a 
day. Because electric power must be generated at the exact moment it is needed, electric 
utility strategic planning makes use of load profiles to understand when electric power 
demand is likely to increase and decrease over the course of a day. The load profiles of 
individual technologies are aggregated into a system-wide load profile representing the 
hourly distribution of electricity demand. The system-wide load profile in turn informs 
utility planners in many decisions, including for example how much fast-ramping capacity 
(i.e. power plants that can quickly increase or decrease output) is needed. GT-NEMS 
provides load profiles for every technology powered by electricity. Beyond this, GT- 
NEMS offers even greater granularity by offering different load profiles for each building 
type. In other words, GT-NEMS will represent an LED product installed in a warehouse 
with a different lighting load profile than that of an LED product installed in a small office 
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space. Having load profiles that vary by building type is especially important for the 
commercial buildings sector in which electric power usage patterns vary significantly. For 
example, the load profile for lighting technologies in warehouses is roughly constant for 
all 24 hours of the day, while that for small office space is high during workday hours and 
low overnight. 
 
In the electric power module, GT-NEMS uses the lighting technologies selected by the 
commercial buildings sector to calculate the demand for electric power caused by lighting 
service. GT-NEMS’ electric power module uses that quantity in its calculation of total 
electric demand for a given time period. The electric power module then calculates the 
least-cost means of generating electricity to meet that demand, including which power 
plants to operate, which fuels to burn for generation, and what kind of new power plant 
capacity to build. In calculating the optimal electricity generation strategy, GT-NEMS uses 
technology data from US DOE Energy Information Administration's Forms 860, 861, and 
923; Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's Form 1; and North American Electric 
Reliability Corporation (NERC) projections (Smith & Brown, 2015). Users can represent 
alternative scenarios by manipulating, among other inputs, GT-NEMS’ representation of 
greenhouse gas policies and technology options.Importantly, GT-NEMS’ sector modules 
use different regional breakdowns. The commercial buildings module represents the 
United States through nine Census divisions, performing separate calculations of total 
energy demanded and technology portfolios selected for each Census division. Conversely, 
GT-NEMS’ electric power module represents the United States through 22 regions 
partially based on regions designated by NERC.43 Despite the difference between modules 
 
43 For a map, see https://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/ces_hall/pdf/appc.pdf 
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in geographical representation, GT-NEMS accurately translates the energy consumption, 
prices, costs, and other calculations between the regional representations. GT-NEMS uses 
a conversion matrix based on historic energy consumption data to ensure that energy 
consumption calculated by census divisions is accurately apportioned among the electric 
power module’s NERC-based regions. 
 
5.4.1.1 Advantages to using GT-NEMS 
 
 
For purposes of this study, GT-NEMS constitutes a superior choice to all alternatives for 
many reasons. The primary reason for choosing GT-NEMS over other options is that most 
energy modeling tools are not able to adequately represent both greenhouse gas policies 
for the electric power sector and end-use technologies like LED-based lighting 
technologies. GT-NEMS is the only nation-scale modeling tool capable of representing a 
portfolio of technology options for lighting service. GT-NEMS goes even farther in this 
particular advantage by addressing “rebound effects” of energy-efficient technologies, in a 
manner compatible with recent literature (Sorrell et al., 2009).44 As such, GT-NEMS is 
also the only modeling tool capable of representing consumers’ choice among competing 
technologies for lighting. Since we want to understand how greenhouse-gas policies and 
consumer technology choices interact, representing consumers’ economic decision making 
of which lighting technology to use is critical for this study. GT-NEMS also offers a 
granular, large-scale, and computationally sophisticated representation of the electric 
power sector and its greenhouse gas emissions policies. Moreover, GT-NEMS represents 
 
44 Assumptions reflecting a stronger rebound effect might diminish some of the absolute magnitudes 
observed in this study, as the aggregate effect of such assumptions would be to decrease the absolute 
amount of energy saved by deployed LEDs. However, such assumptions would have general effects across 
all regions and building types and would therefore be unlikely to change the qualitative differences and 
other patterns of outcomes observed in the study. 
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interactions between the energy consumption sectors and the electric power sector’s 
greenhouse gas emissions policies, making GT-NEMS perfectly suited to the needs of this 
study. 
 
The superiority of GT-NEMS to alternatives becomes apparent when examining studies 
performed with other modeling tools. As described previously in the section on literature 
gaps, some studies have ignored energy efficiency entirely when examining options for 
mitigating the electric power sector’s greenhouse gas emissions (Peters & Hertel, 2017). 
Other studies have taken crude and inadequate approaches to representing energy 
efficiency, such as assuming that energy demand is somehow mysteriously and 
exogenously reduced at some lump-sum cost to society. Many studies use such inadequate 
models and approaches, attempting to make sweeping statements about energy policy 
without considering granular realities, including examples such as: Integrated Planning 
Model (IPM) used by US Environmental Protection Agency (2014), MJ Bradley & 
Associates (2016), and the Bipartisan Policy Center (2016), the Haiku model used by 
Resources for the Future (Burtraw et al., 2016), US-REGEN used by the Electric Power 
Research Institute (2016), and FACETS-ELC used by Wright & Kanudia (2016) 
 
Such approaches obviously fail to answer the question of how the reductions are achieved 
and what implications those reductions have for the portfolio of technologies used to 
consume energy by the residential and commercial sectors. Moreover, such modeling 
approaches cannot reflect instances when supply-side investments for meeting greenhouse 
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gas reduction requirements elevate electricity prices and make energy-efficient 
technologies, like LED-based lighting, more attractive to end-use consumers.45 
 
5.4.1.2 Controlling for rival hypotheses through GT-NEMS simulation designs 
 
 
While experimental and quasi-experimental research designs must employ various 
techniques to eliminate rival hypothesis, the use of GT-NEMS simulation designs makes 
such techniques unnecessary by offering perfect control for rival hypotheses. Experimental 
and quasi-experimental research designs must contend with rival hypotheses, which are in 
essence alternative explanations of the data. These alternative explanations compete with 
the experimental or quasi-experimental researchers’ main hypotheses by casting doubt on 
the belief that the researchers’ findings truly reject or fail to reject the researchers’ 
hypothesis. In plain language, as long as some explanation for the data remains a plausible 
alternative to the researchers’ main explanation, ambiguity remains as to whether the 
research has truly tested the relevant theories. Given this circumstance, the experimental 
or quasi-experimental researcher must use elements of the research design to eliminate 
alternative explanations – in other words, to “control for” those rival hypotheses. Common 
examples include using laboratory conditions to hold constant elements of an environment 
other than the one being tested. Contrary to experimental and quasi-experimental research 
designs, however, the use of GT-NEMS to simulate responses of the US energy economy 
enables perfect control of rival hypotheses. GT-NEMS enables users with very precise 
control of rival hypotheses by allowing users to simulate scenarios with only one factor 
changed between them. All other conditions of the modeled US energy economy are held 
 
45 For further detail on the design and advantages of GT-NEMS, consult Brown et al. 2017. 
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constant. As such, any difference between the two simulated scenarios’ results becomes 
entirely attributable to the single factor that was changed. No alternative explanations are 
plausible. The study’s research design uses GT-NEMS to hold constant the influence of 
any other factor and to only change one factor at a time, and thus any other factors that 
might influence the outcomes of the study are controlled for. 
 
5.4.2 Updating GT-NEMS to reflect the Clean Power Plan and contemporary policies 
 
5.4.2.1 Representing the Clean Power Plan in GT-NEMS 
 
 
This study uses several manipulations of input data and parameters to represent the Clean 
Power Plan in GT-NEMS. Because the Clean Power Plan defines the electric power 
sector’s GHG reduction goals at the level of each US state, GT-NEMS uses a weighted 
aggregation to implement GHG reduction policies at the level of each of the electric power 
module’s 22 regions. GT-NEMS uses data from 2012 on power-plant-level generation to 
weight the GHG reduction targets in the aggregation from state to region. The study 
implements each region’s GHG policy as a cap on the upper limit of tons of CO2 a region’s 
electric power sector may emit in a given year. Moreover, the study scenarios apply the 
CO2 limits to both existing and newly constructed power plants for the entire duration of 
the forecast period. 
 
5.4.2.2 Updating the reference scenarios to reflect contemporary policies promoting wind and 
 
solar generation and to reflect the CPP’s CEIP 
 
 
In addition to modifying GT-NEMS’ CO2 emissions limits, this study makes several 
modifications to GT-NEMS’ other input variables for purposes of representing certain 
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aspects of the Clean Power Plan as well as contemporary policies and latest data. The 
modifications follow those described in Brown et al. (2017), and the reader is directed to 
that source and its appendix for technical details. The modifications include: 
 
• An update of cost data for distributed solar PV via review of contemporary 
estimates of distributed solar PV costs-per-kilowatt-dc 
• An update of GT-NEMS’ data reflecting the wind production tax credit, which was 
extended for five years via the US Congress’ Consolidated Appropriations Act of 
2015 
• An update of GT-NEMS’ data reflecting the solar investment tax credit, which was 
introduced via the US Congress’ Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2015 
• Further modifications making the wind production tax credit and the solar 
production tax credit more generous so as to reflect economic advantages granted 
to wind and solar resources under the Clean Power Plan’s Clean Energy Incentive 
Program (CEIP) 
 





To accurately represent SSL technology in NEMS, I update the model’s representation of 
LED-based lighting technologies to reflect recent projections of product performance 
(Navigant Consulting, 2014). Good cause exists to deviate from GT-NEMS’ default 
assumptions regarding projections of lighting technology performance and costs. Brown et 
al. (2017) used "High Tech" assumptions from the EIA’s AEO 2015 to characterize 
lighting, in addition to several performance-enhancing assumptions to other technologies 
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(lighting and non-lighting) in tandem. Per EIA, however, the High Tech assumptions 
reflect a sensitivity scenario – a set of assumptions that have been deliberately biased in 
one direction or another to produce an expected directional change in a scenario’s 
outcomes. As such, the High Tech case assumptions aren't strongly supported and aren’t 
intended to be – they exist simply to produce a scenario result that makes AEO 2015 readers 
aware of the potential consequences of unforeseen (and not necessarily rationalized) 
technological progress. As a sensitivity, therefore, the High-tech case cannot serve as a 
point of reference and cannot be useful in our hypothesis tests. Moreover, EIA appears to 
have used the DOE SSL program’s 2012 Multi-year Program Plan and 2012 Energy 
Savings Forecast Model as the source of assumptions for AEO 2015 Commercial LED 
technologies.46 In doing so, EIA may have erroneously given LEDs greater efficiency than 
is reasonable. EIA applied luminaire efficiencies forecast in the 2012 MYPP to installed 
LED packages, which simply are not apples-to-apples equivalents of luminaires. Packages 
are always less efficient than luminaires, so EIA likely over-estimated the efficiency of 
LED technology in its AEO 2015 assumptions. From these observations, it is evident that 
more recent forecasts of LED product cost and performance are warranted - the defaults 
and the High Tech case assumptions from AEO 2015 are inadequate, may be erroneous, 
and don't capture recent relevant information. 
5.4.2.4 Updating GT-NEMS’ representation of Commercial Building LEDs 
 
 
Referring to a Navigant Consulting (2014) study forecasting expected performance of LED 
lighting products, I make several updates to GT-NEMS’ representation of LED lighting 
 
46 US Energy Information Administration (April 2015) “Updated Buildings Sector Appliance and Equipment 
Costs.” Washington, USA: U.S Department of Energy. See pages 28 and 37. 
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products in the commercial sector. I make some of the modifications to a single file through 
which GT-NEMS represents all energy-consuming technologies for the commercial 
demand sector, a file called “KTEK.” The KTEK file identifies each technology via a “t” 
value, representing the technology type; and a “v” value, representing the vintage of the 
technology. This arrangement allows KTEK to represent future improved versions of a 
technology as new vintages that first become available in future years, such as a highly- 
efficient LED product becoming available in 2025. KTEK uses a set of other parameters, 
including cost-per-unit of light provided, year of entry into the marketplace, year of exit 
from the marketplace, and useful life to represent each technology. Table 14 below 
describes my modifications to KTEK, including the justification for each modification 
made. 
 
Table 14: List of modifications to KTEK file to represent recent expectations 


























new y2: 2013 
 
 
this product should phase out sooner to reflect 






















names = LED Edison 
2013 typical; new y2: 
2020; new eff: 59.6; 
new c1: 115.27 
The expected cost of a LED A-lamp in 2013 is 
$115.27/k-lm according to Navigant 
projections. The expected efficacy of a LED 
A-lamp in 2013 is 59.6 lm/W according to 
Navigant projections. This product should 
phase out sooner to reflect improvement in 

















new y2: 2030; new 
eff: 88.15; new c1: 
61.31; new c4 
(Subsidy_111d_cost): 
0 
The expected cost of a LED A-lamp in 2020 is 
$61.31/k-lm according to Navigant 
projections. The expected efficacy of a LED 
A-lamp in 2020 is 88.15 lm/W according to 
Navigant projections. Our default scenario 
will have no subsidies to the technologies. 
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Table 15, continued: List of modifications to KTEK file to represent recent 

























new technology name 
= LED Edison 2025 
typical; new y1: 
2023;  new  y2: 2030; 
new eff: 102.9; new 





The expected cost of a LED A-lamp in 2025 is 
$42.12/k-lm according to Navigant 
projections. The expected efficacy of a LED 
A-lamp in 2025 is 102.9 lm/W according to 
Navigant projections. Our default scenario 






















new technology name 
= LED Edison 2030 
typical; new y1: 
2030new   y2:   2040; 
new eff: 114.98; new 




The expected cost of a LED A-lamp in 2025 is 
$30.99/k-lm according to Navigant 
projections. The expected efficacy of a LED 
A-lamp in 2025 is 114.98 lm/W according to 
Navigant projections. Our default scenario 
will have no subsidies to the technologies. We 













new technology name 
= LED T8 2013 
typical; new y2: 
2020new eff: 167.66; 
new c1: 85.64 
The expected cost of a LED troffer in 2013 is 
$85.64/k-lm according to Navigant 
projections. The expected efficacy of a LED 




















new technology name 
= LED T8 2017; new 
y2: 2023new eff: 





The expected cost of a LED troffer in 2013 is 
$59.89/k-lm according to Navigant 
projections. The expected efficacy of a LED 
troffer in 2013 is 119.1 lm/W according to 
Navigant projections. Our default scenario 
















new technology name 
= LED T8 2023 
typical; new y1: 
2023new   y2:   2030; 
new eff: 142.4; new 
c1: 36.01; ; ; ; 
The expected cost of a LED troffer in 2013 is 
$36.01/k-lm according to Navigant 
projections. The expected efficacy of a LED 
troffer in 2013 is 142.4 lm/W according to 
Navigant projections. Our default scenario 















new eff: 167.67; new 
c1: 23.02 
The expected cost of a LED troffer in 2013 is 
$23.02/k-lm according to Navigant 
projections. The expected efficacy of a LED 
troffer in 2013 is 167.67 lm/W according to 
Navigant projections. 
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Table 16, continued: List of modifications to KTEK file to represent recent 

















changed this vintage 
to match changed 
v=24 for the same 
technology 
for some reason the default KTEK file has two 
product specifications, t=25:v=27; and 
t=26:v=14, with the same parameters. Don't 












changed this vintage 
to match changed 
















changed this vintage 
to match changed 
















changed this vintage 
to match changed 


























new technology name 
=  LED  100 HPS_LB 
2013 typical; new  eff 
= 82.6new c1 = 84.80 
2013 value for efficacy (lm/W) of roadway 
and parking area lamps is 82.6 using PNNL 
formulae; 2013 value for cost of ($/k-lm) 
roadway and parking area lamps is 82.6 using 
PNNL formulae; Changed name to reflect that 
the data I used here come from the 2013 values 
























new y2 = 2025; new 
technology name = 
LED 100 HPS_LB 
2020 typicalnew eff = 
114.11; new c1 = 
45.11; new c4 = 0 
2020 value for efficacy (lm/W) of roadway 
and parking area lamps is 114.11 using PNNL 
formulae; 2020 value for cost of ($/k-lm) 
roadway and parking area lamps is 45.11 using 
PNNL formulae; Changed name to reflect that 
the data I used here come from the 2020 values 
























new y1 = 2025; new 
y2 = 2035new 
technology name = 
LED    100  HPS_LB 
2025 typical; new  eff 
= 130.41; new c1 = 
30.99; new c4 = 0; ; ; 
2020 value for efficacy (lm/W) of roadway 
and parking area lamps is 114.11 using; PNNL 
formulae2020 value for cost of ($/k-lm) 
roadway and parking area lamps is 45.11 
using; PNNL formulae; Changed name to 
reflect that the data I used here come from the 
2025 values from; the PP; No subsidies in my 
default case; ; 
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Table 17, continued: List of modifications to KTEK file to represent recent 



















new technology name 
=  LED  100 HPS_LB 
2025 typical; new  eff 
= 141.25new c1 = 
22.80; new c4 = 0; ; ; 
; ; 
2030 value for efficacy (lm/W) of roadway 
and parking area lamps is 141.25 using; PNNL 
formulae2030 value for cost of ($/k-lm) 
roadway and parking area lamps is 22.80 
using; PNNL formulae; No subsidies in my 
















new technology name 
= LED 150  HPS_HB 
2013 typical; new  eff 
= 82.63new c1 = 
48.29; new c4 = 0; ; ; 
; ; 
2013 value for efficacy (lm/W) of roadway 
and parking area lamps is 82.63 using; PNNL 
formulae; 2013 value for cost of ($/k-lm) 
roadway and parking area lamps is 48.29 
using; ; PNNL formulae; changed the name to 


















new eff = 114.11; 
new c1 = 25.68new 
c4 = 0 
2020 value for efficacy (lm/W) of roadway 
and parking area lamps is 114.11 using PNNL 
formulae; 2020 value for cost of ($/k-lm) 
roadway and parking area lamps is 25.68 using 




















new technology name 
= LED 150  HPS_HB 
2025 typical; new  eff 
= 130.41new c1 = 
17.64;  new  c4  =   0; 
new y1 = 2025; new 
y2 = 2035; ; ; 
 
 
2025 value for efficacy (lm/W) of roadway 
and parking area lamps is 130.41 using PNNL 
formulae; 2035 value for cost of ($/k-lm) 




















new technology name 
= LED 150  HPS_HB 
2030 typical; new  eff 
= 143.73new c1 = 
12.98;  new  c4  =   0; 
new y1 = 2030; new 
y2 = 2052 
 
 
2030 value for efficacy (lm/W) of roadway 
and parking area lamps is 143.73 using PNNL 
formulae; 2030 value for cost of ($/k-lm) 
roadway and parking area lamps is 12.98 using 
PNNL formulae 
 
Note: This table’s changes apply to all regions, i.e. all values of “r”, and apply to service- 
demand type 6 (lighting), and to “f” type 1 (electricity) 
 
5.4.2.5 LEDs for Roadways and Parking Structures 
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GT-NEMS requires special modifications made to the commercial sector module for 
modeling energy savings in roadway and parking lighting technologies. GT-NEMS 
calculates the amount of energy consumption for roadway and parking lighting through a 
combined use of SEDS data, CBECS data, and the growth rate of floorspace in the 
commercial sector. First, GT-NEMS calculates the difference in energy consumption for 
each census region between the latest Annual Energy Review (AER)’s commercial-sector 
energy consumption and NEMS’ internal calculation of historic energy consumption based 
upon the Commercial Buildings Energy Consumption Survey (CBECS). GT-NEMS labels 
the difference between the AER amount and the CBECS-based calculation as the “mistie.” 
Because the AER summarizes historic energy consumption for the entire commercial 
sector while the CBECS-based calculation reflects only buildings-driven energy 
consumption, the mistie represents commercial sector energy consumption not occurring 
in buildings – such as energy consumption by lighting for roadways and parking areas. 
After calculating the initial AER-CBECS mistie, NEMS then calculates the annual non- 
building energy consumption by increasing the amount of the mistie in each census region 
in proportion to the growth rate for commercial floorspace for the census region in the 
forecast year of interest. NEMS therefore embodies an assumption that energy 
consumption for roadway and parking area lighting grows at the same rate as commercial 
building floorspace. 
 
The research documented here models growth of the SSL technology market share growth 
in roadway and parking area lighting to 100% by 2030 - that is, the research models a 
scenario in which all roadway and parking area lighting is delivered by SSL technologies. 
Prior work supports the focus on a 100% roadway and parking area lighting market share 
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scenario (Navigant Consulting, 2014). In particular, prior work by Navigant calculates 
exact amounts of lighting energy savings under a complete conversion of roadway and 
parking area lighting to SSL technologies. Table 3.7 and Table 3.8 in the Navigant report 
display the energy savings estimated for roadway lighting and parking lighting, 
respectively – a cumulative total of 137 TWh for roadway lighting during 2013-2030 and 
172 TWh for parking lighting during 2013-2030. 
 
The research implements the savings in energy consumption for parking and roadway 
lighting by subtracting the energy savings amounts estimated in the Navigant report from 
the total non-building energy consumption estimated by NEMS in each year. The research 
uses linear interpolation to estimate energy savings for years not reported in Table 3.7 and 
Table 3.8. I subtract the sum total of annual energy savings for roadway lighting and for 
parking lighting from NEMS’ estimated non-building energy consumption in each year to 
yield estimates of non-building energy consumption that account for a 100% conversion to 
SSL technology for roadway and parking lighting. 
 
Subtracting the roadway and parking lighting energy savings from non-building energy 
consumption requires modifying the CDM source code. NEMS’ estimated non-building 
energy consumption is stored in a variable called “CMNonBldgUse”, which is indexed 
by fuel type, census division, and year. Lines 8477-8509 provide the final calculation of 
non-building electricity consumption – CMNonBldgUse for fuel 1, electricity. While 
many of the lines are dedicated to modeling compliance with the traffic signal standards 
created by the 2005 Energy Policy Act (109th Congress, 2005), the code lines 8502-8506 
are dedicated to calculating CMNonBldgUse for electricity for years after 2015. As such, 
I subtract the energy savings for the census division and year of interest from the 
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calculation of CMNonBldgUse for electricity that begins on line 8502. To reflect the 
savings from 100% conversion of roadway and parking lighting to SSL technologies, I 
first create an array in the source code that stores the lighting energy savings values from 
the Navigant report; the array is indexed by year and census division to reflect the 
structure of the CMNonBldgUse variable and to reflect that the savings apply only to 
electricity. I then modify lines 8506 and 8507 of the CDM source code to subtract the 
value of the array from the CMNonBldgUse variable for each combination of fuel, year, 
and census division. Making use of the Navigant forecast of energy savings in roadway 
and parking lighting requires apportioning national totals to the 9 census divisions; to 
apportion the energy savings, I divide the national energy savings by the percentage of 
total electricity consumed by the commercial sector nationwide made up by each census 









While the array of national roadway and parking energy savings is indexed by fuel type, 
the only non-zero values in the array are for the electricity fuel (f = 1) as lighting energy 
savings forecast by Navigant apply only to electricity. I name the array “RoadParkSave,” 





Where “MNUMCR” refers to the maximum number of regions used by the CDM and 
“MNUMYR” refers to the maximum number of years in the NEMS forecast. The 
maximum number of regions in the CDM is 11, even though there are only 9 census 
division, because the CDM uses region 10 to represent California and region 11 to 
represent the US. The CDM represents California in addition to using region 9 to 
represent the Pacific Northwest census division for the purposes of implementing 
commercial sector energy regulations that are passed only in California. I program values 
into the RoadParkSave array in the units of trillion Btus, since the CMNonBldgUse 
variable is declared in units of trillion Btus. 
 
The calculations that apportion national roadway and parking lighting energy savings use 
commercial sector consumption of delivered electricity in 2012 as the basis for 
apportionment. Delivered electricity excludes the amount of energy lost through 
transmission lines and the amount of primary energy lost via inefficiencies of power plants; 
instead, delivered electricity refers only to the electricity that was made available to the 
consumer to perform useful work. Table 2, Row 25 of the NEMS output in GRAF2000 
supplies the quantities used for the apportionment calculation. I chose to use the 2012 
commercial sector consumption of delivered electricity to implement an assumed 
proportionality between commercial sector electricity-consuming activity and non- 
building electricity consumption. 
 
To match the year indexing of the CMNonBldgUse variable, the array of energy savings 
values for roadway and parking lighting is indexed by year from 2004 to 2040. According 
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to the NEMS Restart GAMS file, restart.GDX, the COMMREP_CMNonBldgUse variable 
(representing the CMNonBldgUse variable in the CDM) is indexed by MNUMYR and 
goes from 2004 to 2040. The indexing of CMNonBldgUse. To view the indexing of the 
CMNonBldgUse variable, I first unzip the restart.gdx.gz file in the NEMS run output 
directory and then use the GAMS IDE on the NEMS server to open the resulting restart.gdx 
file. COMMREP_CMNonBldgUse resides under the “symbol” heading. See directions 
under the file “Interactive_access_to_the_NEMS_restart_file_as_gdx.doc” in the “*Doc/” 
folder of the NEMS distribution. The CMNonBldgUse variable is indexed by the 9 census 
divisions and for the US as whole (region 11). 
 
5.4.2.6 Defining analysis regions by pairing Census Divisions with electric power regions 
 
 
To address the research question and test hypotheses posited earlier, the analysis defines 
four regions as units of analysis between which outcomes can be compared. Because the 
GT-NEMS model implements two distinct topographies of regions for energy consumption 
and electric power supply, the four regions used in this analysis comprise pairings of 
regions from each topography. For energy consumption, the GT-NEMS model uses nine 
Census Divisions to divide the continental US. Conversely, the GT-NEMS model 
represents electric power supply delivery uses a set of regions based loosely on the North 
American Electric Reliability Council (NERC)’s Regional Entity regions. Given the two 
distinct topographies, choosing pairings that are geographically coincident or economically 
interrelated becomes necessary when comparing GT-NEMS’ regional calculations across 
the consumption and supply sectors. This analysis forms regions for units of analysis by 
making the following pairings within GT-NEMS’ consumption and supply topographies. 
The analysis pairs GT-NEMS’ electric power region "CAMX" with the ninth Census 
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Division, “Pacific,” on the grounds that CAMX largely represents California’s power 
sector and, because California is a major importer of electric power from the rest of the 
pacific division, the entire pacific division's LED adoption will arguably influence the 
CAMX region’s power sector outcomes. GT-NEMS’ electric power region "NEWE" 
matches the same exact geographic territory as the first Census Division, “New England.” 
Four of GT-NEMS’ power supply regions – NYU, PNYCW, NYLI, and RFCE – 
accurately represent the supply serving major load centers in the Middle Atlantic Census 
Division, so these four supply regions are paired with the Middle Atlantic Census Division. 
Finally, three of GT-NEMS’ electric power supply regions – SPSO, TRE/ERCT, and 
SRDA –represent supply serving load centers in the West South Central census division, 
and also largely share the same geographic territory – as such, these three supply regions 
are paired with the West South Central Census Division. Taken together, the regions 
formed for this analysis are summarized in Table 17. 
 
Table 18: Table of paired census divisions with NEMS EMM regions for analysis 
 
 
Census Division EMM Region 
20 – Western Electricity Coordinating 
Council / California, i.e. CAMX 
9 – Pacific 
05 – Northeast Power Coordinating 
Council / New England 
1 – New England 
06 – Northeast Power Coordinating 
Council / NYC-Westchester 
07 – Northeast Power Coordinating 
Council / Long Island 
08 – Northeast Power Coordinating 
Council / Upstate New York 
09 – Reliability First Corporation / East 
2 – Middle Atlantic 
1 – Texas Regional Entity 
12 – SERC Reliability Corporation / Delta 
18 – Southwest Power Pool / South 
7 – West South Central 
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5.4.3 Scenario nomenclature 
 
For ease-of-reading, I have created shorthand names for all scenarios simulated in this 
study. Table 18 lists each scenario with its shorthand name and a description of its key 
features. 
 






CPP_AllRS CPP_AllR, plus updates to the RSMLGT and KTEK files to 
reflect recent expectations regarding LED lighting technology 
performance 





5.5 Results from methodology 
 
This section presents the results of using GT-NEMS to analyze LED adoption and power 
sector outcomes. The section first presents demand-side results, i.e. results reflecting LED 
adoption among the four regions inspected. Each region’s results are given and a final sub- 
section compares results between regions. Then, the section presents supply-side results, 
i.e. results reflecting impacts of LED adoption on the power sector outcomes. Again, each 
region’s results are presented in a separate sub-section, and a final sub-section offers 
comparisons across regions. 
 
5.5.1 Demand-side results: LED adoption nationally and among four census divisions 
 
This section presents the modeled adoption of LED products among the four census 
divisions of interest. The results are organized by division; charts and tables appear 
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alongside description of each, and the end of this section presents comparisons and 
interpretations. The LED adoption levels are measured as “service demand” met by LEDs 
which is the amount of demand for lighting met by LED technologies. The adoption levels 
are stratified by eleven building types and three decision types. The eleven building types 
represent functional categories of building floor space and provide insight as to the types 
of buildings into which LEDs are modeled to be installed. 
 
5.5.1.1 1 - New England 
 
 
Table 19 compares the LED adoption levels within the New England region under the 
CPP_AllRS scenario to those of the CPP_AllRSG scenario. Minimal gains occur under the 
subsidy case in 2020, but by 2040 the subsidy case shows over 20% more service demand 
met by LEDs. Under the CPP+subsidy case, growth in service demand met by LEDs 
follows a gradual pattern similar to that of the CPP-only case. 
 
Table 20: Service Demand met by LEDs in New England under the CPP+Subsidy 
and CPP-only cases 
 
 
 2020 2030 2040 




























For increases relative to the CPP-ALLRS scenario in LED adoption observed in the CPP- 
AllRSG scenario, Figure 26 displays the share of the total increase attributed to each 
building type. For New England, LEDs installed in 10 (Warehouses), 6 (Lodging), and 5 
209  
(Healthcare) dominate the early growth in service demand met by LEDs, while late growth 
is dominated by 11 (Other), 9 (Mercantile & Service), and 7 (Large Office). Interme-diate 






















Figure 26: For New England, percent of the increase in service demand met by 
LEDs under the CPP+Subsidy scenario relative to the CPP-only scenario 






For increases relative to the CPP-ALLRS scenario in LED adoption observed in the CPP- 
AllRSG scenario, Figure 27 displays the absolute amount of increase attributed to each 
building type for select years of 2020, 2030, and 2040. Trends in absolute LED growth by 
building type largely follow trends observed in shares of total LED growth attributable to 
Year 
11 - Other 
10 - Warehouse 
9 - Mercantile & Service 
8 - Office, Small 
7 - Office, Large 
6 - Lodging 
5 - Healthcare 
4 - Food Service 
3 - Food Sales 
2 - Education 






































each building type, with 11 (Other), 9 (Mercantile & Service), and 7 (Large Office) 

























5.5.1.2 2 – Middle Atlantic 
 
 
Table 20 compares the LED adoption levels within the Middle Atlantic region under the 
CPP_AllRS scenario to those of the CPP_AllRSG scenario. Minimal gains occur under 
the subsidy case in 2020, but by 2040 the subsidy case shows 20% more service demand 
met by LEDs. Under the CPP+subsidy case, growth in service demand met by LEDs 


































Table 21: Service Demand met by LEDs in Mid Atlantic under the CPP+Subsidy 
and CPP-only cases 
 
 
 2020 2030 2040 
SD met by LED: CPP_AllRS (MMBtu-out) 5 50 148 
SD met by LED: CPP_AllRSG (MMBtu-out) 6 58 177 
Increase under CPP_AllRSG (MMBtu-out) 0 8 30 




For increases relative to the CPP-ALLRS scenario in LED adoption observed in the CPP- 
AllRSG scenario, Figure 28 displays the share of the total increase attributed to each 
building type. For Mid-Atlantic, LEDs installed in 9 (Mercantile & Service), 8 (Small 
Office), and 4 (Food Service) dominate the early growth in service demand met by LEDs, 
while late growth is dominated by 7 (Large Office), 9 (Mercantile & Service), and 11 




























Figure 28: For Mid-Atlantic, percent of the increase in service demand met by LEDs 
under the CPP+Subsidy scenario relative to the CPP-only scenario attributable to 
each of the eleven building types 
 
For increases relative to the CPP-ALLRS scenario in LED adoption observed in the CPP- 
AllRSG scenario, Figure 29 displays the absolute amount of increase attributed to each 
building type for select years of 2020, 2030, and 2040. Trends in absolute LED growth by 
building type largely follow trends observed in shares of total LED growth attributable to 
each building type, with 7 (Large Office), 9 (Mercantile & Service), and 8 (Small Office) 
exhibiting the greatest late-term LED growth. Worth noting is that 11 (Other) constitutes a 
slightly larger share of total late-term LED growth than 8 (Small Office), but 8 (Small 
Office) exhibits slightly larger absolute late-term LED growth; the two building types 
exhibit similar late-term LED growth overall, however. 
Year 
11 - Other 
10 - Warehouse 
9 - Mercantile & Service 
8 - Office, Small 
7 - Office, Large 
6 - Lodging 
5 - Healthcare 
4 - Food Service 
3 - Food Sales 
2 - Education 





























































Figure 29: Absolute amount of LED increase attributed to each building type for 
select years 
 
5.5.1.3 7 – West South Central 
 
 
Table 21 compares the LED adoption levels within the West South Central region under 
the CPP_AllRS scenario to those of the CPP_AllRSG scenario. Minimal gains occur under 
the subsidy case in 2020, but by 2040 the subsidy case shows over 20% more service 
demand met by LEDs. Under the CPP+subsidy case, growth in service demand met by 


































Table 22: Service Demand met by LEDs in West South Central under the 
CPP+Subsidy and CPP-only cases 
 
 
 2020 2030 2040 
SD met by LED: CPP_AllRS (MMBtu-out) 5 51 158 








Increase under CPP_AllRSG (MMBtu-out) 1 7 31 




For increases relative to the CPP-ALLRS scenario in LED adoption observed in the CPP- 
AllRSG scenario, Figure 30 displays the share of the total increase attributed to each 
building type. For West South Central, LEDs installed in 8 (Small Office), 4 (Food 
Service), and 3 (Food Sales) dominate the early growth in service demand met by LEDs, 
while late growth is dominated by 9 (Mercantile & Service), 7 (Large Office), and 8 (Small 




























Figure 30: For West South Central, percent of the increase in service demand met 
by LEDs under the CPP+Subsidy scenario relative to the CPP-only scenario 
attributable to each of the eleven building types 
 
For increases relative to the CPP-ALLRS scenario in LED adoption observed in the CPP- 
AllRSG scenario, Figure 31 displays the absolute amount of increase attributed to each 
building type for select years of 2020, 2030, and 2040. Trends in absolute LED growth by 
building type largely follow trends observed in shares of total LED growth attributable to 
each building type, with 7 (Large Office), 9 (Mercantile & Service), and 8 (Small Office) 
exhibiting the greatest absolute late-term LED growth. 
Year 
11 - Other 
10 - Warehouse 
9 - Mercantile & Service 
8 - Office, Small 
7 - Office, Large 
6 - Lodging 
5 - Healthcare 
4 - Food Service 
3 - Food Sales 
2 - Education 



































































5.5.1.4 9 – Pacific 
 
 
Table 22 compares the LED adoption levels within the Pacific region under the CPP_AllRS 
scenario to those of the CPP_AllRSG scenario. Minimal gains occur under the subsidy case 
in 2020, but by 2040 the subsidy case shows over 20% more service demand met by LEDs. 
Under the CPP+subsidy case, growth in service demand met by LEDs follows a gradual 
































Table 23: Service Demand met by LEDs in Pacific region under the CPP+Subsidy 
and CPP-only cases 
 
 
 2020 2030 2040 
SD met by LED: CPP_AllRS (MMBtu-out) 5 46 142 
SD met by LED: CPP_AllRSG (MMBtu-out) 6 53 173 
Increase under CPP_AllRSG (MMBtu-out) 1 7 31 




For increases relative to the CPP-ALLRS scenario in LED adoption observed in the CPP- 
AllRSG scenario, Figure 32 displays the share of the total increase attributed to each 
building type. For Pacific, LEDs installed in 9 (Mercantile & Service), 8 (Small Office), 
and 5 (Healthcare) dominate the early growth in service demand met by LEDs, while late 
growth is dominated by 9 (Mercantile & Service), 8 (Small Office), and 7 (Large Office). 




























Figure 32: For Pacific, percent of the total increase in service demand met by LEDs 
under the CPP+Subsidy scenario relative to the CPP-only scenario attributable to 
each of the eleven building types 
 
For increases relative to the CPP-ALLRS scenario in LED adoption observed in the CPP- 
AllRSG scenario, Figure 33 displays the absolute amount of increase attributed to each 
building type for select years of 2020, 2030, and 2040. Trends in absolute LED growth by 
building type largely follow trends observed in shares of total LED growth attributable to 
each building type, with 7 (Large Office), 9 (Mercantile & Service), and 8 (Small Office) 
exhibiting the greatest absolute late-term LED growth. 
Year 
11 - Other 
10 - Warehouse 
9 - Mercantile & Service 
8 - Office, Small 
7 - Office, Large 
6 - Lodging 
5 - Healthcare 
4 - Food Service 
3 - Food Sales 
2 - Education 





























































Figure 33: Absolute amount of LED increase attributed to each building type for 
select years 
 
5.5.1.5 Comparisons: LED adoption 
 
 
Comparing results from the four regions reveals several interesting findings regarding LED 
adoption within commercial buildings. Across all four regions, building types that are 
major lighting users do not feature as dominant LED adopters when exposed to a subsidy, 
while less-lighting-intensive building types exhibit the largest LED adoption. Unique to 
the Mid-Atlantic, warehouses come to dominate LED adoption in late 2020s and early 
2030s, but in no other region or time period do warehouses feature as strong LED adopters. 
And finally, commercial buildings of type “Other” exhibit strong late-term LED adoption 
in New England and Mid-Atlantic regions but unremarkable LED adoption in the West 




































Across all four regions, building types that are major lighting users do not feature as 
dominant LED adopters when exposed to a subsidy, contradicting the hypothesis that 
subsidy-driven LED growth among building types would be proportionate to lighting 
service usage. Education buildings, despite being the third most intensive user of lighting 
service according to EIA data,47 do not account for much growth in any of the regions or 
in any timeframe of the forecast. Healthcare buildings, the second most intensive user of 
lighting services, only constitutes a large portion of subsidy-driven LED growth in the New 
England and Pacific regions during the early term of the forecast, and in no other region or 
timeframe. Finally, Food Sales buildings – the most intensive lighting services user of all 
– constitute a major portion of subsidy-driven LED growth only during the early period of 
the forecast for the West South Central region. These results suggest that lighting usage 
alone does not drive the cost-savings benefits that motivate subsidy-driven LED adoption. 
 
By contrast, across all regions and for many periods of the forecast, building types of 
intermediary lighting intensity make up the largest share of subsidy-driven growth in LED 
adoption, further contradicting the hypothesis that subsidy-driven LED growth among 
building types would be proportionate to lighting service usage. Mercantile & Service 
buildings feature most frequently as dominant LED adopters across multiple time periods 
for all four regions. Moreover, Small Office buildings and Large Office buildings 
frequently dominate subsidy-driven LED growth in the intermediate and late time periods. 
This result contrasts the ranking of Mercantile & Service, Small Office, and Large Office 
buildings in terms of lighting usage - Mercantile & Service and Office (Large and  Small) 
 
 
47 See “Top light-consuming building types” section above discussing EIA data on lighting consumption in 
commercial buildings. 
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building types are 4th and 5th most intensive users of lighting, respectively. These results 
add weight to the counterintuitive idea that lighting usage alone does not drive the cost- 
savings benefits that motivate subsidy-driven LED adoption. 
 
As a surprising finding, commercial buildings of the very diverse type “Other” exhibit 
strong late-term LED adoption in New England and Mid-Atlantic regions but unremarkable 
LED adoption in the West South Central and Pacific regions. “Other”-type buildings come 
from a wide variety of functional categories that include both “Other”-typed buildings from 
the EIA’s Commercial Building Energy Consumption Survey (CBECS) and a few 
categories added on by EIA’s NEMS development group. The CBECS definition of 
“Other,” which includes buildings that combine agriculture, industrial activity, or 
residential functions with other types of commercial buildings (i.e. mixed-use buildings), 
categorizes buildings such as airplane hangars, telephone switching facilities, and data 
centers/server farms. To this category, the NEMS definition of “Other” adds Public Order 
and Safety (i.e. police and military) commercial buildings, vacant commercial buildings, 
and all commercial buildings not otherwise categorized. Interestingly, this amalgamation 
of so many diverse building types contributes significantly to subsidy-driven LED growth 
in the mid-term of the forecast for the New England and Mid-Atlantic regions. In no other 
regions or time periods do the Other-typed buildings play a large role in subsidy-driven 
LED growth. Moreover, Other-typed buildings are relatively low users of light – EIA data 
show Other-typed buildings barely exceeding the national average light usage for all 
commercial buildings. The average includes vacant buildings, which if removed would 
make the light usage ranking of Other-typed buildings look even less intensive than the 
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national average.48 The finding adds further weight to the counterintuitive idea that lighting 
usage alone does not drive the cost-savings benefits that motivate subsidy-driven LED 
adoption. Beyond that idea, the finding shows further discrepancies between the regions in 
terms of building types – the northern and eastern regions seem to have strong opportunities 
for intermediate-term LED growth in Other-typed buildings, while southern and western 
regions seem to have no such opportunity. Table 23 summarizes the comparisons of LED 
adoption trends between each of the four regions. 
 
Table 24: Summary of comparisons between LED adoption trends observed in each 


























Mercantile & Service, Small Office, and Large Office buildings 



























5.5.2.1 1 - New England 
 
 
Figure 34 shows the change in total resource cost categories within Division 1 – New 
England under the CPP_AllRS scenario relative to the CPP_AllRSG scenario. Each total 
resource cost category is represented as a share of the change in the region’s total resource 
cost. The total resource cost categories Purchased Power, Fuel Expenses, and Installed 
Capacity constitute the greatest share of change in total resource costs. Purchased Power 
costs make up most of the cost savings throughout the forecast period, with fuel expenses 
a close second. Installed Capacity show a pattern of savings in earlier years but net losses 



















Figure 34: For New England, the percent of total resource cost changes between the 
CPP+Subsidy scenario and the CPP-only scenario attributable to each of the total 
resource cost categories 
 
Figure 35 shows the change in electric power capacity types within Division 1 – New 
England under the CPP_AllRS scenario relative to the CPP_AllRSG scenario. Each 
Energy Efficiency Expenditures 
RPS Credit Expenses 
Purchased Power 
Fuel Expenses 
Non-Fuel Variable O&M 
Capital Additions 












































electric power capacity type is represented as a share of the change in the region’s total 
electric power capacity. The electric power capacity savings are dominated by the Coal and 
Combined Cycle capacity types, indicating that LED adoption largely avoids construction 
of additional coal-fired steam generators and gas-fired combined cycle generators. Oil and 
















Figure 35: For New England, the share of total change in capacity attributed to each 
electric power capacity type 
 
5.5.2.2 2 – Middle Atlantic 
 
 
Figure 36 shows the change in total resource cost categories within Division 2 – Middle 
Atlantic under the CPP_AllRS scenario relative to the CPP_AllRSG scenario. Each total 
resource cost category is represented as a share of the change in the region’s total resource 
cost. Total resource cost categories of Installed Capacity and Fuel Expenses dominate the 
changes in total resource costs but exhibit great volatility throughout the forecast in 
oscillating from savings to net losses. Installed Capacity shows several instances of cost 
savings followed by punctuated net cost increases, indicating several instances of 
Distributed Generation 5/ 









































postponed new capacity construction. Fuel Expenses largely follow Installed Capacity. 
Interestingly, Energy Efficiency Expenditures contribute a significant share of the total 
resource cost savings in the forecast’s early term, indicating that utilities are spending less 




















Figure 36: For Mid-Atlantic, the percent of total resource cost changes between the 
CPP+Subsidy scenario and the CPP-only scenario attributable to each of the total 
resource cost categories 
 
Figure 37 shows the change in electric power capacity types within Division 2 – Middle 
Atlantic under the CPP_AllRS scenario relative to the CPP_AllRSG scenario. Each electric 
power capacity type is represented as a share of the change in the region’s total electric 
power capacity. Throughout the intermediate term of the forecast, most of the positive and 
negative changes in capacity are dominated by Renewable Sources. In the late term, 
however, Combined Cycle capacity dominates an increase in overall capacity growth. The 
Energy Efficiency Expenditures 
RPS Credit Expenses 
Purchased Power 
Fuel Expenses 
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volatile trends in Mid-Atlantic capacity changes, particularly for renewable resources, 














2020 2022 2024 2026 2028 2030 2032 2034 2036 2038 2040 
Year 
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Figure 37: For Mid-Atlantic, the share of total change in capacity attributed to each 
electric power capacity type 
 
5.5.2.3 7 – West South Central 
 
 
Figure 38 shows the change in total resource cost categories within Division 7 – West 
South Central under the CPP_AllRS scenario relative to the CPP_AllRSG scenario. Each 
total resource cost category is represented as a share of the change in the region’s total 
resource cost. Total resource cost categories of Purchased Power, Fuel Expenses, and 
Installed Capacity dominate the changes but exhibit great volatility throughout the forecast 
in oscillating from savings to net losses. In some years cost increases in Installed Capacity 
are accompanied by cost increases in Purchased Power and Fuel Expenses, but in other 
years Purchased Power or Fuel Expenses exhibit cost increases without any accompanying 

























Capacity exhibiting savings in early years but net losses in later years, indicating that 





















Figure 38: For West South Central, the percent of total resource cost changes 
between the CPP+Subsidy scenario and the CPP-only scenario attributable to each 





Figure 39 shows the change in electric power capacity types within Division 7 – West 
South Central under the CPP_AllRS scenario relative to the CPP_AllRSG scenario. Each 
electric power capacity type is represented as a share of the change in the region’s total 
electric power capacity. In the early term, Renewable Sources dominate the changes in 
total capacity, and overall there are fewer Renewable Sources under the CPP+Subsidy 
scenario in the early term. Oil and Natural Gas Steam makes up the largest share of capacity 
savings in the intermediate and late term, with Combined Cycle contributing a small share 
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in the late term as well. The lack of increases in total capacity throughout most of the 
intermediate and late term of the forecast signifies that total resource cost increases during 
this period are attributable to new resources that are built to replace existing resources that 
have retired and been de-commissioned. Since Installed Capacity costs increase but total 
capacity does not, it follows that the Installed Capacity expenditures are being used to 


















Figure 39: For West South Central, the share of total change in capacity attributed 





5.5.2.4 9 – Pacific 
 
 
Figure 40 shows the change in total resource cost categories within Division 9 – Pacific 
under the CPP_AllRS scenario relative to the CPP_AllRSG scenario. Each total resource 
cost category is represented as a share of the change in the region’s total resource cost. Fuel 
Expenses and Installed Capacity dominate the cost savings. Purchased Power exhibits net 
Distributed Generation 5/ 
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cost increases in early years of the forecast. Installed Capacity exhibit patterns of cost 
savings in early years followed by punctuated net cost increases in later years, indicating 




















Figure 40: For Pacific, the percent of total resource cost changes between the 
CPP+Subsidy scenario and the CPP-only scenario attributable to each of the total 





Figure 41 shows the change in electric power capacity types within Division 9 – Pacific 
under the CPP_AllRS scenario relative to the CPP_AllRSG scenario. Each electric power 
capacity type is represented as a share of the change in the region’s total electric power 
capacity. Renewable Sources dominate the early-term and intermediate-term changes in 
capacity under the CPP+Subsidy scenario. Through 2030, all reductions in total capacity 
can be attributed to reduced capacity from Renewable Sources. In the late-term, however, 
total capacity savings becomes dominated by savings in Combined Cycle capacity. Net 
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increases in total resource cost without accompanying increases in total capacity during the 
late-term of the forecast imply that new capital costs are being incurred in the late term for 


















Figure 41: For Pacific, the share of total change in capacity attributed to each 
electric power capacity type 
 
5.5.2.5 Comparisons: Supply-side changes 
 
 
Comparing results from the four regions reveals several interesting findings regarding the 
impacts of subsidy-driven LED adoption on power sector outcomes, especially given the 
finding that all four regions adopt similar levels of LEDs as percentages of each region’s 
total lighting service demand. In some regions, LED adoption reduces the growth of 
Renewables and Combined Cycle generators in the late term, showing how efficient 
electric power consumption can compete with growth in new “clean” infrastructure. While 
some regions fully mitigate new capacity builds through LED adoption, other regions 
exhibit investment-shifting forward in time – suggesting that for some regions new 
Distributed Generation 5/ 














































infrastructure postponement is possible, but that new infrastructure construction may be 
inevitable. Thanks to the Clean Power Plan compliance assumed in the subsidy scenario, 
however, much of the new construction consists of relatively low-carbon-intensive 
capacity. Finally, only one region – the Mid-Atlantic Region – shows the interesting result 
of subsidy-driven LED adoption crowding out utility spending on energy-efficiency 
programs, showing an unexpected effect for a region with high energy efficiency program 
spending. 
The results enable the following specific regional comparisons of the different financial 
and infrastructure outcomes while having similar levels of subsidy-driven LED adoption. 
As for costs, while Purchased Power cost savings make up a large portion of the total cost 
savings experienced by the New England and West South Central regions, the Pacific and 
Mid-Atlantic regions save a much smaller amount of Purchased Power costs. The New 
England region experiences cost savings in almost all years, while the Pacific, West 
South Central, and Mid-Atlantic regions show a volatile pattern of savings alternating 
with cost increases year over year – indicating a greater degree of capacity postponement 
rather than mitigation in the latter three regions. The Mid-Atlantic is the only region to 
exhibit a significant portion of cost savings coming from reduced utility spending on 
energy efficiency programs. As for infrastructure, the regions exhibit several differences 
as well. Only the New England and West South Central regions’ subsidy-driven LED 
adoption appears to cause reductions in coal-fired capacity, and the share of total capacity 
reduction attributed to coal-fired capacity is much smaller in West South Central than in 
New England. The New England and West South Central regions both also exhibit a 
substantial share of total capacity reductions coming from Oil and Gas Steam units. 
Conversely, for the Mid-Atlantic and Pacific regions, most of the reductions in total 
capacity come from Renewable Sources and Combined Cycle units, yielding the 
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interesting finding that LED adoption may compete with low-carbon resources only in 
certain regions of the US. Only the Pacific and West South Central regions exhibit a 
pattern of cost and capacity changes indicating large amounts of new infrastructure being 
built to replace retiring generating units. By contrast, the Mid-Atlantic and New England 
regions’ costs largely correlate with capacity additions, indicating new construction that 
subsidy-driven LED adoption has postponed. Table 24 summarizes the comparison of 
observed trends. 
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Table 25: Summary of electric power sector trends resulting from LED adoption 
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5.5.3 Grouped results figures 
 
For comparisons, the charts of results for each of the four regions have been grouped 
together in the following figures. Figure 42 groups the results for LED adoption, Figure 43 
groups the results for total resource cost categories, and Figure 44 groups the results for 





































Figure 42: All regions’ results: Percent of the increase in service demand met by 
LEDs under the CPP+Subsidy scenario relative to the CPP-only scenario 
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Figure 43: All regions’ results: Percent of total resource cost changes between the 
CPP+Subsidy scenario and the CPP-only scenario attributable to each of the total 









































































Figure 44: All regions’ results: The share of total change in capacity attributed to 














































































































































































5.6.1 Summary of main findings 
 
The relevance of differences in the buildings infrastructure and electric power 
sector infrastructure between US regions becomes quite clear from the findings in this 
analysis. Specifically, and most importantly, each of the four regions examined adopts a 
similar level of LEDs in terms of the region’s total lighting demand met by LED 
technologies. By 2040, the analysis finds that each region meets approximately 20% of its 
lighting demand through LED technologies. Despite the similarity in level of LED 
adoption, however, each region’s electric power sector exhibits its own distinct response. 
Some regions such as New England respond to reduced demand by reducing imported 
energy (Purchased Power) while other regions respond to savings with a greater proportion 
of reductions in their own generation (Fuel Expenses). Some regions such as the Pacific 
and West South Central regions are able to reduce total capacity but still incur new 
construction costs (Installed Capacity) due to a need to replace retiring generators. Distinct 
from other regions, the Mid-Atlantic exhibits a large number of instances of postponed new 
generator construction. Moreover, where LED adoption reduces the region’s electric power 
total capacity, the type of total capacity reduced varies significantly by region as well. The 
New England region exhibits a uniquely large share of reductions in coal-fired capacity, 
while the Mid-Atlantic and Pacific regions exhibit large reductions in renewable sources. 
The West South Central region exhibits a relatively diverse portfolio of capacity reductions 
coming from subsidy-driven LED adoption, including reductions in renewable capacity, 
oil and gas steam-powered capacity, and coal-fired capacity. 
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The diversity of impacts leads to a rejection of some of the study’s hypotheses and failure 
to reject some of the study’s hypotheses. Table 25 organizes the verdicts delivered on each 
of the study’s hypotheses. 
 




Hypothesis Findings Reject,   Fail   to Reject, Future Research Needed 
1: Building types that are 
the most intensive users of 
lighting will exhibit the 
greatest LED adoption 
Buildings with most intense 
lighting usage show relatively 
low LED adoption; Buildings 
with intermediate lighting 
usage show relatively high 
LED adoption 
Reject 
2: Holding LED adoption 
constant, power sector 
outcomes will vary by 
region due to the influence 
of path-dependent factors 
Each region has a unique 
pattern of trends in both LED 
adoption and the resulting 
power sector outcomes 
Fail to Reject 
3: Greater LED adoption 
will result in lower total 
resource cost 
Most regions exhibit patterns 
of postponed costs – i.e. one 
year showing LED adoption 
reducing costs and then the 
subsequent year showing LED 
adoption increasing costs. 
Only one region shows mostly 
reductions in total resource 
costs in all years. 
Reject; 
Future Research Needed 
to explore why most 
regions postpone costs but 
one region is able to 
mitigate costs. 
4: Greater LED adoption 
will displace high- 
emitting power sources 
Some regions show substantial 
displacement of high-emitting 
power sources, but other 
regions show displacement of 






5.6.2 Why the findings are novel and interesting 
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The novelty of the study’s findings is grounded in the study’s novel methodology. While 
most studies of electric power sector emissions apply different policies to observe 
emissions reductions outcomes, this study takes a novel approach by holding emissions 
reductions constant and observing variation in compliance costs under different scenarios. 
By allowing the examined regions to achieve CPP compliance in all scenarios and allowing 
compliance costs to vary by scenario, the study exposes relationships LED adoption has 
with the cost of CPP compliance and power sector operations. Finally, while the literature 
generally finds that efficient energy-consuming technologies provide cost-competitive 
options for reducing CO2 emissions, the analysis presented here adds nuance by illustrating 
heterogeneous, path-dependent, region-specific impacts of introducing efficient 
technologies. The study’s comparison of regional LED adoption to Total Resource Cost 
(TRC) and electric power capacity outcomes under CPP compliance with a subsidy to LED 
technologies reveals the regional differences that add nuance to nation-level findings, such 
as that presented in Brown et al (2017). 
 
This study’s novelty and its connection to the study’s novel methodology also rests with 
improvements to GT-NEMS’ representation of SSL technologies and the novel subsidy 
policy implemented in GT-NEMS. Prior work has made use of GT-NEMS representation 
of interactions between the energy consumption sectors and the electric power sector’s 
greenhouse gas emissions policies (Brown et al 2017), which already represents a novel 
improvement over competing studies. However, this prior work has not included an 
accurate, empirically grounded characterization of SSL technologies for commercial 
building applications. This study provides such a characterization, involving copious data 
collection from existing works characterizing current and expected improvements in 
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commercial buildings’ SSL products. Moreover, prior work has not included a nation-wide 
subsidy policy whose representation requires the use of specific modeling capabilities 
possessed only by GT-NEMS. Prior work has also not yet combined that subsidy modeling 
with modeling to represent a cap on power sector emissions. Both the subsidy modeling 
and the combination of subsidy modeling with power emissions cap modeling represent 
unique and novel contributions of this study. 
 
5.6.3 Takeaways for policy-making 
 
The diverse responses of regions to a single nation-wide policy offer several useful 
policymaking takeaways. Electricity efficiency is rarely done for its own sake and 
generally toward the ends of more-desired outcomes policymakers expect to be delivered 
from electricity efficiency – such as co-pollutant reduction, cost savings to consumers, and 
the development of new industries such as renewable electric power. With those ends in 
mind, the results of this study prompt greater caution and forethought among policymakers. 
For example, policymakers seeking to grow a region’s renewable electric power industry 
should carefully consider whether policies subsidizing LEDs or electric power savings in 
general might foreclose future opportunities to grow a region’s renewable generation. The 
examples of the Mid-Atlantic and the Pacific regions in this study make it clear that LED 
adoption can displace renewable resources in some regions, while the example of the New 
England region shows that LEDs might not displace renewable generation in other regions. 
Similarly, policymakers seeking to reduce non-carbon pollutants from electric power 
generation should make a consideration of whether policies subsidizing LEDs might reduce 
demand in regions supplied largely by renewable generation, leading to minimal reductions 
in non-carbon pollutants. Regions such as the Mid-Atlantic and Pacific, where LED 
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adoption displaces mostly renewable generation, accompanying non-carbon pollution 
reduction may be rather slight compared to regions such as New England wherein LED 
adoption displaces coal-fired capacity. Next, policymakers seeking to reduce costs of 
electric power infrastructure should consider whether their region must undergo new 
construction or replacement construction. If future costs of power infrastructure are 
expected to come from replacement construction, as found in the West South Central 
region, LED adoption may not satisfy the aims of avoiding future construction costs. 
Conversely, in regions such as the New England and Mid-Atlantic regions, LED adoption 
avoids or postpones new construction and the associated costs, illustrating the role of path- 
dependent regional infrastructure in determining the degree to which LED adoption (and 
energy efficiency more broadly) can achieve policymaker’s cost reduction goals. Moreover 
and perhaps most surprising, policymakers seeking to lower electric power bills paid by 
hospitals and schools should carefully consider how well a subsidy to LEDs in general will 
achieve this goal – given this study’s finding that, despite being large users of lighting 
products, hospitals and schools are nowhere near the largest adopters of subsidized LEDs, 
which in fact are office buildings and stores. 
 
Policymakers intending to use energy efficient products such as LEDs to affect long-term 
pollution and cost outcomes from the electric power sector should account for the electric 
power sector’s extreme path-dependencies. Policymakers should design policies to account 
for the intervening effects of that path-dependent infrastructure – lightbulb subsidies may 
not be a one-size-fits-all solution. 
 
In designing policies that account for path-dependent electric power infrastructure when 
pursuing the goals of pollution reduction, cost savings, and renewable energy generation, 
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policymakers fortunately have many alternatives to consider. Policymakers seeking to 
reduce the costs of constructing new or replacement power plants could consider policies 
that enable competitive solicitation for replacement construction and policies that 
encourage knowledge-sharing across utilities to facilitate access to low-cost replacement 
technologies. Policymakers seeking to reduce carbon emissions from power plant 
operation might target power imports instead of domestic generation if imported power is 
more carbon-intensive than domestic generation; domestic energy efficiency (e.g. lightbulb 
subsidies) may not be the best path in such a case, and encouraging growth in clean 
domestic generation to reduce dependence on dirtier imported power might be a better 
option. Policymakers seeking to reduce local pollutants should contemplate the energy 
infrastructure that energy-efficiency-driven reductions in demand would displace – if the 
infrastructure is new renewable generation, it lightbulb subsidies may not be the most 
effective means of reducing local pollution. Technology standards or pollution taxes may 
be a more effective means of pursuing this goal. 
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS ON LIGHTING 
TECHNOLOGY PATHS TAKEN AND YET TO BE TAKEN 
 
6.1 Lessons from Path-dependency analyses of lighting innovation policies 
 
6.1.1 Path-dependency in firms: Core Capabilities can frustrate policies fostering inter-firm 
collaboration for technology development 
 
When faced with the question of why Hewlett-Packard’s spin-out Agilent abandoned its 
LED joint-venture with Phillips, Nelson and Winter’s evolutionary theory of economics 
provides key explanatory insights. This study examined relevant data on each firm’s early 
history, decision-making routines, and collaboration behavior during the 1980s, finding 
links between each firm’s established decision-making routines (i.e. “Core Capabilities”) 
and each firm’s 1980s inter-firm collaboration. The study finds that Nelson and Winter’s 
hypotheses regarding evolutionary economics hold under evidence from the histories of 
Hewlett-Packard, Philips, and each firm’s inter-firm collaboration behavior. Moreover, the 
study finds that the specific history of Agilent and its Core Capabilities inherited from 
Hewlett-Packard explain the decision by Agilent to abandon its joint-venture with Philips 
in 2005. 
 
Policymakers who design policies to affect R&D performed by firms and academics who 
study R&D performed by firms should care about this chapter because it reveals a key 
latent factor, Core Capabilities, that affects how a firm performs R&D and whether it will 
collaborate on R&D with other firms. This chapter highlights how Core Capabilities 
hampered the collaboration between two firms, Hewlett-Packard and Philips, on 
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developing new technology for SSL. Hewlett-Packard and Philips were an ideal match for 
developing SSL technology and assisting SSL innovation because of Hewlett-Packard’s 
expertise in optics and solid-state materials and Philips’ expertise in designing and 
manufacturing consumer lightbulbs. Moreover and more importantly, many policies had 
been put into place to foster inter-firm collaboration, a major policy shift from the post- 
World-War-II era in which inter-firm collaboration within the US had been discouraged by 
policy. Yet despite policies favoring an advantageous case of interfirm R&D collaboration, 
Hewlett-Packard and Philips collaborated through a joint-venture only a short while before 
Hewlett-Packard abandoned the joint-venture and SSL altogether. The analysis presented 
in this chapter reveals that Core Capabilities were to blame for the infringed collaboration 
between Hewlett-Packard and Philips. 
 
Since this chapter’s analysis reveals a factor affecting firms’ R&D performance, 
policymakers and academic researchers focusing on this area should alter their policy 
designs and research designs accordingly. Policymakers should take assessments of the 
Core Capabilities of the firms whose R&D they seek to influence and design policies so as 
to take advantage of – or at least not get thwarted by – firms’ Core Capabilities. In a similar 
manner, academic researchers interested in what drives firm R&D should look further into 
the Core Capabilities of firms of interest. Researchers should account for a firm’s Core 
Capabilities when estimating the influence of any other factor on the firm’s R&D 
performance. Moreover, publicizing analyses that establish individual firms’ Core 
Capabilities would be of great use to policymakers seeking to design policies influencing 
those firms’ R&D. 
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6.1.2 Path-dependency in patenting: Appropriability Regimes can frustrate policies fostering 
technology sharing through patent production and licensing 
 
Overall, the study’s evidence from sampled researchers’ patenting behavior indicates 
support for a path-dependent explanation for reduced patenting in the face of a policy 
designed to spread knowledge embodied in patented technologies. Teece’s Appropriability 
Regimes hypothesis holds and provides part of the explanation, but there are further 
nuances – specifically with regards to which sector a researcher is working in. As with 
related path-dependency studies, the path-dependency focus helps highlight factors that 
have contributed to countervailing effects against policy design and, in so doing, aid the 
design of more effective policies for change. 
 
The study’s use of a path-dependency framework highlighted path-dependent variables 
such as Appropriability Regimes that fluster innovative R&D policies. The study illustrates 
the influence of path-dependency on outcomes from innovative policies stimulating 
innovation in the lighting sector. By applying path-dependency to patent licensing 
requirements, the study builds upon prior findings in path-dependency. In highlighting 
factors that frustrate the aims of contemporary innovation policies towards lighting, this 
dissertation aims to inform the design of future innovation policies such that future policies 
may account for influential factors and design strategies that nullify or take advantage of 
such factors to enact change. 
 
As with any study of path-dependency, the overall finding must be one of nuance. A policy 
attempting to force sharing of patents may not necessarily discourage patent production in 
every case, but may have disparate impacts among those affected because of path- 
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dependent factors governing patent production. Theory predicted that the forced sharing of 
patents would discourage the affected parties from producing patents, but only in certain 
cases did this turn out to be true. We can conclude, for example, that if the DOE SSL 
Program expected technology expedition to occur through forced sharing of patents 
produced by Lighting-industry-affiliated investigators, the program may have defeated 
itself through a policy that discouraged Lighting-industry-affiliated investigators from 
producing patents. Conversely, if the DOE SSL Program held the same expectation for 
Materials-industry-affiliated investigators, the program may rest easy knowing that its 
Compulsory Licensing policy is not likely to have defeated this goal. Moreover, if the 
program hung its hopes on patents produced by Small Firms, the program needn’t worry – 
unless the program had specifically hoped for small, California-based startups to acquire 
and then share patents. This study has revealed many such nuances in the relationship 
between policies for forced patent sharing and affected parties’ decisions to produce 
patents. The study underscores the fact that path-dependency concepts help researchers 
understand the factors and patterns that have contributed to persistent circumstances and 
in so doing aids the design of more effective policies for change. The study uses a path- 
dependency research lens to highlight factors that an innovative policy effort did not 
capture and aids in the crafting of more effective means of creating change. 
 
6.1.3 Path-dependency in buildings and power grids: Existing infrastructure can frustrate 
policies for lighting adoption and electricity cost reductions 
 
Analyzing the differences in regional responses to policies promoting SSL technology 
adoption provides many useful takeaways for policy-making. Electricity conservation is 
rarely done for its own sake and generally toward the ends of more-desired outcomes 
248  
policymakers expect to be delivered from electricity conservation – such as co-pollutant 
reduction, cost savings to consumers, and the development of new industries such as 
renewable electric power. With those ends in mind, the results of this study prompt greater 
caution and forethought among policymakers. For example, policymakers seeking to grow 
a region’s renewable electric power industry should carefully consider whether policies 
subsidizing LEDs or electric power savings in general might foreclose future opportunities 
to grow a region’s renewable generation. The examples of the Mid-Atlantic and the Pacific 
regions in this study make it clear that LEDs adoptions can displace renewable resources 
in some regions, while the example of the New England region shows that LEDs might not 
displace renewable generation in other regions. Similarly, Policymakers seeking to reduce 
non-carbon pollutants from electric power generation should make a consideration of 
whether policies subsidizing LEDs might reduce demand in regions supplied largely by 
renewable generation, leading to minimal reductions in non-carbon pollutants. Regions 
such as the Mid-Atlantic and Pacific, where LED adoption displaces mostly renewable 
generation, accompanying non-carbon pollution reduction may be rather slight compared 
to regions such as New England wherein LED adoption displaces coal-fired capacity. Next, 
policymakers seeking to reduce costs of electric power infrastructure should consider 
whether their region must undergo new construction or replacement construction. If future 
costs of power infrastructure are expected to come from replacement construction, as found 
in the West South Central region, LED adoption may not satisfy the aims of avoiding future 
construction costs. Conversely, in regions such as the New England and Mid-Atlantic 
regions, LED adoption avoids or postpones new construction and the associated costs, 
illustrating the role of path-dependent regional infrastructure in determining the degree to 
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which LED adoption (and energy efficiency more broadly) can achieve policymaker’s cost 
reduction goals. Moreover and perhaps most surprising, policymakers seeking to lower 
electric power bills paid by hospitals and schools should carefully consider how well a 
subsidy to LEDs in general will achieve this goal – given this study’s finding that, despite 
being large users of lighting products, hospitals and schools are nowhere near the largest 
adopters of subsidized LEDs, which in fact are office buildings and stores. 
 
In designing policies that account for path-dependent electric power infrastructure when 
pursuing the goals of pollution reduction, cost savings, and renewable energy generation, 
policymakers fortunately have many alternatives to consider. Policymakers seeking to 
reduce the costs of constructing new or replacement power plants could consider policies 
that enable competitive solicitation for replacement construction and policies that 
encourage knowledge-sharing across utilities to facilitate access to low-cost replacement 
technologies. Policymakers seeking to reduce carbon emissions from power plant 
operation might target power imports instead of domestic generation if imported power is 
more carbon-intensive than domestic generation; domestic energy efficiency (e.g. lightbulb 
subsidies) may not be the best path in such a case, and encouraging growth in clean 
domestic generation to reduce dependence on dirtier imported power might be a better 
option. Policymakers seeking to reduce local pollutants should contemplate the energy 
infrastructure that energy-efficiency-driven reductions in demand would displace – if the 
infrastructure is new renewable generation, it lightbulb subsidies may not be the most 
effective means of reducing local pollution. Technology standards or pollution taxes may 
be a more effective means of pursuing this goal. 
 
6.2 Implications for Path-dependency: Contributions to existing academic debates 
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Beyond informing policymaking, the studies in this dissertation make contributions to 
path-dependency theory on par with contributions made by published academic journal 
articles and filling crucial gaps in the literature. While the important factors revealed 
through the path-dependency analyses presented in this dissertation have important 
implications for policymaking, the dissertation’ studies contribute to path-dependency 
theory through unique applications of path-dependency to new areas. As shown in Chapter 
2’s literature review, academic literature on path-dependency contains several crucial gaps 
in terms of how and to what topics path-dependency analysis has been applied. Each study 
presented in this dissertation involves an original and novel application of path-dependency 
analysis and thus expands the scope of the theory. Moreover, as shown in Chapter 2’s 
review of literature on path-dependency, published academic journal articles frequently 
serve the purpose of using path-dependency analysis to contribute a new factor that 
explains failure to innovate. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 of this dissertation perform exactly that 
task and thus make contributions on par with published journal articles. 
 
Chapter 3’s analysis expands the domain of path-dependency theory to the new topic of 
joint ventures and brings novel content to the theory by focusing on entire firm histories. 
As written in Chapter 3, joint ventures have been a common topic of research in the 
management science and business history fields, but these fields have not applied the path- 
dependency analysis framework to exploring the causes and effects of joint ventures. The 
path-dependency analysis framework has only seen one application to joint ventures –a 
study by Pajunen & Fang (2013), which focuses on the beginnings and endings of joint 
ventures between Finnish and Chinese firms. However, Pajunen & Fang’s study only 
focuses on how early events during a joint venture’s history create lock-in effects that 
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influence events later in that joint venture’s history. Pajunen & Fang’s work does not 
examine the histories of the respective firms coming to the joint venture and does not 
incorporate those histories into explaining outcomes of a joint venture. This leaves a gap 
in the literature – an application of path-dependency that examines the whole history of 
firms involved in a joint venture. Chapter 3’s analysis fills this gap by applying a path- 
dependency analysis that encompasses the whole scope of Hewlett-Packard’s and Philips’ 
respective histories. In so doing, Chapter 3 provides a contribution to path-dependency 
theory similar to that made by several published academic journal articles by contributing 
Core Capabilities as a new factor that explains the failure of joint ventures. 
 
Chapter 4’s analysis not only explores a novel topic but also brings path-dependency 
analysis to that topic for the first time. Chapter 4’s analysis is novel without the addition 
of path-dependency in that Chapter 4’s analysis studies a compulsory licensing policy for 
a specific technology. As noted in the literature review, most studies of compulsory 
licensing focus on international patent licensing discussed during WTO negotiations, and 
studies of compulsory licensing outside of this area focus on nation-wide policies. No study 
focuses on a technology-specific compulsory licensing policy. To this new area of research, 
Chapter 4 brings path-dependency theory for the first time. No prior study has used the 
path-dependency framework to analyse patent licensing, and so Chapter 4’s analysis 
expands the domain of path-dependency theory to include not just patent licensing, not just 
compulsory licensing, but compulsory licensing of patents in a specific technological 
domain. Beyond meeting the novelty of application standard, Chatper 4 also meets the 
standard of a published academic article on path-dependency theory by contributing 
Appropriability Regimes as a factor explaining failure to innovate. 
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Chapter 5’s analysis contributes to the literature on path-dependency in energy systems an 
entirely new paradigm of forward-looking path-dependency analysis. As shown in Chapter 
2’s review of literature on the path-dependencies in energy systems, the literature’s 
published academic articles apply path-dependency retrospectively. All studies reviewed 
involve a historical examination of energy systems’ evolution, taking advantage of time 
that has passed and revealed causes and effects. None of the studies provides a forward- 
looking approach that could inform policymaking before policies are implemented. As 
shown in the works by Alan Porter and others on forecasting technology pathways, 
however, path-dependency analysis can indeed be applied prospectively. The literature on 
path-dependency in energy systems has thus lagged the literature on R&D policy by failing 
to employ a forward-looking approach, leaving a large gap for future work. This is 
especially important given the strong path-dependencies present in energy systems – these 
strong path-dependencies make the need for analyses that can advise policymaking 
prospectively all the more immediate. While there is much potential for forward-looking 
applications of path-dependency in energy systems, Chapter 5’s analysis helps to fill this 
gap. Moreover, Chapter 5 makes contributions to the literature on par with published 
academic journal articles. Chapter 5 contributes several counterintuitive findings that reject 
reasonable hypotheses (and common policymaking assumptions) about how energy 
systems would behave under expanded adoption of SSL. 
 
6.3 Where is solid-state lighting going to go next? 
 
Having addressed through the Path-dependency Framework some of the history of 
innovation in lighting, we now turn to discussion of future prospects for SSL. As this 
section will discuss, the industry has recently seen a homogenization and a single-path for 
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LED commodity lamps, but new applications and growing markets for SSL specialty 
products have presented many new paths that SSL technology could take. This section will 
also discuss how projections of future markets for SSL specialty products add a cautionary 
note to the technology optimism, however, given the potential for SSL’s long lifetimes to 
reduce sales after an initial global rollout. 
 
6.3.1 Near-term outlook for solid-state lighting technology 
 
LED technologies have seen many recent improvements in efficiency and have exhibited 
a significant increase in adoption rates; moreover, researchers have recently found a wide 
variety of new applications for LED lighting technologies. Researchers still haven’t solved 
fundamental problems like reduced output (“droop”) at high current and unequal thermal 
efficiency for different LED frequencies, however, so some challenges remain. Moreover, 
now that subsidized LED commodity lamps have collapsed prices, suppliers show little 
interest in solving fundamental R&D problems with LED commodity lamps. Instead, 
recent designs compensate for fundamental problems through such measures as turning on 
more LEDs when at high currents to compensate for droop. LED flickering under 
application of a conventional dimmer will also continue to be a challenge and must be 
overcome to achieve consumer acceptance (National Academies of Sciences Engineering 
and Medicine, 2017). 
 
Several new applications for SSL have recently emerged, and more are likely to in the near 
future. One popular application that dovetails with related innovations in home networking 
technologies goes under the umbrella term of “Connected Lighting Systems,” in which 
users can wirelessly control light dimming, color-tuning, and other lighting features of your 
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home. Connected Lighting Systems vary in complexity – some systems are stand-alone 
(i.e. only for controlling the lighting in a home) while other systems interface with the 
internet and anything else connected to the home network (e.g. enabling users to control 
both the washing machine and the lighting from a single device). Moreover, various 
Connected Lighting Systems use different wireless protocols for communication, such as 
ZigBee, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, or proprietary protocols. A consortium called the Connected 
Lighting Alliance has endorsed the use of ZigBee 3.0 for Connected Lighting Systems. 
Conversely, skeptics have raised the issue (common to all home network technologies) that 
hostile actors could penetrate a Connected Lighting System for harmful purposes (Colon 
& Torres, 2017; Grau, 2015; Halper, 2016; Moore, 2016). 
 
Some observers have raised concerns regarding the impact of widespread LED adoption, 
particularly for public lighting applications, on human and environmental health. 
Emissions in the high-frequency blue-light range affects the circadian cycles of humans 
and animals and may also have effects on plants physiology. The emissions of LEDs used 
for public lighting such as streetlights in the high-frequency blue-light range have therefore 
been raised as a public health concern, in addition to increased glare and light pollution 
from LED streetlights. A “Dark Sky” movement advocates for minimal or no short- 
wavelength blue frequencies in public lighting (IDA (International Dark-sky Association), 
2010), and the American Medical Association issued a report recommending that Color- 
correlated Temperatures (CCTs) be below 3,000 K – i.e. that public lights be kept in the 
“warm” range of color, closer to the red-light end of the emissions spectrum, to avoid 
interfering with circadian cycles (AMA (American Medical Association), 2016). The 
National Academies made a formal finding that researchers should continue investigating 
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these problems and developing solutions (National Academies of Sciences Engineering 
and Medicine, 2017). 
 
Control systems combined with highly directional lighting can enable one luminaire to 
accomplish the work of many luminaires; using sensors and network controls, beams from 
a single lamp could be directed to places where light is needed instead of requiring multiple 
lamps to illuminate the same spaces. For example, sensors could direct light from a single 
lamp along sidewalk paths only when pedestrians are walking there (OSRAM, 2015). In 
addition, Combining lights with sensors has been explored in hopes of enabling such 
applications as streetlights that combine as-needed efficient lighting with crime-detection 
and automated reporting to authorities (Murthy, Han, Jiang, & Oliveria, 2015). 
 
 
With climate change on the rise and global food security on the decline, the benefits of 
being able to grow crops outside of their normal environments are rapidly rising (Weber & 
Matthews, 2008). Other types of lamps have been used to grow plants indoors and out of 
their usually climates (Duke, Hagin, Hunt, & Linscott, 1975; Helson, 1965), but new 
research is showing that you can use LEDs more effectively for the same purpose (Kim, 
Hahn, Heo, & Paek, 2004). LEDs are well-positioned to be the best product for 
horticultural lighting because of their high efficiency and their excellent ability to control 
color – plant growth responds better to certain frequencies (i.e. colors) of light (McCree, 
1972), and the ability of LEDs to optimize exact light frequencies so as to maximize plant 
growth is a strong advantage over other options for horticultural lighting. Figure 45 shows 
an example of LEDs being used for horticultural lighting at frequencies that don’t seem 





Figure 45: An example of LEDs being used for horticultural lighting at frequencies 
that don’t seem aesthetically appealing but nevertheless promote strong plant 





One emerging application of LEDs involves re-purposing them for communication instead 
of illumination. Under the umbrella term of Visual Light Communication (VLC), or “Li- 
Fi,” LED light sources are finely controlled at high-emissions frequencies to rapidly emit 
information in the same manner as that of radio waves in contemporary Wi-Fi technology. 
Potential exists for Li-Fi to be faster than Wi-Fi (Chi et al., 2015), possibly up to 100 times 
faster (“Li-Fi 100 times faster than Wi-Fi,” 2015). Challenges are that Li-Fi requires an 
uninterrupted path between the emitter and receiver, i.e. no walls or objects can be in the 
linear path of the signal (unlike Wi-Fi and radio which go through walls and other objects). 
An advantage is that Li-Fi is more difficult to detect without knowing in advance what the 
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path of the signal is, and if that path is enclosed (e.g. inside of a building) it cannot be 
detected using any instruments outside of the building due to the linearity of the signal, 
which minimizes potential for network intrusion (Grobe et al., 2013; Harbers & Manney, 
2014; O’Malley, 2015). In automobiles, researchers have found ways to use LEDs and 
laser LEDs for car-to-car communication as a further example of Li-Fi or VLC. Because 
the beams from LEDs are linear rather than omnidirectional, systems can be designed to 
use LEDs for directional headlights that shine on the road and not into the eyes of oncoming 
drivers. Moreover, using highly efficient blue lasers to create white light has already been 
demonstrated and can be applied to increase automobile energy efficiency (National 




6.3.2 Where are markets for solid-state lighting products going next? 
 
Globally, SSL represented 6 percent of the world’s installed lighting at the end of 2015 
(US Department of Energy, 2016c). LED sales have gone up in the past few years 
(National Research Council of the National Academies, 2013) and are projected to 
increase further - In 2020, it is projected that LED lamps will be 42 percent of unit sales, 
76 percent of revenues, and one-third of the installed base of lighting technology. 
Projections show significant growth in LED market shares ranging from 67 percent to 80 
percent by 2022. Conventional lamps are being replaced with LEDs at an increasing rate, 
but because of the LEDs’ long lifetimes sales are likely to decline after an initial wave of 
increased sales. Commodity lamp sales are expected to peak in 2020. Specialty products 
sales are expected to peak in 2022. LEDs sell fewer units but bring in more revenue 
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because they are priced higher (National Academies of Sciences Engineering and 
Medicine, 2017). Despite the increases in sales being an apparent success for the LED 
industry, some forecasts predict peaks in sales around 2020 and subsequent ~66% decline 
of industry revenue by 2030 (Pike Research, 2011). This could have huge impacts on 
employment in the SSL industry worldwide and perhaps especially in the US where 
much of the SSL industry’s R&D is still performed 




In the US, both the federal government and the California state government have been very 
pro-active with regulations on lighting during the Obama administration. The US 
Department of Energy has instituted several rounds of rulemaking to regulate lighting 
products’ energy efficiency. One industry association has claimed that the subsequent 
rulemakings have had diminishing returns in terms of energy-efficiency gains49 and 
increasing losses to suppliers’ bottom line, offering an attempted visualization in support 


















49 See Kyle Pitsor, NEMA, letter to Brenda Edwards, U.S. Department of Energy, regarding Docket Number EERE-2011-BT-STD- 






Figure 46: NEMA’s visualization offered in support of their claim that subsequent 
lighting efficiency rulemakings have had diminishing energy-efficiency returns.50 




On August 28, 2019, the US Department of Energy closed a rulemaking required by the 
US Congress’ Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA 2007) that targeted 
energy efficiency for general service lamps without issuing a final rule. EISA 2007 requires 
the US Secretary of Energy to prohibit sale of any lamp below a 45lm/W efficacy (the 
 
50 NEMA’s caption for the figure: “Effects of Department of Energy (DOE) rulemakings on energy savings 
and industry net present value. Data points indicate the manufacturing net present value of past 
rulemakings on lamps and ballasts (squares) and on other efficiency measures (circles). The horizontal line 
represents the average projected energy savings for DOE’s applieance efficiency rulemakings completed 
since 2008. The dots above the horizontal line show that some of the lighting rulemakings have contributed 
most significantly to the cumulative energy savings of these rulemakings, but there are some below the 
orizontal line that have only contributed marginally. NOTE: GFSL = general service fluorescent lamps; 
IRL = incandescent reflector lamps; MH = metal halide.” 
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“backstop standard”) if the US Secretary of Energy finds that an amendment to current 
regulations on general service lamps is necessary and the US Department of Energy failed 
to complete the rulemaking by January 1, 2020. Standards formerly proposed in the US 
Department of Energy’s rulemaking process would have had the effect of eliminating 
current CFL products in favor of current LED products for low-intensity applications 
(310lm to 2,000lm). The US Department of Energy has contended that the 45lm/W 
standard that would take effect if the rulemaking fails to conclude will automatically apply 
to each and every lighting product, but industry associations have contended that the 
45lm/W standard refers to an average across all products sold by a given lighting supplier 
(a la CAFÉ standards for automobiles) (National Academies of Sciences Engineering and 
Medicine, 2017). Currently, the US Department of Energy contends that the backstop 
standard will not apply because necessary conditions identified in EISA 2007 for the 
standard to apply have not been met, but many commenters to the US Department of 
Energy’s February 2019 proposal to end the rulemaking without issuing a final rule contend 
that the conditions have been met and that the backstop standard will become binding 
statute as of January 1st, 2020 (US Department of Energy, 2019). The regulatory 
environment will continue evolving following likely litigation against the US Department 
of Energy’s decision. 
The California Energy Commission, a state agency that promulgates regulations of 
consumer products, has used Title 20 of the California Code of Regulations to recently 
issue CEC’s own performance standards for consumer lighting technologies that became 
effective on January 1, 2018. CEC’s regulations are part of a broader effort to meet 
aggressive goals for energy efficiency set forth in the California legislature’s 2015 Clean 
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Energy and Pollution Reduction Act (National Academies of Sciences Engineering and 
Medicine, 2017). 
 
With regards to building codes regulations, the American National Standards Institute 
(ANSI)’s American Society of Heating, Refrigerating, and Air-conditioning Engineers 
(ASHRAE) Standard 90.1-2016 is the first set of building codes to be based on LED 
technology characteristics for any applications. As of 2017, only Maryland, New Jersey, 
and Vermont state building codes had adopted the previous standards, ASHRAE 90.1- 
2013, which were still based on conventional lighting technologies. Under Title 24 Part 6 
of the California Code of Regulations, California’s CEC published a set of building codes 
in 2016 that were also based on LED technologies for some applications (National 
Academies of Sciences Engineering and Medicine, 2017). 
 
With regards to regulations outside of the US, the European Commission (EC) directed 
suppliers to phase-out all directional incandescent lamps by 2016 and to phase-out all non- 
directional incandescent lamps by September 2018, with few exceptions that instead 
received higher efficiency and performance standards. The Japanese government has only 
instituted general policies toward energy efficiency that, for example, enforce efficiency 
performance for buildings as a whole. Despite these general standards, however, the 
Japanese market has transitioned to the world’s highest penetration of LED technologies 
with LED luminaire products accounting for 70% of total luminaire sales. This largely 
occurred after the 2011 tsunami and subsequent shut-down of all Japanese nuclear power 
plants, increasing the costs of electricity to Japanese consumers. The Japanese government 
has previously proposed to ban all manufacture and imports of fluorescent lamps starting 
in 2020. Cuba was the first country to ban all filament lamps in 2005, and Australia phased 
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out traditional incandescent lamps in 2009 (National Academies of Sciences Engineering 
and Medicine, 2017). 
 
6.4 What will lighting contribute to US economic growth and development? 
 
In a 2016 report, the DOE SSL program exposes a looming question on whether SSL will 
follow the paths of other recent US-based clean-technology innovations by being 
developed in the US but manufactured and assembled outside the US. In the DOE SSL 
program’s words: “to what extent will the U.S. economy also benefit from the robust 
business and job creation that will emerge as a result of the transition to SSL (SSL)?” 
Noting that the US and its public-private R&D partnerships have been at the center of 
technology development for the global SSL industry, the DOE SSL program’s report 
acknowledged the global nature of manufacturing in the industry and the possibility that 
future SSL industry growth might not happen domestically. As an example, the DOE SSL 
program pointed to the history of the solar panel industry as an example of early US 
technology leadership that was appropriated by foreign firms and resulted in huge growth 
for the Chinese manufacturing sector (US Department of Energy, 2016a). Given the ties 
between manufacturing and economic growth, the manufacturing question becomes more 
broadly one of whether or not development of SSL technology can provide, or at least 




6.4.1 Geographic distribution of the solid-state lighting industry 
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First, the sources indicate consistently that the SSL industry is a global one – the activities 
that go into producing SSL products are globally distributed and each involve global supply 
chains. Both the materials that go into the semiconductor components of SSL products and 
the tools used to process those materials are produced around the world. The DOE SSL 
program highlights this fact by presenting tables documenting the names of major firms 
involved in the SSL industry as of 2015. Table 26 presents the firms involved in producing 
the 3 major manufacturing components of SSL products – die manufacturing, package 
manufacturing, and luminaire (finished product) manufacturing. Table 27 presents the 
firms involved in the supply of materials and equipment necessary to carry out each of 
Table 26’s three manufacturing categories. From both tables, the large presence of firms in 
Asia is immediately noticeable. In most categories for both tables, Asia holds the largest 
number of firms or is tied for the largest number of firms with either North America or 
Europe (US Department of Energy, 2015, Section 8.3). 
 
Despite the clear illustration of a global SSL industry implied by the tables, reason still 
exists to hold open the possibility that SSL could foster regional economic growth. Of note 
is that the tables’ regional classifications only represent where a firm is headquartered and 
not (necessarily) where the firm conducts its manufacturing activity (US Department of 
Energy, 2015, Section 8.3).. As learned in this dissertation’s earlier chapter on the histories 
of Philips and Hewlett-Packard, both companies have long ago globally distributed both 
their R&D and manufacturing. As such, reasons still stands to believe that, despite the 
tables on where SSL industry firms are headquartered, SSL R&D and manufacturing might 
still lead to regional economic growth. 
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Table 27: The LED Supply Chain - LED Die, LED Package, and Luminaire 
Manufacturers. Source: US Department of Energy, 2015 
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Table 28: The LED Supply Chain - Equipment and Materials Suppliers (continued 





Based on discussions with industry experts, the National Academies claim that supply 
chain and cost reasons lead to most of the LED device fabrication for high-power LEDs 
being hosted in Asia. For low-power and mid-power LEDs, the National Academies claim 
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that the largest suppliers are a Taiwanese company called “Epi Star” and a Chinese 
company called “San’an”. The National Acadmies note that wafer fabrication, wafer 
dicing, and contact metallization are usually done in-house to safeguard the manufacturer’s 
processing trade secrets – in other words, there is no supply chain for this aspect of SSL 
production (National Academies of Sciences Engineering and Medicine, 2017). 
 
6.4.2 Current state of the global solid-state lighting industry and its markets 
 
The National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine provide further insight 
into the state of the SSL industry and its likely prospects for driving regional economic 
growth. The National Academies’ assessment paints a picture of an industry reeling from 
price declines but finding new applications and niche markets offering potential growth. 
The National Academies claim that the SSL industry faced a condition of oversupply of 
commodity LED lamps for the past few years and has been restructuring to accommodate 
the situation. Citing to DOE reports (US Department of Energy, 2016b), the National 
Academies claim that, between 2013 and 2016, the price of LED lamps declined rapidly 
due to a subsidized increase in output from Chinese firms in the SSL supply chain. The 
National Academies claim that, from 2010 until 2017 (and possibly beyond), the Chinese 
government provided enormous subsidies to investments in Metal-organic Chemical Vapor 
Deposition (MOCVD) equipment, a key component for growing SSL dies. The resulting 
over-production of LED elements and subsequent overproduction of LED commodity 
lamps led to massive and disruptive price declines. Simultaneously, demand for commodity 
LEDs fell as LED-powered LCD displays became replaced with Organic LEDs (OLEDs) 
for back-lighting smartphone displays and large LED displays began requiring a smaller 
number of higher-powered LED elements. The National Academies note that the resulting 
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price decline has helped put commodity LED products on a more even footing with 
competition from CFLs and foreshadows the end of incandescent bulbs and conventional 
fluorescent lighting (National Academies of Sciences Engineering and Medicine, 2017). 
Figure 47 shows some evidence for this, illustrating the decline in the cost-per-unit-of- 
illumination and the corresponding increase in total US installations for LED commodity 





Figure 47; Between 2008 and 2015, a decline occurred in the cost-per-unit-of- 
illumination along with a corresponding increase in total US installations for LED 
commodity lamps (aka LED A-Type lamps). Source: US Department of Energy, 
2016b 
 
With the decline in prices, however, affected members of the global SSL industry have 
also faced a decline in profits and have taken steps to re-structure. The National Academies 
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include Table 28 in their report, showing that all major SSL industry members saw 
declining or steady profits in 2015 – the midst of the LED commodity lamp price decline. 
The National Academies note that, as of 2017, an increasing number of firms in the Chinese 
market were either going out of business or merging with other firms; this led the National 
Academies to predict wider global industry consolidation. Moreover, the National 
Academies note that members of the industry have begun their separating commodity lamp 
production activities from their specialty lamp production activities. Many industry actors 
have divested or plan to divest their commodity lamp activities in the near future, seeing 
the commodity lamp business as presenting unattractive margins and little opportunity to 
differentiate one’s products from competitor’s products (National Academies of Sciences 
Engineering and Medicine, 2017). As examples of those who have divested, General 
Electric chose to separate its lamp production activities from its specialty product activities 
(Black, 2015), and OSRAM has divested its lamp production into a spin-off company 
(Prodhan, 2015). The National Academies expect firms who remain in the LED commodity 
lamps business to continue focusing on cost reduction but at the same time express 
skepticism about those firms laying out R&D investments to bring costs down given LED 
commodity lamps’ relatively low margins. The National Academies claim that, instead, 
those firms still making commodity lamps have moved their manufacturing centers to low 
cost locations in Asia. In their report, the National Academies make a formal finding that 
domestic manufacturing of LED commodity lamps is financially infeasible for US firms. 
The National Academies also claim that all US-based manufacturers have either separated 
operations of their commodity lamps business from their specialty lamps business or 
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divested the commodity lamps business entirely (National Academies of Sciences 
Engineering and Medicine, 2017). 
 
Table 29: Ranking of LED Manufacturers by Revenue: The Largest 10 Players in 
the LED Industry Saw Their Revenues Shrink or Stay Level. Source: Stephanie 







Given that commodity lamps are a high-volume, low-price market segment, many industry 
players are giving more attention to specialty market segments that frequently involve 
made-to-order SSL products or relatively niche applications. Some members of the 
industry are pursuing new applications (highlighted in a section above) such as integrating 
SSL control systems, using SSL products for communication, and medical applications for 
revenue growth. Fortunately for such firms, the adoption of LED specialty products is also 
increasing especially for street and outdoor lighting, retail lighting, and industrial lighting. 
Despite relatively low volumes relative to the commodity lamps market, the specialty SSL 
products market remains financially encouraging due to higher revenues (National 
Academies of Sciences Engineering and Medicine, 2017). 
270  
Importantly, the National Academies report highlights that the industry’s turn to specialty 
SSL products for growth has led to some reversal of common globalization patterns and an 
increasing regionalization of production. For specialty products such as large outdoor 
lighting products and customizable/one-off products, firms have begun situating their 
manufacturing closer to demand to reduce lead-time and shipping costs – moving their 
manufacturing facilities from Asia and into North America. Moreover, the National 
Academies expects that the next generation of SSL products will possess a large number 
of diverse features that a customer can customize on order and further expects that such 
products will of necessity be increasingly manufactured locally (National Academies of 
Sciences Engineering and Medicine, 2017). 
 
6.4.3 The Department of Energy’s view on appropriating the economic benefits of SSL 
 
Despite the global nature of the SSL industry, some firms have been motivated to locate 
some of their facilities in the US, and even in specific regions. The reasons for these 
decisions were revealed through DOE SSL discussions on how SSL could avoid becoming 
another story of US technology leadership turning into growth only for overseas 
manufacturers. The DOE SSL program asked industry executives to discuss what factors 
– including policy decisions – would most influence their decisions on where to invest 
capital and locate facilities. The executives mentioned six key factors that would affect 
their decision to locate in the US and offered examples of how each factor has in practice 
influenced an SSL industry firm’s location decision (factors and examples discussed below 
are taken from US Department of Energy, 2016a). 
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Access to markets: Some executives chose to locate R&D in the US but use contract 
manufacturers to serve markets abroad out of a desire to reach multiple markets from one 
location, such as the MOCVD equipment maker Veeco Instruments who does R&D in New 
Jersey and contracts for manufacturing in New York and Singapore. Conversely, many 
executives reported a desire to locate manufacturing in the US for advantages in accessing 
US SSL markets, such as executives with the three largest US lighting manufacturers – 




Access to supply chains: Quality control and operational integration can motivate a firm 
to locate its facilities close to those of other firms in the SSL industry, as with the firm 
CREE’s choice to source domestically for manufacturing of certain components. While 
much of the supply chain is drawn to Asia by the presence of the world’s package 
manufacturing facilities, Finelite centers its supply chain in California. Finelite’s 
executives claim that this has helped the firm respond to market requirements, possibly 





Access to innovation: Access to skilled and highly specialized R&D labor also motivates 
a firm’s choice of location. The former HP-Philips joint venture Lumileds locates in the 
US to recruit workers from top university’s materials science schools. Lumileds also stays 
in the US in order to develop its technology further by collaborating intensively with 





Intellectual property protection: Manufacturing in the US offers the distinct advantage of 
intellectual property protection, a factor that has influenced Lumileds and CREE who each 
have MOCVD operations located in the US to protect both patents and trade secrets/know- 




Labor costs, productivity, and quality: While some construct the high cost of US 
manufacturing labor as a key barrier to domestic manufacturing, that cost can be seen as a 
premium on the quality and productivity of US labor. Several SSL firms such as the UK 
firm Carclo and US firm TOGGLED have chosen to re-locate manufacturing in the US 




Government incentives: While subsidies to manufacturing are relatively low in the US 
compared with other countries such as China, state and local tax incentives have 
successfully attracted firms such as CREE and Universal Display Corporation to locate 
R&D facilities in the US. In addition, Maryland’s Cecil County has funded training for 
local LED manufacturer I-lighting alongside direct financial aid from the Maryland state 
government. 
 
6.4.4 Can SSL contribute to US economic growth and global competitiveness? 
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Given these findings, it seems possible for a US-based SSL industry to emerge. The current 
SSL industry clearly has no regional nexus and remains globalized. Findings made by the 
National Academies give the impression that part of the SSL industry, such as LED 
packaging, will remain globalized through the near future and likely beyond. Yet the 
executives surveyed by the DOE SSL program indicate strongly that many local economic 
features influence where SSL industry firms locate their facilities. Particularly, the 
executives highlighted access to specialized labor and the presence of other members in 
the SSL supply chain as key attractors. Also, global trends away from commodity lamp 
production and toward growth in specialty SSL products appear to be driving greater 
regionalization of manufacturing and other components of the SSL supply chain. 
Advantages of being close to markets – another attractor highlighted by industry executives 
– appear likely to have a strong influence on firms’ facility location decisions in the near 
future. 
 
Moreover, the industry already has a strong intermediary – the DOE SSL program itself, 
which has throughout its history been convening SSL industry members from diverse 
sectors (academia, industry, government, and non-profits) to focus on specific, commonly 
faced issues. Much of the activity driving the development of the DOE SSL program’s 
annual R&D plans (and formerly, annual manufacturing roadmaps) can be construed as the 
actions of an economic development intermediary. The political sensitivities would be 
strong and would require significant action to overcome, but – were the DOE SSL program 
to take its role to a regional level, the program could have strong potential to drive 
formation of a new US-based SSL industry. Politically, it might be most feasible for the 
DOE SSL program to adopt a role as regional intermediary in an economically distressed 
274  
region facing post-industrial decay and standing to benefit from a revitalization of R&D 
and manufacturing. However, it’s difficult to conceive of such a region that would also 
bear certain advantages named by SSL industry executives as key attractors, such as strong 
presence of top universities for supplying skilled R&D labor, national laboratories to act 
as technology collaborators, and markets with growing demand for specialty SSL products. 
Nevertheless, the DOE SSL program should be lauded for the intermediary work it has 
already performed and for tackling head-on the question of how to return the economic 
benefits of the program’s investments in SSL technology to US taxpayers in the form of a 
stronger SSL manufacturing presence and well-paying opportunities for skilled labor. 
Future work should consider how to introduce a regional (or regionalizing) intermediary 
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